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ABSTRACT 
  
Recent work examining health and well-being has identified people’s group 
memberships as important contributors to positive life outcomes. Social identification 
with these groups, in particular, has been identified as a powerful positive predictor of 
psychological well-being. In the current thesis I present five studies, two correlational, 
two experimental and one overarching study which combined the data from the 
preceding studies. Each of these studies expands upon this earlier work from within the 
social identity approach to understanding psychological well-being by examining not 
only people’s relative levels of social identification with their groups, but their 
perceptions of their own relative in-group prototypicality within these groups. Building 
explicitly upon self-categorization theory principles, the results of these five studies 
demonstrate that: (1) perceived self-in-group prototypicality can be measured separately 
from social identification with a group, and that (2) these two combine multiplicatively, 
so that people who have both high social identification and high perceptions of self-in-
group prototypicality also have the highest level of psychological well-being on several 
psychological well-being outcome measures. This latter effect occurs even after 
controlling for known factors related to these outcomes, including age, gender and 
major life stressors. Overall, this thesis provides evidence for the first time that 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality contributes to predicting whether a social group 
may be beneficial to an individual’s psychological well-being. The theoretical and 
clinical implications of the findings of this thesis are then discussed in relation to the 
social factors in the biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Overview 
 
Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 
 Psychologists have approached psychological well-being from a variety of 
perspectives. The most dominant model is referred to as the biopsychosocial model 
(Engel, 1960), in which all three factors - Biological, Psychological and Social – are 
considered to impact upon peoples’ psychological well-being. Biological factors 
(genetic, biochemical, etc.) and psychological factors (mood, personality, behaviour, 
etc.) in this model have received comparatively high levels of theoretical and empirical 
attention. In contrast, the social factors (cultural, familial, socioeconomic, etc.) have 
been relatively less well theoretically integrated. In order to fill this observed gap in the 
conceptual and empirical work, this thesis focuses on the social factors which influence 
psychological well-being. I specifically employ the social identity approach (SIA) 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) to examine 
how social psychological processes - seeing oneself in terms of a social identity and 
embodying the characteristics of the identity - may be related to psychological well-
being. I suggest that, it is only through the psychological representation of social group 
memberships within individuals, that social factors at all levels of analysis, come to 
influence their psychological well-being. I demonstrate that employing this conceptual 
framework to examine the influence of social factors in the biopsychosocial model of 
psychological well-being enables us to more fully integrate ‘the social’ in clinical 
psychology. 
 In the first three chapters, I provide a broad review of the extensive literature 
that has examined psychological well-being, the social factors important to 
psychological well-being, and highlight the insufficiently nuanced approach to 
examining these constructs. Reviewing literature in this domain will, of course, involve 
drawing upon research that touches on the biological or psychological factors, but the 
key focus will remain predominantly on the social factors. I then present the key 
concepts from within the SIA that have recently been employed to examine these 
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concepts and review the literature which, using this approach, has revealed its value in 
explaining how social factors influence psychological well-being. I then present the 
empirical predictions derived from this review that are employed in the current thesis to 
examine the underlying psychological processes by which social factors come to 
influence psychological well-being.  
 In Chapter 2, I provide an analysis of how psychological well-being is 
conceptualised, the forms it takes, how it is experienced and how it is measured. This 
informs the definition of psychological well-being I employ in the current thesis. I also 
briefly explain what are thought to be the causes of psychological well-being or 
psychological ill-health and how this knowledge has been applied to the work of clinical 
psychologists in the treatment and prevention of psychological ill-health.  
 Then, in Chapter 3, I review the research, covering a broad range of topics that 
explores the social factors that influence psychological well-being. This research 
suggests that social factors are important to psychological well-being and highlight the 
value of considering the social component in the bio-psychosocial model of 
psychological well-being. In doing this, I highlight the effects of social processes on 
psychological well-being and demonstrate there is limited integration of the evidence 
from various levels of analysis. 
 Chapter 4 then introduces a specific model of social processes, the social 
identity approach (SIA), which was originally used to explain intergroup relations but 
has recently been expanded into the area of health and well-being. I explain the value of 
employing this framework to examine the social component of psychological well-
being. I introduce concepts explained by this theoretical perspective that are essential 
for the current analysis and review some literature on the association between social 
identity concepts and psychological well-being, before making a series of new 
predictions to be examined in the current thesis.  
 In this targeted review of the social identity approach, I provide a rationale for 
examining prototypicality as a moderating variable in the relationship between social 
identification and psychological well-being. I outline the evidence that social 
identification has a positive relationship with psychological well-being, but also the 
evidence that indicates possible exceptions to this. I then explore how the concept of 
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prototypicality, particularly how it relates to determining one’s representativeness as a 
group member or ‘fit’ within a social group, relates to psychological well-being and the 
theoretical implications of this. 
In Chapter 5, I outline the specific conceptual and empirical hypotheses that I 
examine in the following empirical work of this thesis. I briefly summarise the rationale 
for exploring these concepts to explain the effects of social factors on psychological 
well-being previously outlined. I surmise that social identification will positively 
predict psychological well-being and perceived self-in-group prototypically will 
moderate its impact. 
In Chapter 6, I then present the first of six empirical studies in which I describe 
and examine the psychometric properties of a scale developed specifically for this 
thesis. This new measure of self-perceived in-group prototypicality, the Perceived Self-
In-group Prototypicality Scale (PSIPS), measures perceptions of one’s own relative in-
group prototypicality as a group member. Using data combined from four unique 
datasets, I demonstrate that this scale successfully measures this construct separately 
from social identification. Based on data obtained in the four data sets described in the 
following chapters, I illustrate that this new scale is a sound basis of measurement of 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality for use in the empirical studies contained in the 
current thesis. 
In Chapter 7, I present the results from two correlational studies (Studies 2 and 3), 
examining two different university student identities (student residential hall and 
Australian National University student). In both studies, I measure social identification, 
relative levels of self-in-group prototypicality and examine the relationship between 
these variables and a number of measures of psychological well-being. I find a strong 
positive relationship between social identification and psychological well-being, and 
that prototypically does moderate the positive effects of social identification for a range 
of psychological well-being measures, in a number of ways. Because this was tested in 
two separate studies, with the second including a slightly different measure of 
depression, I was able to examine if, indeed, the nature of the moderation was different 
across salient identities and for different measures of psychological well-being. To 
further examine if there was any causal relationship between prototypicality levels and 
psychological well-being, the nature of the effects shown in Studies 2 and 3 were then 
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examined in two experimental studies (Studies 4 and 5), reported in the following 
chapter.  
In Chapter 8, I then present the results of these two experimental studies (Studies 
4 and 5). These studies examined the effects of the same two independent variables: 
social identification (high/low) and perceived self-in-group prototypically (high/low), 
on six dependent measures of psychological well-being (including Satisfaction with life, 
Social Support, Social Connectedness, Depression, Anxiety and Stress). In both Studies 
4 and 5, a manipulation of perceived self-in-group prototypicality was employed to 
examine the causal role of this variable and determine if its impact on psychological 
well-being was independent of social identification. The manipulation of prototypicality 
occurred via the provision of feedback on the results participants obtained on bogus 
psychological tests. In both cases the bogus psychological test feigned measuring 
participants’ degree of ‘typicality’. The bogus ‘psychological test’ used in Study 4 was 
an Implicit Attitudes Test (adapted from Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), 
while in Study 5 it was a Personal Attributes Test (developed for this thesis). In both 
cases the bogus feedback was presented in the same format, with participants being 
informed that they were either high or low in prototypicality compared to other ANU 
Students. This was a particularly difficult manipulation to instantiate effectively as it 
essentially attempts to tell individuals that what they may consciously think of 
themselves may be different to what their actual perceptions may be. The measure of 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality (PSIPS), developed for this thesis, was also 
included in both studies and served as a manipulation check. Unfortunately there was no 
significant effect on the PSIPS as a function of the prototypicality manipulation. Hence 
an analysis of measured prototypicality (PSIPS) was then conducted to examine patterns 
consistent with those examined in Studies 2 and 3. This analysis revealed that perceived 
self-in-group prototypicality did again moderate the positive effects of social 
identification on a number of measures of psychological well-being. 
In both Studies 4 and 5, the ANU student identity was the constant salient social 
identity employed. However, the specified comparison out-group in the PSIPS items 
differed between these two studies. In Study 4, the out-group specified was students 
from a lower status vocational educational institution (‘TAFE students’), while in Study 
5 it was broadly defined as ‘students from another institution’. This enabled me to 
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examine the influence of comparative fit processes (defined more fully later in this 
thesis) on one’s own relative in-group prototypicality for a valued social identity and its 
impact on psychological well-being.  
Chapter 9 then presents the results of Study 6. In this study the data from Studies 
2, 3, 4 and 5 (presented in the previous two chapters of this thesis) were compiled and 
analysed. This final study, therefore, provided a larger sample size and the ability to 
clarify any inconsistency in patterns of significant moderation effects of relative in-
group prototypicality on social identification’s relationship with psychological well-
being. After accounting for the effects of being in the correlational studies (2 and 3) or 
the experimental studies (4 and 5), and covariates of age, gender, English as a second 
language and experience of a major life stressor in the last six months, the combination 
of higher identification and higher prototypicality consistently predicted higher levels of 
psychological well-being. Combined, these results therefore provided evidence for the 
first time that there is value to one’s psychological well-being from seeing oneself in 
terms of a social group identity and embodying the attributes of a social identity.  
 In Chapter 10, I summarise the findings of all five studies and their contribution 
to the overall research program. In doing so I demonstrate that the social identity 
approach provides an important and, as yet, not fully recognised conceptual framework 
from which to examine social processes in psychological well-being. I show how the 
extent to which one sees oneself in terms of a social identity and as embodying the 
attributes of that identity constructs one’s sense of psychological well-being. For the 
first time, through measuring perceived self-in-group prototypicality and social 
identification separately and examining how these two concepts interact, I demonstrate 
that social identity processes are able to explain and successfully predict psychological 
well-being. I then discuss the implications of these empirical findings for social identity 
theory and how they may relate, and could be applied to, clinical psychology’s 
conceptualisation of social factors in the biopsychosocial model and to applied 
prevention and intervention programs that seek to enhance psychological well-being. 
Some limitations of the current research program are also outlined and addressed in this 
final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Psychological Well-being 
 
Chapter Overview 
 Psychological well-being is a concept used regularly in the psychological 
literature and practice of clinical psychologists, but eludes precise definition. For 
example, some define it abstractly (e.g., Waterman, 2008), others define it operationally 
(e.g., Diener, 1984), and yet others define it in terms of a specific measure (e.g., Ryff & 
Singer, 1996) and of course it is also defined, by clinicians, in terms of symptomatology 
and clinical presentation (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The term 
‘psychological well-being’, can therefore describe a range of experience from complete 
well-being to ill-health (i.e. the presence of symptoms of psychopathology or mental 
illness). In this chapter, I review the different conceptualisations of psychological well-
being in the literature, before I propose a definition of psychological well-being for the 
current work. 
 The biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being states that biological, 
psychological and social factors, and their interactions, contribute to psychological 
well-being (Engel, 1980). A review of the extensive and broad based theoretical and 
empirical literature reveals that the biological and psychological factors have received 
considerable attention (Borrell-Carrió, Suchman, & Epstein, 2004; Deiner, Suh, Lucas, 
Smith, 1999; Engel, 1960; Hankin, & Abela, 2005; Huppert, 2009), whereas, the social 
components to psychological well-being have been less well integrated (Kessler, Price 
& Wortman, 1985; Coyne & Downey, 1991; Cruwys, 2014). For this reason, the focus 
of this thesis is on the social contributors to psychological well-being. Therefore, the 
current chapter’s review of the psychological well-being literature focuses primarily on 
psychological well-being in terms of individuals subjective judgments of their own 
well-being as these are most likely to be impacted by social processes. The focus of this 
review will also remain on psychological well-being at more sub-clinical levels, 
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING  
 
  
   7 
because clinical levels of severe psychopathology are shown to have a strong biological 
component (Zuckerman, 1999). This in no way negates the growing evidence of the 
importance of social processes in the aetiology, prevention and treatment of serious 
psychopathology (Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam, & Jetten, 2014), but instead 
emphasises the effects of social factors on subjective experience, which may not 
necessarily always constitute the presence of symptoms of severe mental illness (Burns 
& Machin, 2013). However, while the focus of this thesis is on the sub-clinical end of 
the psychological well-being continuum, the processes examined may in fact contribute 
to our understanding of social processes’ effects on psychological well-being across this 
whole continuum. Considering psychological well-being in this way facilitates my 
review of the broadest possible extant literature on psychological well-being and its 
social contributors within this thesis. 
 
Defining Psychological Well-being 
 Historically, psychological research and practice concerned with human 
psychological well-being has focused on psychopathology and reducing mental illness 
(Berrios, 1996). The dominant models within this tradition are currently the stress-
diathesis (Zubin, Stuart & Condray, 1992) and biopsychosocial models (Engel, 1979), 
which explain psychological ill health as resulting from the interaction of vulnerabilities 
(biological or psychological) and exposure to stressors upon the stress response of an 
individual (Ingram & Luxton, 2005). However, there is another perspective that 
suggests being ‘well’ psychologically requires more than being free of distress or other 
mental problems. Researchers who have used this understanding of psychological well-
being have attempted to examine factors that contribute to positive mental states as 
well. Research in this second area has largely been derived from two general 
perspectives: the hedonic approach, which focuses on happiness and defines 
psychological well-being in terms of pleasure attainment and pain avoidance; and the 
eudaimonic approach which focuses on meaning and self-realisation (Waterman, 2008). 
The eudaimonic perspective defines psychological well-being in terms of the degree to 
which a person experiences a purposeful and meaningful functioning life (Ryan & Deci, 
2001) and interestingly recognises the importance of social relationships in this domain.  
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 Despite considerable differences between the definitions of psychological well-
being from within the three approaches (disorder, hedonic and eudaimonic), each have 
uniquely contributed to our overall understanding of the construct. All three approaches 
have also equally contributed to the development of prevention and treatment strategies  
to address psychological ill health but also how to enhance positive psychological well-
being. Each approach has given rise to different research foci and bodies of knowledge 
that appear divergent, however, more recently these views are coming to be seen by 
some as complementary (Dodge, Daly, Huyton, & Sanders, 2012). Hence, recently 
developed measures of psychological well-being now generally reflect all three aspects 
of psychological well-being. Despite this recent move toward integration, there is on-
going debate about the best way to define psychological well-being (Dodge et al., 
2012). In this section I will describe each of these perspectives in more detail, 
describing how each contributes to our understanding of psychological well-being 
before examining the commonly used measures to examine this construct. 
 Developed from the hedonic perspective, and arguably the most broadly 
understood and rigorously defined model of psychological well-being, is the subjective 
well-being model (Waterman, 2008). This consists of an affective component of the 
balance between positive and negative affect, together with a cognitive component of 
judgments about one’s life satisfaction. In this way, subjective well-being is conceived 
as the maximization of life satisfaction and positive affect and the minimization of 
negative affect (Deiner, 1984; Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999). The ability to be 
happy or contented has been one central criterion of mental health and psychological 
well-being adopted by a variety of researchers and theorists (e.g., Menninger, 1930; see 
Diener, 1984, and Jahoda, 1958 for reviews). Indeed, when the perceptions of happy 
people are compared with those who are relatively more distressed, the former are more 
likely to have positive self-concept or self-esteem (Beck, 1967; Kuiper & Derry, 1982), 
feel in control and more optimistic, and higher self-efficacy (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; 
Abramson & Alloy, 1981). While the latter are more likely to have symptoms of 
depression and anxiety (Bech, Olsen, Kjoller, & Rasmussen, 2003). While each of these  
factors are known to be related to happiness, all are also similarly indicators of 
psychological well-being, suggesting some overlap between the two constructs. Overall 
the hedonic approach assumes that having more positive affect than negative affect 
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contributes to a perception that one’s life is ‘good’. The strength and stability of the 
association between subjective well-being and a whole range of health and well-being 
outcomes demonstrates that it is a powerful predictor of psychological well-being across 
the continuum. However, some theorists have argued that any one of these factors do 
not necessarily directly cause psychological well-being (Waterman, 2008). 
 For instance, the eudaimonic perspective equates psychological well-being with 
an ability to self-actualise and live in accordance with one’s ‘true self’ (Waterman, 
2008). This perspective sits within the humanistic tradition; although the theorists 
Rogers and Maslow define self-actualisation slightly differently, both equally 
emphasise the role of ‘the self’ in its manifestation. Carl Rogers (1951/2015, p. 149) 
defined self-actualisation as ‘the process of maintaining a coherent sense of self’, while 
Maslow (1943/1962) defined it as ‘the growth of an individual toward fulfilment of the 
highest needs; those for meaning in life’. From the eudaimonic perspective, subjective 
happiness alone cannot be equated with well-being but, instead, requires achievement of 
the basic drive towards self-actualisation or self-determination (Ryan, Kuhl & Deci, 
1997). More recently, within this perspective, self-determination theory (SDT) further 
specified the components of psychological well-being to include factors such as 
meaning in life, autonomy, competence, and inter-relatedness (Ryan & Deci, 2001). The 
inclusion and importance of the quality of an individual’s social connections 
(interrelatedness) to their psychological well-being in this approach is particularly 
relevant to the current thesis.  
 More broadly, other theorists have argued that self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), 
the reflection a person's overall subjective emotional evaluation of his or her own worth 
(judgment of oneself as well as an attitude toward the self), is a sufficient indicator of 
the presence of psychological well-being. Ryff and Singer (1998) also proposed that 
psychological well-being should include more specified eudemonic components such as 
self-acceptance, purpose in life and personal growth. Finally, in the emerging positive 
psychology literature, which examines “the conditions and processes that contribute to 
the flourishing or optimal functioning of people, groups, and institutions” (Gable & 
Haidt, 2005, p.104), psychological well-being has been defined in terms of achieving “a 
life of fulfilment, happiness, and meaning” (Seligman, 2011, p.12). Within the resulting 
PERMA model, psychological well-being is considered to be comprised of five core 
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components: positive emotions (feeling good); engagement (being completely absorbed 
in activities); relationships (being authentically connected to others); meaning 
(purposeful existence) and achievement (a sense of accomplishment and success). This 
approach integrates both the hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives, includes a social 
component, broadens positive emotions to include more than simple happiness, and 
recognises psychological well-being as multifactorial. 
 To summarise, while we see a lack of consensus in the literature about how 
psychological well-being should be conceptualised and measured, an emerging 
consensus is that psychological well-being consists of cognitive, emotional and social 
components. Also, it is recognised that psychological well-being is not simply the 
presence or absence of these factors, but a product of the extent of the presence of all of 
these components and how they combine (Dodge et al., 2012). Combined with evidence 
from the psychopathology literature, we see that both an individual’s psychological 
resources (i.e., cognitive and coping style, self-esteem) and exposure to external factors 
(i.e., stressors) are important predictors psychological well-being. In the following 
section, I briefly describe the literature that has examined the causes of psychological 
well-being. Based on the review of the definitions of psychological well-being provided 
above, I employ the broadest possible definition of psychological well-being, as a 
relatively positive subjective judgement of one’s life and own cognitive, emotional and 
social state to enable inclusion of the largest possible extant literature in this review.  
What Causes Psychological Well-being? 
 The causes of psychological well-being, like the definition, are complex, highly 
individualistic, and multi-factorial. Necessarily, basic and applied research has 
approached this subject from numerous theoretical viewpoints. A substantive amount of 
this work has affirmed the value of the biopsychosocial perspective for our 
understanding of the causes of psychological well-being. Empirical evidence now 
demonstrates biological, psychological and social processes interact with each other to 
affect psychological well-being. Combined with knowledge from behavioural (Jones, 
1924; Skinner, 1953; Watson, 1924), cognitive (Beck, 1963) and attachment (Bowlby, 
1969) theories (to name a few) we can now successfully predict psychological ill-health 
and understand many of the complex underlying processes from its results. It is now 
well accepted that psychological well-being is a product of the interaction between prior 
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experiences, current experiences and a cognitive, emotional and behavioural response to 
these experiences. As articulated in the stress-diathesis model (Coyne & Downey, 1991) 
there is a strong relationship between internal and external forces combining to 
influence psychological well-being. In this section, I will provide a brief overview of 
the biological, psychological and social factors that are demonstrated to predict 
psychological well-being and the explanations provided by the dominant theories to 
explain these processes.  
 It is important to recognise, however, that this review is by no means exhaustive, 
as I focus on the most significant and illustrative factors. In addition, I recognise that, of 
the factors described here, any one factor or combinations of these factors may be 
important for either negative or positive mental states, for different people and at 
different times. This reflects the complex interplay between environmental and person-
centred factors that contribute to psychological well-being. It is also important to note 
that in some cases it is difficult to categorise factors neatly into either the biological, 
psychological or social categories. This is sometimes the product of a lack of clear 
definition of the categories and sometimes because the meaning attributed to the 
specific factors can be conceptually different depending on the causal sequence of their 
effect on psychological well-being (i.e., if the factor is predisposing, precipitating or 
perpetuating psychological well-being). It is also a product of an overlap or 
interdependence of certain factors within each category, represented schematically in 
Figure 1. Indeed, it is because the three categories overlap that, together, they are 
integral to our understanding of psychological well-being. With these caveats in mind, I 
will now explain each category in more detail before briefly summarising the evidence 
that identifies the biological, psychological and social factors that predict psychological 
well-being.  
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Figure 1. The Biopsychosocial Model of Psychological Well-being 
 
Biological factors in Psychological Well-being 
 Biological factors in the biopsychosocial model refer to the aspects of human 
biology that influence general well-being. The biological factors most implicated in 
psychological well-being include brain structure and chemistry (neurotransmitters, 
hormones), genetics, and biological function (sleep, exercise, nutrition, health, immune 
response). Indeed, the effects of brain damage as a result of Traumatic Brain Injury (by 
way of damage inflicted by external forces) on psychological well-being is well 
documented (Bombardier, Fann, Temkin, Esselman, Barber, & Dikmen, 2010; 
Anderson, Krogstad, & Finset, 1999). Low serotonin and dopamine levels are strongly 
implicated in mood disorders (Nutt, 2008). The hormone cortisol has been shown to be 
essential to the regulation of the stress response in the body (Burke, Davis, Otte, & 
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Mohr, 2005) and has been linked to many physical and psychological effects, with 
implications for an individual’s well-being (McEwen, 2008). More recent evidence 
suggests specific genes may be related to certain mental illnesses (Sullivan, Neale, & 
Kendler, 2000). This highlights the reciprocal relationship between psychological well-
being and physical health or biological factors. Finally, we also know that sleep, 
exercise and nutrition play an important role in psychological well-being (Strohle, 2009; 
Pemberton, & Tyszkiewicz, 2016). Combined, this knowledge shows clearly that 
biological factors are fundamental to psychological well-being. Recent technological 
advances, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), continue to rapidly expand our 
understanding of the structures and functions of the brain and the biological 
underpinnings of psychological well-being. Most recently, the finding that the brain has 
the ability to change itself (i.e. neuroplasticity) (Doidge, 2010) and psychiatric 
medications are increasingly effective in treating Depression (Rush, Warden, 
Wisniewski, Fava, Trivedi, et al., 2009), has provided considerable hope that biological 
treatments can be employed to influence brain function, with direct and secondary 
effects on psychological well-being. 
 
Psychological factors in Psychological Well-being 
 Psychological factors in the biopsychosocial model refer to people’s internal 
cognitive and emotional factors, which inform their responses to and engagement with 
the external environment, and ultimately their psychological well-being. The 
psychological factors shown to be important to psychological well-being can be 
grouped into four categories: behavioural factors (i.e., conscious and un-conscious 
behaviour, coping skills and social skills); cognitive factors (i.e., perception, attitudes, 
beliefs, thinking, learning, memory); emotional factors (i.e., attachment, anxiety, 
depression), and self concept factors (i.e., personality, self-esteem). Many of these 
factors interact, alter across the lifespan and are shaped by environmental factors. As a 
result, researchers have found it difficult to show the exclusivity of each in the causation 
of psychological well-being (McLaren, 1998). Instead, the experience of psychological 
states, derived from the presence or absence of the above factors, are largely shown to 
mediate the impact between negative social factors and psychological well-being. By 
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way of example, of the complex relationship between psychological factors and 
psychological well-being, we find that the formation of a quality ‘attachment’ or 
emotional bond with a care giver has profound implications for the development of 
coping, cognitive, emotional and self-concept factors that predict psychological well-
being later in life. There are many theories, most notably, attachment (Bowlby, 1969; 
Ainsworth, 1978), cognitive (Ellis, 1962; Beck, 1963), behavioural (Watson, 1924;  
Skinner, 1953) and social learning theory (Bandura, 1969; 1977b), that contribute to our 
understanding of the processes by which psychological factors impact on psychological 
well-being. Combined, this large body of work has contributed substantially to our 
current understanding of the psychological factors that contribute most to psychological 
well-being. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explain the central tenants of 
all the major psychological theories that describe how specific psychological processes 
impact psychological well-being, I focus here on those most relevant to the current 
work.  
 The psychological concept of identity is considered central to how individuals 
perceive themselves and hence is a psychological process involved in psychological 
well-being (Kyrios, Nelson, Ahern, Fuchs & Parnas, 2015). It is also strongly 
implicated in the conceptual framework employed in the current thesis, the social 
identity approach. Current conceptualisations of identity suggest it is a dynamic 
cognitive system that changes and responds to contextually situated, external and 
internal experiences, to provide a response to the question “who are you?” (McConnell, 
2011; Vignoles, Schwartz & Luyckx, 2011). Identity is shown to be implicated in an 
array of cognitive processes associated with trauma (i.e. autobiographical memory, 
affect, appraisals, schema and other systems of meaning - for review see Brewin & 
Holmes, 2003; Dalgleish, 2004) which are significant predictors of psychological ill-
health (Beck, 1967). However, the cognitive developmental, personality and social 
psychological literatures that examine the relationship between identity and trauma have 
been limited in focus to personality disorders and childhood trauma, and is 
insufficiently nuanced in terms of the various aspects of self or identity. This means 
there still exists limited understanding about the aspects of identity which universally 
influence psychological well-being. Recent investigations of the social or group related 
aspects of identity and their relationship to psychological well-being suggests the social 
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aspects of identity are important to consider. The conceptualisation of ‘social identities’ 
employed in this thesis will be more fully explained later, but first, let us review what is 
known about social factors more generally in the biopsychosocial model of 
psychological well-being. 
 
Social factors in Psychological Well-being 
 Social factors in the biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being are 
generally considered all of the aspects in an individual’s external environment that are 
relational or social. As such, ‘social’ factors are broadly defined to include, 
interpersonal relationships (e.g., relationships with family, spouse, friendships), group 
level factors (e.g., social networks) and even macro-cultural factors (e.g., culture, 
poverty, education). Environmental stressors, particularly those interpersonal (e.g., 
conflict, violence) or intergroup in nature (e.g., prejudice, ostracism), are demonstrated 
to be extremely deleterious to psychological well-being (Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler & 
Schilling, 1989; Cohen & Wills, 1985; Leary, 1990). This suggests ‘social’ factors are 
very important to psychological well-being. This is most clearly evidenced by work that 
shows early childhood trauma (via abuse or neglect by carers) (Herman, Perry, & van 
De Kolk, 1989) and exposure to major stressful life events (i.e. those which are 
predominantly relational) are the highest contributors to stress (Bolger, DeLongis, 
Kessler & Schilling, 1989), later development of psychopathology (Dube, Anda, Felitti, 
Edwards, Croft, 2002; Lacey, Kumari & Bartley, 2014; Johnson, Cohen, Brown, 
Smailes, & Bernstein, 1999; Wingenfeld et al., 2011), and even mortality (Holt-
Lunstad, Smith, & Layton, 2010). Other societally determined factors, such as poverty 
or low socioeconomic status, also contribute significantly to the stressful events an 
individual is exposed to with serious implications for thier physical and emotional 
health, including mortality (WHO, 1977). Finally we also know that membership in 
certain social groups that experience prejudice (Cox, Abramson, Devine, & Hollon, 
2012), discrimination (Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014), or exclusion 
can also increase the risk of individuals developing psychopathology (Leary, 1990). 
 Importantly, however, work that has examined the impact of social factors on 
psychological well-being have also shown that a number of factors, including social 
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support, mediates this relationship. This shows that social factors can be beneficial to 
psychological well-being, and it is not the presence of stress or support alone that 
predicts psychological well-being. The emotional and cognitive (psychological) 
response a person has to social experiences appears to moderate the impact of social 
stressors on an individual’s psychological well-being (DeLongis, Folkman, & Lazarus, 
1988). People have also been shown to adapt emotionally post exposure to stressful 
major life events, so we also know that negative impacts are not inevitably (Lucas, 
2007). Therefore, the independent contribution of social factors to psychological well-
being above or beyond the biological or psychological remains unclear. Indeed, this 
view is reflected in the commonly used term ‘psycho-social factors’, which in its 
combination of these two aspects of the biopsychosocial model, suggests social and 
psychological factors are not independent. Despite this, the literature clearly 
demonstrates that ‘social’ factors are important within the biopsychosocial model of 
psychological well-being, and they do provide independent predictive power to 
predispose or protect an individual’s psychological well-being. However, there may still 
be a need to employ a conceptual model which enables the examination of social factors 
in psychological well-being more effectively. 
 Overall, the review provided here shows there is a large body of research, from 
within a variety of perspectives and theoretical approaches, which has contributed to our 
understanding of the causes of psychological well-being. However, despite the value the 
biopsychosocial perspective has brought to our understanding of the causes of 
psychological well-being, the challenge still remains to understand the processes that 
connect the biological, psychological and social factors in the manifestation of 
psychological well-being (Suls & Rothman, 2004). While we now know the predictors 
of psychological well-being, there still exists a lack of clarity about how to 
conceptualise psychological well-being, and how the biological, psychological and 
social factors combine and influence each other to determine it. As a consequence, the 
measurement of psychological well-being, and hence the predictive utility of the 
empirical work, and the conceptual progress within the literature, appears disjointed and 
incomplete, particularly in relation to the work that has sought to understand the social 
factors and processes related to psychological well-being. This I will demonstrate in an 
in-depth review of the literature that has examined the role of social factors in 
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psychological well-being, in Chapter 3. But first, it is necessary to explain the most 
common measures of psychological well-being. The analysis contained in my review of 
the psychological well-being literature provided in the preceding sections, combined 
with the evaluation below, will then inform the choice of measures used in the current 
work. 
 
Measuring Psychological Well-being 
 There are a wide range of measures used in the empirical research to examine 
psychological well-being. Some have been commonly adopted, others less so. The 
different conceptualisations of psychological well-being (described earlier in this 
chapter), are clearly reflected in how it has been operationalised. I will now describe 
briefly the most common scales used to measure psychological well-being that are 
derived from each of the perspectives (disorder, hedonic and eudaimonic). I will 
highlight the respective benefits and weaknesses of each of the measures and then 
explain the rationale for the choice of measures used in this thesis.  
 There are a large number of measures of psychological well-being that derive 
from the disorder perspective (considering psychological well-being to be another term 
for mental health). The majority of these are measures designed for utilisation with 
clinical populations and are too numerous to mention here. The Depression, Anxiety 
and Stress Scale (DASS-21) (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) and Kessler Psychological 
Distress Scale (K-10) (Kessler, Andrews, Colpe, Hiripi, Mroczek, et al., 2002) are two 
commonly used, brief, self-report screening measures of symptomatology of 
psychological ill health (specifically, Depression, Anxiety and Stress). Both have been 
extensively used in both clinical settings and large epidemiological studies (Kessler et 
al., 2002; Kessler, Green, Gruber, Sampson, Bromet, et al, 2010). These measures 
typically ask patients to rate the degree to which they have felt symptoms across a 
recent period (e.g., “ I felt down and blue” never, sometimes, often or always) and 
hence are highly subjective. They are easy to administer, and are shown to be reliable 
predictors of psychological disorder or distress, or poor psychological well-being 
(Groth-Marnat, 2009; Kessler, et al., 2002; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). 
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 Other methods of assessment of psychological well-being employed by 
clinicians include structured or semi-structured clinical interviews and clinical 
observation (Groth-Marnat, 2009). Each of these methods are less subjective as they 
require the employment of clinical judgment, typically by psychiatrists or clinical 
psychologists, to ensure diagnostic integrity. Hence, a significant limitation of the 
clinical measurement of psychopathology (psychological ill-health) is that it is often 
heavily resource contingent. Other measures of depression within the general population 
(non-clinical populations), and for use in large epidemiological studies, include: The 
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) (Goldberg 1992), the Patient Health 
Questionnaire (PHQ-9) (Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001), the Mental Health Index 
(MHI-5) (Ware & Sherbourne, 1992), World Health Organization Well-Being Index 
(WHO-5) (Bech, 2004) and the Centre for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 
(CES-D) (Radloff, 1977). One advantage of each of these measures is their ease of 
administration due to their short form. The ability of these measures to cover the entire 
dimension of psychological well-being - from the complete absence of well-being to the 
highest level of psychological well-being – is also particularly advantageous. Yet some 
measures assess depression alone, while others include factors with a particular social 
emphasis like ‘emotional ties’, which is a dimension of well-being measured in the MHI 
(Viet & Ware, 1983). The result of this is that it is particularly difficult to compare the 
results of studies that use different measures, and employ different operationalisations 
of the construct of psychological well-being. 
 The most commonly used measure of psychological well-being from the 
hedonic perspective is based on the concept of subjective wellbeing (Lucas, Diener & 
Suh, 1996), which is comprised of two components: affect (as measured by the Positive 
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and 
satisfaction with life (measured by the scale of the same name (SWL) (Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). Questions in these measures include: “To what 
degree to you currently feel happy? (or sad or frustrated)” or; “Overall, I am satisfied 
with my life”). Both these scales have been extensively validated (Andrews & Withey, 
1976) and shown to measure the construct reliably and predict most indicators of health 
and well-being (Deiner & Chan, 2011) with minimal differences across cultures 
(Diener, Diener, & Diener, 2009).  
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 The Psychological Well-being Scale (PWBS) (Ryff & Keyes, 1995) is another 
measure of positive well-being, but derived from the eudaimonic perspective. This scale 
includes six subscales to measure the six factors of this model, which include: 
autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with others, 
purpose in life, and self-acceptance. The full version consists of 84 questions, the 
medium form, 54 questions, and while the short version is only 42 questions, it is far 
less statistically reliable than the longer version. In addition, some authors argue that 
more needs to be done to ascertain the predictive advantage of measuring each factor, 
above and beyond the value of shorter scales (Seifert, 2005). One other difficulty with 
this measure is that it does not include a measure of affect, a significant 
predictor/component of psychological well-being across the literature. The Warwick-
Edinburgh Mental Well-being Scale (WEMWBS) has recently been developed to 
address some of these concerns. Using positively worded items such as “I’ve been 
feeling optimistic about the future” and “I’ve been feeling loved”, this measure focuses 
on positive thoughts and feelings and, as such, incorporates both the hedonic and 
eudaimonic aspects of psychological well-being. Both the PWBS and WEMWBS 
measure people’s experience of social relationships, with a focus on positive emotions 
derived from connection with others. These scales therefore measure a limited range of 
what could be considered a ‘social factor’ and, beyond recognising social relationships 
are important to psychological well-being, there is limited theoretical rationale for the 
inclusion of these items. Finally, the PERMA profiler (Butler & Kern, 2015), a measure 
of psychological well-being adopted within the sub-discipline of ‘positive psychology’, 
measures five dimensions of well-being: positive emotion, engagement, relationships, 
meaning and accomplishment, along with negative emotion and health. Of particular 
relevance to the current thesis is the inclusion of social or relational aspects as essential 
components of psychological well-being in these later measures and the models they are 
derived from. However, as we can see there are numerous measures developed and each 
operationalise psychological well-being slightly differently. This is a limitation within 
the literature, as the large variety of ways in which psychological well-being is 
measured in the literature, limits comparability and cohesion. It is also important to note 
that in the measurement of psychological well-being, positive interpersonal 
relationships appear to be the only socially orientated factor considered and the full 
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range of social factors known to be related to psychological well-being (i.e. group or 
societal level factors) are not considered. 
 As we can see from the above review, a lack of consensus about how 
psychological well-being should be defined has had a number of implications for how it 
has been operationalised. As noted above, the dominant measures of psychological 
well-being are very different depending on the conceptual view from which they are 
developed. This arguably has made cohesion of the literature’s findings difficult. As 
noted above, the more recently developed measures and approaches have attempted to 
incorporate the conceptual features of each of the disorder, eudaimonic and hedonic 
approaches. This supports the premise that all three perspectives may be important and 
psychological well-being should be measured as a multidimensional construct (Huppert 
and So, 2013). The current analysis of how psychological well-being has been 
operationalised to date has been used to inform the choice of measures employed in the 
current research. It is important to note that this led to the choice of a number of specific 
scales designed to assess multiple components of psychological well-being from all 
three perspectives.   
 In the following section I will briefly explain how the empirical findings of the 
large body of literature that has examined psychological well-being has been applied to 
the work of clinical psychologists. The treatment and prevention of psychological ill 
health and enhancement of human flourishing (psychological well-being) represents the 
application of the work reviewed above. The clinical psychology perspective and 
literature additionally provides some unique insights into the importance of social 
factors to psychological well-being, namely, the role of the therapeutic alliance as a 
significant relationship involved in improving psychological well-being. However, the 
following review of this literature also demonstrates that social factors have not been 
effectively conceptualised nor well integrated into current therapeutic clinical 
approaches to the assessment and treatment of psychopathology. This is important in 
terms of the current thesis, in which I will pose a conceptual model to address the gaps 
in our current understanding of the ‘social’ in psychological well-being and its 
treatment by clinical psychologists.  
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Application of the biopsychosocial model to the treatment of psychopathology  
 The knowledge that biological, psychological and social factors contribute to 
psychological distress and psychopathology has been applied in clinical psychological 
practice in many ways. Here I will provide a brief overview of how the biological, 
psychological and social factors have been generally considered in clinical assessment 
and treatment, largely from the Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) perspective. In 
doing so, I highlight the importance of considering each of these aspects in the 
assessment and treatment of psychological ill-health/psychopathology, and the strengths 
and deficits in how social factors have been conceptualised at each stage.  
 All three factors (biological, psychological and social) are considered essential 
to examine in the clinical assessment (Andrasik, Goodie, & Peterson, 2015). 
Psychiatrists and clinical psychologists obtain a thorough medical and psychiatric 
history of patients, including their developmental and family medical histories, to 
determine the influence of biological factors in the patient’s presentation. The 
assessment also always includes a history of, or current experience of, social stressors 
and supports (Melchert, 2011). Often, from within the CBT framework, particular 
emphasis is placed on ascertaining the ‘meaning’ the patient has made about stressful 
events and the impact of these on the patient’s feelings, thoughts and behaviours. 
Combined, such an assessment informs the clinician about the social and psychological 
factors most likely related to the patient’s psychopathology or distress. As we can see, 
the patient’s subjective reports are typically combined with the clinician’s observations 
and, where possible, information from other sources (police, family members etc.), to 
determine which factors are most important (Groth-Marnat, 2009). The Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (2013) also contributes to this 
assessment through provision of current knowledge on prevalence, development, risk 
and prognostic factors, gender and cultural issues and comorbidities. Clinicians then 
match a patient’s symptoms with criteria in the DSM-5 to form a diagnosis and, 
combined with their clinical judgement/experience, determine the social factors most 
likely to have or be contributing to the patient’s symptoms. Both a strength and deficit 
of the assessment is its reliance on the subjective experience of the patient and the 
clinician’s judgment to determine which of the multiple factors and their complex 
interplay may be manifestly impacting a patient’s psychological well-being. 
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 Following assessment, the biological, psychological and social factors 
implicated in the patient’s diagnosis are targeted in treatment. Therapists develop a 
formulation about the biological, psychological and social factors that precipitated or 
are perpetuating the psychological distress or disorder. Once again, this is done by 
drawing upon knowledge of the disorder and prognostic factors derived from the 
literature and clinical experience. Depending on which biological, psychological and 
social factors are most commonly related to the distress or disorder (as determined by 
evidence and clinical judgement), these are targeted in therapy with the most 
appropriate evidence-based intervention (Australian Psychological Society, 2010).  
 Depending on the assessment and formulation, a variety and combination of 
interventions can be used in treatment. For example, treatment can often include 
medication, cognitive/behavioural therapy (Beck, et al., 1979), or other specific types of 
therapies or specific skills training. There are many interventions that can be employed 
to address the social factors implicated in the patient’s presentation. I briefly explain the 
most important here. First, the clinical relationship itself could be considered a social 
intervention, by virtue of it being an important interpersonal relationship that influences 
treatment. The therapeutic alliance (the relationship between patient and therapist) is an 
aspect of treatment strongly associated with treatment response and outcomes (Martin, 
Garske, & Davis, 2000). The therapeutic alliance is often considered an essential 
component of establishing emotional safety for the patient (McWilliams, 2004) and it is 
this that is suggested to be most valuable to reducing symptomatology. The mechanisms 
underlying therapeutic alliances that provide benefits to patients have been examined in 
detail (Henry & Strupp, 1994) and appear to be important in most treatment approaches. 
Secondly, we find that specific therapy modalities incorporate interventions to address 
the social deficits or distress a patient may be experiencing. For example, Cognitive 
Behaviour Therapy (CBT) (Beck et al, 1979) commonly includes exposure and 
behavioural activation to address social factors such as social conflict, isolation or 
avoidance. Interpersonal Therapy (IPT) (Klerman & Weissman, 1994) addresses 
dysfunction in interpersonal relationships that are having a direct effect on 
psychological well-being through teaching social skills/ assertiveness. In both these 
examples the aim of the social intervention employed is to alter the psychological 
pathology/processes that mediate the effect of social stressors on psychological well-
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being, or build skills that reduce the likelihood of social stressors occurring. However, 
we still do not know whether these psychological treatments are effective as a result of 
directly enhancing the social elements of patients’ presentation or some other factor. 
 Finally, social factors are also considered in the prevention of remission and 
relapse. Social withdrawal is a common sign of the onset of psychopathology and 
assisting patients to recognise this and instead engage socially is shown to be effective 
in preventing deterioration in psychological well-being (Klerman & Weissman, 1994). 
Overall, we can see that at each stage of treatment, clinical psychologists consider social 
factors in the work they do to address psychological ill health. However, I have touched 
on the limitations in our knowledge that still exist in relation to assessment and 
treatment of social factors in clinical psychological practice. Finally, it is important to 
note that it is beyond the scope of this thesis to describe all the ways in which social 
factors are considered in relation to the opposite end of the psychological well-being 
continuum (i.e. to maintain or further enhance psychological well-being or human 
flourishing), however I contend that social factors are important to consider across the 
full range of psychological well-being, from psychological ill-health to flourishing.  
 
Conclusion 
 In summary, despite some inconsistencies in how psychological well-being is 
defined and operationalised in the literature, a substantial amount is known about the 
biological (genetic, biochemical, etc.), psychological (mood, personality, behaviour, 
etc.), and social factors (cultural, familial, socioeconomic, etc.), which contribute to its 
enhancement or deficiency. We also know these three factors combine in an intricate, 
variable interaction to predict psychological well-being. Clinical psychologists consider 
all three aspects in the treatment of psychological ill-health and fostering of 
psychological well-being. Various measures of psychological well-being generally 
include items that measure the biological and psychological aspects, but few include 
items that measure the social aspects of psychological well-being. When they do, they 
do not account for the full range of social factors that are known to be related to 
psychological well-being. In addition, there appears to be considerable overlap between 
each of the three factors, so that each is not clearly differentiated or defined. In the 
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following chapter I will be looking more closely at the full range of social factors which 
have been shown to relate to psychological well-being and demonstrate how the 
absence of a clear theoretical framework that can be used to explain the full range of 
what is considered ‘social’ has limited the integration of this aspect of the 
biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being. The aim of the current thesis is to 
employ a new conceptual framework to assist realisation of the underlying processes by 
which social factors come to influence psychological well-being, in its most broadest 
sense.  
 In the following Chapter, I review in more depth how social factors have been 
defined in the literature and the evidence that demonstrates the relationship between 
social factors and psychological well-being. Because this review draws on literature 
from largely disparate and unintegrated conceptual approaches, I have imposed a 
structure with which to assist its integration. To this end, I first examine the evidence 
that demonstrates that interpersonal factors (such as the mere presence of others, 
significant relationships and the stress/support they represent) are important to 
psychological well-being. I then outline the major conceptual models that have been 
used to explain these effects, demonstrating their lack of integration. I then go on to 
review the work that has examined the social group or macro-societal level factors that 
predict psychological well-being, and demonstrate the need for a conceptual model that 
can integrate the knowledge from these disparate areas of the literature.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Social component to psychological well-being 
 
Chapter Overview 
 While the biological (genetic, biochemical, etc.) and psychological factors 
(mood, personality, behaviour, etc.) in the biopsychosocial model of psychological 
well-being have received considerable attention, the social factors (cultural, familial, 
socioeconomic, etc.) have been relatively less well integrated. Close examination of the 
literature reveals social factors are important to psychological well-being. However, the 
definition of what a ‘social’ factor is variable, and numerous terms are used to define it 
in the literature. This has meant the conceptualisation and operationalisation of social 
factors appears ad hoc and not fully integrated, which has limited our full understanding 
of their impact. Some work conceives social factors as simply an environmental stressor 
(Bolger, et al. 1989), others as a fundamental human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), 
others postulate social concepts associated with childhood development (Bowlby, 
1969), and other’s work simply recognises empirically that the presence of others can 
have a positive or negative impact on psychological well-being (e.g., Berscheid & 
Walster, 1969). While all of this work has successfully described which social factors 
are important to psychological well-being, the empirical literature has largely examined 
them in terms of interpersonal processes or sociological groups. This dichotomy, 
however, does not cover the full range of what could be considered ‘social factors’. For 
example, it has not furthered our understanding of how the social is represented in the 
self and hence has not elucidated why social processes influence psychological well-
being, particularly when other people are not physically present or are not well known 
to the individual. 
 In this chapter, I will firstly describe how social factors have traditionally been 
defined and conceptualised in the literature and the plethora of terms used to describe 
the different ways social factors have been operationalised. I will then briefly discuss 
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how this has led to difficulties integrating the findings, from the various approaches that 
have been employed, to examine social factors in psychological well-being. In doing so, 
I impose some structure to the literature in order to facilitate description by presenting 
the empirical evidence that exists within what I consider to be interpersonal, societal 
and group levels of analysis. Namely, the evidence that demonstrates the mere presence 
of another, interpersonal relationships, broad macro-cultural processes, and membership 
in sociological groups all influence psychological well-being. In my analysis of this 
literature, I highlight gaps in our knowledge that still exist, largely as a result of the lack 
of integration of the evidence from multiple levels of analysis that use disparate 
conceptual approaches. I then contend that a comprehensive conceptualisation of how 
social factors come to influence psychological well-being is required. I suggest further 
empirical work to assist our understanding of how social group membership comes to 
be psychologically represented by individuals, and hence become meaningful to the 
individual, would be beneficial. I also highlight how social factors can both be a 
mechanism for psychological ill health, but also a mechanism for psychological well-
being. Finally, I posit the value of a new approach to examining the role of social 
factors on psychological well-being, that can address the issues I outline. Specifically, 
seeing oneself in terms of a social group identity and embodying the characteristics of 
that identity may affect psychological well-being. 
 
Defining Social Factors 
 Social factors have been defined very broadly in the literature as anything 
external to the individual or in the ‘social’ environment (Engel, 1960). In his seminal 
paper “The Contribution of the Social Environment to Host Resistance”, Cassel (1976) 
outlined the important social factors to health, which broadly included: interpersonal 
interactions with people known to the person (i.e. interpersonal relationships with a 
spouse, friends or one’s doctor) or not known to the individual (i.e. community 
members); roles in life and social networks, or marginal status in society (i.e. social 
isolation, marginalised groups or positions within groups); and cultural norms and 
dominance hierarchies, social disorganization or rapid social change (Cassel, 1976). We 
thus find social factors have been examined broadly, at three different levels: 
interpersonal, group and societal level processes. 
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 Some researchers have been concerned primarily with the impact of 
interpersonal stressors (Bolger, et al. 1989) and/or interpersonal social support (Cohen 
& Wills, 1985), or have simply reported differences in psychopathologies between 
groups (King, 1978; Strauss, 1989; Dohrenwend, Dohrenwend, Dodson & Shrout, 
1984; Eron & Peterson, 1982). In all cases, the focus has been either on interpersonal 
processes, sociological level processes or related to sociological groups (i.e. people 
individuals actually have contact with or are demographically identified as, such as 
race, gender and socioeconomic status) (Kessler & McLeod, 1985). As a result, the 
literature reveals an abundance of terms that define and describe social factors and their 
processes. For example, social exclusion, social isolation, social networks (Fowler & 
Christakis, 2008), social stressors, social support (Cohen & Wills, 1985), belonging and 
connectedness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), loneliness (Cacioppo, Hughes, Waite, 
Hawkley & Thisted, 2006), social capital (Putnam, 2001), and social engagement 
(Rook, 1990) have all been used when examining ‘social factors’ and their effects on 
psychological well-being.  
 There are also considerable differences in the operationalisation of the construct 
across the literature. For example, tools used to measure exposure to social stressors 
have ranged from life events checklists to clinical interviews (Brantley, Waggoner, 
Jones, & Rappaport, 1987; Cohen, Kessler, & Gordon, 1997; Brown & Harris, 1975). 
The work examining social capital (Putnam, 2001) and social connectedness have 
measured predictors as broad as access to phone and internet, actual contact with others 
and feelings of trust and loneliness. A variety of outcome measures are also employed 
including: feelings of social cohesion (sharing values); social support (perceived access 
to help) (Harpham, Grant & Thomas, 2002; Heitzmann & Kaplan, 1988) and emotional 
connections (social bonds and networks) (Kingley, 2006). This lack of consistency and 
cohesion in how social factors are examined in the literature creates some difficulty 
when it comes to integrating the literature. 
 Given that the original conceptualisation of the biopsychosocial model and that 
definition of social factors within it was particularly broad, the difficulties within the 
literature outlined here is not unsurprising. As Engel (1960, p.459), who first proposed 
the biopsychosocial model, stated:  
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“As the name suggests, its (the biopsychosocial models) intent is to provide a 
framework within which can be conceptualized and related as natural systems all 
the levels of organization pertinent to health and disease, from subatomic 
particles through molecules, cells, tissues, organs, organ systems, the person, the 
family, the community, the culture, and ultimately the biosphere.” . . . with 
“processes at the cellular level subordinate to those at the tissue or organ level, 
which in turn are subordinate to those at the person or community level“ (Italics 
added for emphasis).  
In addition, Cassel (1976), stated “the most commonly accepted candidates (to 
negatively impact health and well-being) in the ‘social environment’” are the 
“‘psychosocial’ factors generated by human interaction” (Cassel, 1976, p.108).  
 Certainly, the inclusion of the ‘social’ in the biopsychoosical model represents 
an important step forward in our understanding of health and well-being. As a 
consequence we also now have considerably more knowledge about the role of social 
factors in health and well-being (Carr, Umberson, DeLamater, & Ward, 2013). We also 
see strong recognition of the need to address social factors to enhance people’s health 
and well-being in both public policy and clinical practice today (WHO, 2015). 
However, while employing the broadest definition of what is ‘social’ has possibly 
enabled inclusiveness, it appears to have limited our conceptual understanding of the 
underlying processes involved. If we consider social factors can include interactions 
between individuals and within groups, it could be that the underlying mechanisms in 
each situation may also be different. Perhaps then, considering the evidence from each 
level (i.e. familiar, family, community and culture/interpersonal, group and societal) as 
distinct may provide insights. For this reason I impose this structure in this review to 
examine possible conceptual differences that occur at each level. In doing so, I 
demonstrate that the middle level, community or group, is perhaps the most vaguely 
defined of each of the levels. I will also illustrate that while the literature recognises 
interpersonal relationships and networks, groups or society level factors are all 
important to psychological well-being, current models fail to fully account for the 
effects of social groups people belong to. More specifically, the affinity people feel 
towards social groups they are a member of, and the degree to which they embody the 
attributes of group members, which occur at this group level are particularly 
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noteworthy. Especially given the considerable evidence that feelings of belonging to 
social groups, are very important to well-being and may even be considered a 
fundamental human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Indeed, the aim of the current 
thesis, was to employ a new conceptual model to address this theoretical and empirical 
gap, so we may better understand the processes by which social factors influence 
psychological well-being.  
 To deal with issues arising from the different conceptualisation of social factors 
across the literature (which appear to have arisen from the nature of its definition), and 
facilitate some structure to the following review, I have organised the literature 
presented here into three levels, the interpersonal, group or societal levels of analysis. 
However, it should be noted that the majority of the literature does focus on the 
interpersonal or is derived from sociological definitions of social factors (such as face to 
face interactions) and fails to capture group level elements to the same extent. I will 
now review this literature in the following sections, beginning first with describing the 
interpersonal level social factors and what is known about their relationship to 
psychological well-being. 
 
Social factors and psychological wellbeing at different levels of analysis 
Interpersonal level processes in psychological well-being 
Mere Presence of Others 
 The social psychological literature clearly demonstrates that people’s attitudes 
and behaviour (including those about the self) are shaped by external social forces and 
people adapt to social contexts (Marcus, 2005). Seminal social psychological studies 
identify specific social processes that influence people’s attitudes (Sherif, 1935, 1937; 
Asch, 1956) and behaviours (Allport, 1920; Zajonc, 1965). Most of this early work 
recognised empirically that the mere presence of others (Allport, 1920), including 
groups of others (Ingham, Levinger, Graves, & Peckham, 1974; Mann, 1981; 
Widmeyer, Brawley, & Carron, 1985), had both positive and negative implications for 
human functioning. Overall, this work contributed to the understanding that social 
cognition (Frith & Blakemore, 2006) is important, that it often occur beyond conscious 
awareness (implicitly) (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wyer, 2014) and has profound 
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implications for human function (Baron-Cohen, 2008; Couture, 2006), including 
psychological well-being (Bolger et al., 1989). 
 Evidence that social processes were directly related to psychological well-being 
was perhaps best illustrated by the observation that the mere presence of another 
directly influenced people’s emotions. A number of studies show that experimentally 
manipulated anxiety may be eased by the mere presence of others (e.g., Schacter 1959; 
Wrightsman, 1960), and the presence of others increased laughter (Chapman, 1973). 
Indeed, theorists such as Berscheid and Walster (1969, p.20) postulated that “when 
people feel anxious, afraid, lonely or unsure of themselves they will find the mere 
presence of others rewarding”. However, while it appeared people recognised the 
benefits of the presence of others, and choose to spend time with others when 
experiencing stress (Schachter, 1959), or anxiety (Wrightsman, 1960), whether this was 
because they were motivated to affiliate with others due to a desire to learn (about 
themselves, their skills, abilities, perceptions and attitudes) (Festinger, 1954), to reduce 
anxiety (Stroebe & Stroebe, 1997) or obtain information (Shaver & Klinnert, 1982) was 
still not clear. In addition, it was demonstrated that the presence of others could also be 
aversive or have negative implications for mood. For example, Yapko (2009) and 
Benazon and Coyne (2000) identified that living with someone with depression 
increases the likelihood of someone becoming depressed, suggesting negative mood 
could also be ‘contagious’.  
 Further work that attempted to identify the mechanisms by which the presence 
of others impacted mood posited physiological arousal (Zajonc, 1965) and evaluative-
cognitive mechanisms, such as evaluation apprehension and attention (Cottrell, Wack, 
Sekerak & Rittle, 1968), were responsible for the impact of the presence of others on 
mood. Evidence of the automacy of humans to engage in social comparison (whereby 
we compare our abilities and opinions to that of others) (Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995; 
Stapel & Suls, 2004) certainly revealed implicit social cognitive processes underlie 
peoples mutual influence of each other’s emotions. Some theorists explained the arousal 
effects of the presence of others in terms of sociobiological processes, which are “the 
result of the survival benefit of social relationships and collective action, which 
promoted genetic selection of organisms who find social contact and relationships 
rewarding and the lack of such contact and relatedness aversive.” (Bovard, 1985, p. 
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103). A meta-analysis of over 65 studies comparing the ability of social stress appraisal 
or manipulated emotional state to explain cortisol or immune responses, found social 
cognitive processes (i.e. appraisals, rumination, worry and social threat) were more 
important than global mood states in predicting physiological stress responses (Denson, 
Spanovic & Miller, 2009). This suggests that social cognitive processes, as opposed to 
arousal alone, better explains how social factors impact psychological well-being. 
 Despite the evidence provided by this early work, the explanations arising from 
them provided little clarity around the underlying processes by which psychological 
well-being is influenced by social factors across multiple levels of analysis (i.e., 
interpersonal, group and societal levels). It simply showed that interpersonal factors can 
either represent a stressor or support, and recognised that interpersonal interactions and 
relationships were important to psychological well-being. Specifically, close 
interpersonal relationships are a significant stressor, above and beyond other types of 
life stressors, and interpersonal social support is a significant mediator of the stress - 
psychological well-being relationship (Bolger et al., 1989). In the following section, I 
will review the social stressor and support literatures and demonstrate that, while this 
work has shown a strong causal link between the type, quality and closeness of the 
interpersonal relationship and psychological well-being, the theoretical explanations of 
how and why affiliation with others or interpersonal bonds impact psychological well-
being have been limited. 
Social Stressors  
 Research which has explored the relationship between social factors and 
psychological well-being has revealed ‘social stressors’ and, specifically, interpersonal 
stressors, are important predictors of an individual’s psychological well-being (Bolger 
et al., 1989). Evidence of a direct relationship between the absence of interpersonal 
interactions and poor psychological well-being led researchers to suggest interpersonal 
contact was essential to human development (Lilly, 1956; Spitz, 1945; Grassian, 1983). 
Observations that people who experience long periods of being alone or isolated were 
more likely to experience symptoms of mental illness (Lilly, 1956); infants raised in 
institutions (who had received food and shelter but little to no social contact) were more 
likely to die or experience lifelong mental disability (Spitz, 1945); and prisoners kept in 
solitary confinement experienced delirious effects on their psychological well-being (for 
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review see Grassian, 1983) certainly indicated just this. Together, these findings led 
theorists to posit that interpersonal contact was essential to psychological well-being 
(for review see Baumiester, 1991). However, there also appeared to be something 
special about significant relationships and/or interpersonal bonds, and those formed 
early in life (Bowlby, 1969). Many forms of interpersonal relationships, including 
parent/carer-child relationships (Bowlby, 1969), spousal relationships (Rothberg & 
Jones, 1987; Bloom, White & Asher, 1979), friendships (Lowenthal & Haven, 1969), 
and even the therapeutic alliance (Rogers, 1959), were also examined. Overall, this 
work demonstrated a strong causal link between the type, quality and closeness of 
interpersonal relationships and psychological well-being (Durkheim, 1897/1951; 
Lepore, 1992). Close bonds with another individual seemed to afford individuals with 
emotional, cognitive and material resources that buffered them from the negative effects 
of stress. 
 The parent/carer-child relationship, as a person’s first experience of an 
interpersonal relationship, appeared to be particularly important in terms of an 
individual’s long-term psychological well-being outcomes. Certainly, studies that 
showed childhood exposure to mistreatment by others can result in serious physical and 
psychological ill health later in life (Dube et al., 2002; Lacey et al., 2014; Johnson et al., 
1999) demonstrated this link. However, as far back as Freud (1924) the importance of 
the parent/carer-child relationship to lifelong psychological well-being was theorised. 
Empirical work testing the processes associated with childhood development outlined in 
Bowlby’s (1969) Attachment Theory, demonstrated that the parent/carer-child 
relationship was instrumental in the development of internal working models of 
interpersonal relationships that formed the basis of the quality of relationships 
experienced later in life. A large body of work has since shown that attachment 
insecurity predicts poorer psychological well-being or psychopathology later in life (for 
review see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), including psychological disorders associated 
with disintegrated self (i.e. personality disorders) (Johnson et al., 1999). Indeed, 
evidence that early disruption of the parent/carer-child attachment can both cause 
immediate and intense distress (Bowlby, 1980; Gilbert, 1992) and lasting neurological 
changes (Teicher, 2000) reveals the lasting impact this relationship can have on an 
individual’s psychological well-being. Thus, Attachment Theory (Bowlby, 1969) 
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represents one conceptual model that has successfully explained how interpersonal 
relationships, if only parent/carer-child relationships, can come to influence and 
psychological well-being.  
 The stress process ‘hypothesis’ (Coyne & Downey, 1991) or model, while more 
commonly used to explain the relationship between interpersonal relationships and 
psychological well-being, is less conceptually robust. The empirical work derived from 
this approach despite being largely descriptive, clearly demonstrated that a range of 
stressful interpersonal relationships (beyond the parent/carer-child relationship), and/or 
mere interpersonal interactions, could also be detrimental to psychological well-being. 
For instance, interpersonal conflict was identified to be one of the most common forms 
of stress in people’s lives, predicting up to 80% of daily fluctuation in mood (Bolger et 
al., 1989). While chronic stress appeared to have a stronger relationship to 
psychological ill-health than single episodes (Ilfeld, 1977; Birley & Brown, 1970; 
Brown and Birley, 1968; Paykel, 1985), conflict with individuals with whom 
individuals spend considerable amounts of time, such as parent/carer or one’s spouse, 
were more likely to be strongly related to psychological ill-health than other 
relationships (Bolger et al. 1989). Indeed, episodes of depression were found to be most 
often triggered by a specific negative event in the social sphere (Tennant, 2002) and 
most commonly these related to spousal conflict and serious threat to or loss of a 
relationship (death of a loved one or divorce) (Weissman, 1987; Coyne, 1987). This 
suggests, in general, interpersonal ‘bonds’ are important to psychological well-being. 
Indeed, psychological ill health is shown to increase substantially following exposure to 
interpersonal stressors (Andrews, Tennant, Hewson, & Vaillant, 1978; Shrout, 1989) 
and people are more prone to being depressed if living with someone (often a spouse) 
who has previously also been depressed (Coyne, Kessler, Tal, Turnbull, Wortman, & 
Greden, 1987). The pervasive and profound impact of spousal conflict on health and 
well-being more broadly is perhaps best demonstrated in a study where laboratory 
induced conflict between married couples was found to have a strong association with 
lowered immune functioning (Kiecolt-Glaser, Malarkey, Chee, Newton, et al., 1993).  
 However, spousal and parental relationships are clearly not the only domain in 
which interpersonal conflicts occur. In fact, stress resulting from school or workplace 
bullying (Bizumic, Reynolds, Turner & Bromhead, 2009; Turner, Reynolds, Lee, 
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Subasic & Bromhead, 2014; van Dick & Haslam, 2012; Paykel, 1994), rape or physical 
assault (Koss, 1990; Elder, Caspi & Downey, 1986), for instance, can occur between 
complete strangers and can have equally negative effects on an individual’s 
psychological well-being (Acierno et al., 2002). This suggests that it may not simply be 
social stressors with people with whom we have a close bond or relationship that are 
important to psychological well-being, but that proximity and regularity of contact of 
the other person, or perceptions of importance are not the only mechanisms for 
influence. Other work suggested that relationships with others, more broadly, were just 
as important, and the work that examined this provided greater insight into why social 
factors are important to psychological well-being.  
 In his seminal work examining the social causes of suicide, Durkheim 
(1897/1952) identified that rates of suicide were greater, not only for individuals 
without close relationships, but also for individuals who were members of specific types 
of social groups (religious) or forms of society (i.e. those in social, economic or political 
upheaval). This led him to postulate that a sense of social disconnection, or feeling as if 
one does not belong, may be just as important to psychological well-being as close 
relationships. The relationship between an individual’s internal judgements in the social 
factors-psychological well-being relationship is further supported by evidence that the 
actual size of one’s social networks (number of interpersonal relationships) matters less 
to psychological well-being outcomes than the individual’s subjective experience of 
aloneness (Cacioppo, Hawkley & Thisted, 2010). Obviously, these perspectives do not 
negate the value of the tangible social support social networks provide, or suggest that 
meaningful close interpersonal relationships are not important. They simply suggest 
moderating factors in the relationship between social stressors and psychological well-
being which have not yet been fully elucidated.  
 Further support for the importance of psychological representations to the social 
factors - psychological well-being relationship comes from evidence that ‘perceived 
social isolation’ is a good longitudinal predictor of depression symptoms, even after 
controlling for key candidate variables (demographic characteristics, personality, 
physical health, stress and a number of indicators of social-relationship quality) 
(Cacioppo et al., 2010). In addition, subjective loneliness is shown to be associated with 
personality disorders and psychoses (DeNiro, 1995; Neeleman, Power, 1994; Richman, 
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Sokolove, 1992), suicide (Goldsmith, Pellmar, Kleinman & Bunney, 2002) and 
increased depressive symptoms (Cacioppo et al., 2006; Segrin, 1999; Wei, Russell, 
Zakalik, 2005; Heikkinen & Kauppinen, 2004). This would suggest the psychological 
representation of ‘others’ is at least as equally important as face-to-face contact or 
meaningful bonds with others. In fact, some theorists suggest that the extent to which 
interpersonal relationships and social networks satisfy a person’s subjective need for 
social connection (Victor, Scambler & Bond, 2009) has a substantial role in their impact 
on psychological well-being (Cruwys et al., 2016).  
 We also find social isolation and loneliness are associated with perceived 
deficits in access to social support. This is another ‘social factor’ which has been shown 
to predict psychological well-being (Broadhead et al., 1983; Leavy, 1983; Mitchell, 
Billings & Moos, 1982). In the following section, I will describe the literature that has 
examined the relationship between social support and psychological well-being, before 
touching on explanations of how social support is thought to mediate the stress-
psychological well-being relationship. This evidence suggests that psychological 
representations of the social world are just as important to psychological well-being as 
actual contact/interaction. 
Social Support 
 Numerous studies have shown that interpersonal relationships with spouses, 
friends, and family members who comprise people’s social networks afford individuals 
with emotional (self-esteem, ventilation) (Cobb, 1976; Weiss & Willis, 1985), 
informational (advice, appraisal, cognitive guidance), and instrumental (material or 
tangible resource provision) support and this is highly beneficial to their physical health 
and well-being (Broadhead et al., 1983; Leavy, 1983; Mitchell, Billings & Moos, 1982). 
Several prospective epidemiological studies have shown that individuals who have 
limited social support (perceived or actual) have higher mortality rates (Berkman & 
Syme, 1979; Blazer, 1982; House, Robbins & Metzner, 1982). Similarly, numerous 
prospective studies using mental health outcome measures have shown a positive 
relationship between social support and mental health (Aneshensel & Frerichs, 1982; 
Billings & Moos, 1981; Henderson, Byrne & Duncan-Jones, 1981; Holahan & Moos, 
1981; Turner, 1981/1983; Williams, Ware, & Donald, 1981).  
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 Cohen and Wills (1985) suggest the direct beneficial effect of social support 
occurs through large social networks providing regular positive experiences, stable, 
socially rewarded roles in the community and meaningful existence. In so far as these 
factors provide the individual with positive feelings, a sense of predictability and 
stability in one's life situation and recognition of self-worth, there will be psychological 
well-being benefits. Social support or integration into social networks can also help 
individuals to avoid negative experiences (e.g., economic or legal problems) that 
otherwise would increase stress and hence a higher probability of psychological or 
physical disorder (Aslund, Larm, Starrin, & Nilsson, 2014). In addition, social support 
can buffer individuals from the effects of stress via either intervening between the 
stressful event (or expectation of that event) and a stress reaction or by attenuating or 
preventing a stress appraisal response (Cohen & Wills, 1985). The perception that 
others can, or likely will, provide necessary material support appears to assist the 
individual to alter perceptions of the threat itself and their ability to cope with its 
effects. This in turn appears to ameliorate the impact of the stressor (Cohen & Wills, 
1985) and foster positive well-being. 
 Evidence that certain types of support that interpersonal relationships and groups 
provide are more beneficial depending on the stressor and whether the support is 
actually provided or simply perceived to be available (i.e. social support/social 
networks) (Billings & Moos, 1981), suggests that psychological processes also mediate 
the relationship between social support and psychological well-being. However, as the 
design and measurement of social support and social networks often fails to account for 
specific attributes of the social environments or group related factors, this is a 
significant limitation to this work. For example, a study into depression in immigrant 
Mexican women found income predicted depression more than social network and 
emotional support (Vega, Kolody, Valle, & Weir, 1991).  However, the majority of 
work in this area does not include broader social demographic indicators in their study 
designs. There-fore we have limited understanding overall about the importance of 
some social factors to psychological well-being over others. So, while this literature has 
increased our understanding of the ways social support benefits psychological well-
being, we still do not understand the full nature of their effects. In addition, some 
researchers stress the importance of sociological variables (e.g., demographic factors 
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such as a person’s age, gender and social class; see Thoits, 1995, for a review), while 
others emphasise the psychological or individual-level variables (e.g., the personality of 
support recipients; Delongis & Holtzman, 2005). This has meant that, beyond 
identifying social support as important to psychological well-being, the ability of this 
work to comprehensively explain how and why social factors are implicated in 
psychological well-being is limited. In the following section, I will review the literature 
which has identified that more broad societal level social factors also have a role in 
psychological well-being. 
 
Societal level processes in psychological well-being 
 There is considerable work that demonstrates broader societal level processes 
can also be important for people’s psychological well-being. Drawing upon a range of 
work, from a variety of perspectives, this literature reveals that social structures that 
limit social integration and connections, or the size and diversity of an individual’s 
social network, can have negative implications for psychological well-being (Barnett & 
Gotlib, 1988; Berkman & Glass, 2000; Cohen & Wills, 1995; Helliwell & Barrington-
Leigh, 2012; Kawachi & Berkman, 2001; Pinquart & Sorenson, 2000). In addition, 
other features of a society, such as culture (i.e. individualistic/collective) (Kitayama, 
Markus & Matsumoto, 1995), and social dynamics (i.e. cohesion, economic or political 
change) (Durkheim, 1897/1952) affect cognition (i.e. sense of self, attitudes and 
perceptions) and behaviours (i.e. suicide, help seeking, employment) directly related to 
psychological well-being. In this section I will review the literature that has examined 
the societal level processes and their relationship to psychological well-being. I will 
consider how some theorists have attempted to explain why these effects occur and 
demonstrate the lack of clarity these explanations have afforded the attempts of the 
current thesis to examine the role of social factors in psychological well-being. 
 Social structures are clearly stratified by age, race, sex and socioeconomic 
status, and organised in terms of residential, communication, work organisations and 
larger political and economic structures. The social inequalities afforded by the 
structures within societies have been extensively demonstrated and are strongly related 
to physical and psychological well-being (WHO, 2007). The relationship between social 
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structures and psychological well-being has also been demonstrated to be related to the 
prevention of an individual’s ability to integrate in or be connected to society (Hughes 
& Demo, 1989; Hall & Wellman, 1985), rather than limitation of access to material 
resources alone. This view is consistent with the literature reviewed in the previous 
section, that demonstrated social affiliation, relationships and connection to others is 
very important to people’s psychological well-being, and when people experience social 
exclusion this can be aversive (Baumeister & Tice, 1990). When we consider the same 
processes occur at the societal level, we also find that being included in social life and 
being able to develop or maintain large and diverse social networks is also important to 
psychological well-being (Berkman & Glass, 2000).  
 Durkheim’s (1897/1952) examination of the societal level processes related to 
suicide, is perhaps the most comprehensive explanation of how societal level process 
influence psychological well-being. In this seminal work, Durkheim (1897/1952) 
proposes that through social controls and norms weakening, or deregulation of societal 
values, beliefs and norms (Turner & Noh, 1983), a society’s capacity for integration is 
weakened and this results in poorer psychological well-being of the population. 
Certainly, we find considerable evidence that whether people are employed, married, 
attend church, belong to organisations or have frequent contact with friends and 
relatives are all determined, in part, by social structural conditions (Berkman, Glass, 
Brisette, & Seeman, 2000). We also know that individuals who are particularly prone to 
not being able to access and engage in society, for physical, health or financial reasons 
(i.e. older people, unemployed, low socio-economic) are also generally less socially 
integrated (Hughes & Gove, 1981) and have poorer psychological well-being as a 
consequence (Kawachi & Berkman, 2001). However, most of the studies that examine 
these effects simply identify those people and situations that increase vulnerability to 
poorer psychological outcomes (Cherlin, 1981; House, 1987; House, Landis, & 
Umberson, 1988; Sidani et al., 2016; Weitzmann, 1985) and provide limited conceptual 
explanation of how and why societal level processes influence psychological well-
being.  
 The social networks literature examines the structure and composition of social 
networks, at the individual level, and the level of networks of networks. The studies in 
this area have also demonstrated that the structure of the network determines an 
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individual’s behaviour, attitudes and emotional responses (Berkman et al., 2000). This 
is further evidence that societal level processes, particularly those related to social 
connection and integration, are important for psychological well-being. However, while 
a large number of studies consistently demonstrate that a lack of social ties or social 
networks predicts mortality (Cohen, 1988; House, Landis & Umberson, 1988; Berkman, 
1985), because these studies include everything from close interpersonal relationships, 
to membership in community associations in their measures of social networks, the 
results from this empirical work fails to elucidate the underlying process responsible. As 
previously mentioned, one way in which social networks may influence psychological 
well-being is through the provision of social support, but in fact, this account fails to 
consider the fact that social networks exist within larger social and cultural contexts, 
which also shape them.  
 Despite the strength of the evidence that certain demographic factors (i.e. 
gender, age, marital status and socioeconomic status) can predict psychological well-
being outcomes (Diener, Sandvik & Larsen, 1985) (i.e. being obtained from large 
prospective and longitudinal study designs), once again we find this work is purely 
descriptive. While socioeconomic status is shown to be strongly associated with 
biopsychosocial functioning (Anderson & Armstead, 1995; Williams, Yu, Jackson & 
Anderson, 1997), the underlying mechanism responsible is still unexplained. For 
example, socioeconomic status is strongly associated with unemployment and poverty. 
These factors also limit an individual’s ability to engage in social life and social 
networks, but are also demonstrated to increase stress (Kopp, Szedmak, & Skrabski, 
1998; O’Brien, 1986). Therefore, whether the negative impacts of low socio-economic 
status on psychological well-being occur as a result of features of societal structures, 
social support, social integration, social networks, or interpersonal stressors is still not 
clear. Of course, this does not negate the fact that economic or social inequalities 
inherent in the cultural and political structures of society may create, enforce and 
perpetuate disadvantage, which can negatively impact psychological well-being (SEKN, 
2008). Certainly, these factors do directly influence people’s ability to access health 
care and dietary requirements for good health (Marmot, 2005). They also influence 
psychological well-being through increasing stress as a result of limiting social support, 
including access to resources (i.e. money, food) or as a result of exposure to negative 
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intergroup interactions, such as prejudice and discrimination (Williams, Yu, Jackson & 
Anderson, 1997). This simply demonstrates the complexity of the interactions between 
the many variables involved and this work still does not provide one cohesive 
theoretical framework to explain how societal level processes influence psychological 
well-being. 
 Culture, broadly defined as the characteristics, activities and interests of a people 
(Elliot, 2010), is another societal level process that has a demonstrated relationship to 
psychological well-being. Studies that have identified differences between the 
psychological well-being of individualistic and collectivist cultures, have provided 
some clues about the mechanisms by which societal factors impact psychological well-
being. This derives from evidence that differences between cultures, in terms of how the 
self is viewed, is related to psychological well-being (Collins, 1998). For instance, the 
independent view of self (dominant in western cultures), which acknowledges 
relationships with others, but the self as independent, was shown to be less beneficial to 
psychological well-being compared to the interdependent view of self (dominant in 
collectivist cultures) where the self is dependent on and deeply embedded with others 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Scott, Ciarrochi, & Deane, 2004; Kitayama, Markus, & 
Matsumoto, 1995; Matsumoto, 1999). Theorists have suggested that the collectivist 
view of the self impacts thinking styles and self-esteem by shifting attention to 
relationships and context (i.e. away from the self), and this results in enhancement or 
protection of psychological well-being when connections with culture and family are 
maintained (Collins, 1998) and by engendering a ‘sense of belonging’ (Nisbett & 
Maduda, 2003). While this work by no means suggests that the psychological well-
being of individuals within collectivists cultures will always better than those within 
individualist cultures, it does highlight the importance of social norms, transmitted via 
culture, to psychological well-being. 
 As we can see from this review, there is considerable evidence that societal level 
processes, such as societal structures, social networks, socio-political and cultural 
factors are related to psychological well-being. However, what is also evident is that 
there is no one cohesive theoretical framework provided by this literature to explain 
how all these very diverse social processes come to influence psychological well-being. 
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Social group processes in psychological well-being 
 The broad social psychological literature has also demonstrated a relationship 
between social group memberships and psychological well-being. The focus of this 
work has largely centered on the effects that being a member of a stigmatised group 
(e.g., defined on the basis of race, gender, religion, mental health etc.), and being 
exposed to negative treatment by another group (i.e. discrimination), has on 
psychological well-being. Considerable empirical work demonstrates that individuals 
who are members of these groups are at higher risk of developing psychological ill-
health (Eccleston, 2008), while other work suggest this is not always the case (Bachman 
et al., 2011). This demonstrates that while social group membership is an important 
predictor of psychological well-being, there may be other moderating variables that 
determine when group membership leads to psychological ill-health. Elucidating the 
underlying processes that lead to social group memberships becoming either beneficial 
or detrimental to psychological well-being is what I want to build upon and understand 
further in this thesis.  
 Being a member of a stigmatised group (Major & Eccleston, 2005; Eccleston, 
2008) is demonstrated to have deleterious impacts on an individual’s psychological 
well-being. Many stigmatised group members report having lower self-esteem than their 
non-stigmatised counterparts (Major, Quinton & McCoy, 2002), and members of these 
groups are also much more likely to experience discrimination, which produces high 
levels of stress (Meyer, 2013; Williams, Spenser & Jackson, 1999). However, once 
again it is unclear what the mechanisms underlying these effects are. For example, we 
also know that exposure to discrimination or stigmatisation alone does not result in 
poorer psychological well-being, nor does simply being a member of these groups mean 
that psychological well-being is always negatively impacted. This suggests that the 
individual’s interpretation of the event (as stressful) also mediates this relationship 
(Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999). Other mediating factors include the adequacy 
of an individual’s coping strategies, the chronicity of the social stressor, or if it results 
in material in-equalities (Schmitt & Jackson, 1996; Williams, et al., 1999). 
 Prejudice and discrimination, as a consequence of membership in a certain 
social group, has also been demonstrated to be a unique form of stress that produces 
chronic feelings of helplessness, hopelessness and frustration, depression, resentment, 
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distrust or paranoia (Fernando, 1999; Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993; Seligman, 
1975; Tew, 2005). It is thought this is due to the chronic nature of this form of stress; 
however, beyond identifying that stress occurs as a result of individuals being part of a 
specific social group, this work does not consider the ‘group’ as a special concept in 
itself. For instance, discrimination or prejudice could be considered to be an 
interpersonal process, just one uniquely derived from membership in a certain group  
(Poteat, Mereish, Birkett, 2015). As a result, the literature that has examined the 
negative implications of stigmatisation and discrimination to psychological well-being 
has, in itself, not contributed to explaining how groups come to be psychologically 
represented and hence matter to an individual and their psychological well-being. 
Indeed, understanding the social cognitive processes underlying group membership is 
likely to provide greater clarity about when and how social group memberships will 
impact psychological well-being.  
 There is also evidence that other social processes that result from being a 
member of a specific group (i.e. stereotyping, ostracism and intergroup conflict) can 
cause negative outcomes for an individuals psychological well-being (Branscombe, et 
al., 1999, Schmitt & Jackson, 1996; Williams, et al., 1999). This indicates that 
considering what is unique about group level processes may be important. Of course, it 
is also important to note there is evidence that group membership can have both positive 
and negative implications for psychological well-being. In fact, we know social group 
membership may for instance furnish many benefits to psychological well-being (see 
previous review on social support). We know that people like to ‘belong’ to groups, and 
when they feel as if they ‘belong’ they feel better (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Sherif & 
Cantril, 1947). Indeed, evidence that a sense of belonging has the strongest relationship 
with physical and mental health (Berry & Welsh, 2010), compared to other aspects of 
social group membership, such as access to social support and the material resources 
groups provide, has led researchers to ask, what it is about ‘groups’ that is special. As 
the review provided here demonstrates, how others treat an individual, based on group 
membership, can have important implications for psychological well-being. However 
two important caveats to this are relevant to the current thesis. First, when individuals 
belong to groups that are perceived positively by themselves or others, their 
psychological well-being may not be as adversely effected, or actually enhanced. 
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Secondly, the impact of social group membership on psychological well-being could 
differ depending on broader social contextual factors. This leads me to the central 
argument of this thesis - that coming to see oneself in terms of a social group identity 
and embodying the attributes of group members will be positively related to 
psychological well-being. It is only when the social becomes psychologically 
represented that it becomes meaningful to the individual and it is this process that leads 
to social factors becoming important to psychological well-being. I will consider these 
processes more fully in the subsequent chapters. 
Conclusion 
 As I have established in this review, a considerable body of empirical work has 
demonstrated social factors are important to psychological well-being. Some work 
demonstrates, 1) the primacy of social factors in psychological well-being, 2) social 
interactions and networks can be a source of stress or support, 3) societal political and 
structural advantage can afford benefits to individuals’ psychological well-being, and 4) 
membership in certain social groups can have direct implications for psychological 
well-being. While our understanding of the social factors in the biopsychosocial model 
of psychological well-being has been derived from multiple levels of analysis 
(interpersonal, societal and groups), it is apparent that this literature is not well 
integrated. Considerable gaps in our conceptualisation of social factors in the 
biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being still exist. For example, societal 
level factors could also be considered in terms of group membership, exposure to 
discrimination could be considered an interpersonal factor, and cultural factors can 
directly relate to individual processes. This emphasises the point, that while I have 
imposed a structure (interpersonal, societal and group level processes) to provide some 
order to this examination of the literature, there is no clear distinction or rationale by 
which we are able to differentiate the processes occurring at these different levels of 
analysis. As a result, the literature appears ad hoc, often overlaps, and ultimately it is 
difficult to discern the influencing factors.  
 Indeed, it may be that individual level processes (meaning making about the 
events and self concept), interpersonal processes (i.e. conflict or unjust exclusion by 
another person) and society wide processes (i.e. systems which prevent social mobility 
and engagement) operate similarly and require integration to fully explain how social 
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factors influence psychological well-being. As I have demonstrated in this review, the 
social processes at the interpersonal, societal and group levels of analysis each 
contribute to psychological well-being and there is benefit that could be obtained from 
integrating them in one cohesive framework. While the separate description of each 
level of processes provided in this review was necessary to provide some structure to 
the analysis, we can now see that a cohesive conceptual theoretical approach, which 
integrates all three levels of the analysis of social factors in psychological well-being, is 
required. 
 There are a number of broad lessons derived from the literature that has 
examined the role of social factors in the biopsychosocial model of psychological well-
being. The first is that the ‘social’ is important, but this extends beyond face-to-face 
interactions and interpersonal relationships and, therefore, there is a need to examine the 
social component as a mental representation. Second, social factors can be both a 
stressor or support for psychological well-being. Third, social group membership 
influences psychological well-being, but the underlying mechanisms are unclear.  
 The question for psychologists thus remains: What are the psychological 
processes involved in the relationship between social factors and psychological well-
being? To address the observed gaps in the literature this review reveals, we require a 
cohesive theoretical account, which focuses on subjective representation of self with 
others beyond simply the interpersonal. This is something within which researchers 
working in the social identity approach, which comprises social identity theory (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979) and self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987), have been making 
headway. Although these theories were originally developed to explain intergroup 
relations, they have recently been applied to the health and well-being sphere. The aim 
of the current thesis is to work within this burgeoning area of the literature to examine 
the social aspects of the biopsychosocial model and their role in psychological well-
being. In the following chapter I will describe this current social psychological theory, 
which focuses on people’s subjective representations of self with others. I will focus 
primarily on two key concepts within this theory that are likely to be valuable in 
understanding how an individual’s place within the social world is related to 
psychological well-being.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Social Model to explain Social Processes in Psychological Well-being 
 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter introduces a specific model of social processes that is applied in the 
current thesis to examine the role of social factors in psychological well-being. The 
social identity approach (SIA) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al, 1987) is a 
conceptual approach, comprised of social identity theory (SIT) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
and self-categorisation theory (SCT) (Turner et al., 1987) that is broadly a theory of 
psychological group membership and seeks to describe the affinity of self with others. 
This approach has recently been applied to the examination of social factors in health 
and well-being, in the Social Cure literature (see Jetten, Haslam, & Haslam, 2012). In 
this chapter I will review key concepts from within the the SIA, and empirical findings 
derived from within it, that demonstrate this theoretical framework can be used to 
explain how social factors influence, more specifically, psychological well-being. I will 
focus precisely on two key concepts, social identification and prototypicality, and how 
they relate to psychological well-being. This will inform the key predictions I make in 
the current thesis. I will then review the literature that has demonstrated social identity 
processes can be used to predict psychological well-being.  
 First, it is necessary to elucidate the underpinnings of the SIA. To this end, I will 
begin by providing a background on the social psychological analysis of groups from 
which social identity theory was derived. I will then introduce the relevant concepts of 
the SIA, which are essential for the current analysis, specifically the two social identity 
concepts of social identification and prototypicality. I review how these concepts have 
been measured in the past and what we know about their relationship to psychological 
well-being. This will then assist me to make a series of new predictions, which I will 
examine in this thesis. 
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The social psychological analysis of groups 
 Social psychology has historically been interested in the effect that social groups 
and memberships in social groups have on human psychology and behaviour. 
Originally, the focus of this literature considered the effects of sociological groups (the 
actual collections of individuals who have contact with each other, know each other or 
who are materially dependent on each other) (for review see Hogg, 1993). This work 
focused on interdependence between individuals and has explored interpersonal 
attraction/liking, interpersonal similarities and group relations (Lewin, 1948). Among 
other work, Sherif and Sherif’s (1953; 1964) seminal ‘boys’ camp’ studies recognised 
that face to face groups have a material reality, which involves interdependence and role 
status relationships, and that these processes can vary dynamically. These studies also 
recognised that groups have psychological validity, with group members ‘identifying’ 
with the group, and adopting group goals as personal goals, with profound implications 
for intergroup relations. However, because these studies were conducted in situ, the 
results were necessarily complex or confounded by many other variables, hence the 
generalisability of the conclusions were limited. Thus, concepts identified in these early 
social psychological studies were brought into the lab in the 1970’s to examine them 
under greater control and with more precision. Tajfel (1972) in particular, starting with 
base line categorisation, found group based behaviours occurred in the absence of prior 
contact or any form of interdependency. This began the idea more formally that groups 
could be psychological represented in the minds of individuals and people’s subjective 
representations of groups were very important. From this work, social identity theory 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979) and then self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987) were 
developed and formed what is now considered the Social Identity Approach (SIA). This 
approach considered groups in terms of psychological representations and assumed that 
these representations are a normal part of cognitive functioning. It also considered that 
people have self-representations of themselves as both unique individuals, but also as 
group members.  
 While social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) was originally used to 
explore intergroup relations and prejudice (Tajfel, 1969), this was expanded in the late 
1980’s by self-categorisation theory (Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & 
McGarty, 1994) to include an analysis of the self-concept as defined by social context. 
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As foreshadowed, this allowed researchers to examine a variety of phenomena beyond 
just prejudice and discrimination (Tajfel, 1969), including topics as diverse as 
leadership, communication, motivation and collective action (e.g., see Haslam, 
Ellemers, Reicher, Reynolds, & Schmitt, 2010; van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003) and 
more recently, health and well-being (Haslam, Jetten, Postmes, & Haslam, 2009; Jetten, 
Haslam & Haslam, 2012). This unique theoretical framework afforded researchers the 
ability to examine, (1) the impact of large social groups (such as nations and 
communities) where individuals do not necessarily have contact or interdependence 
with fellow group members, (2) how social factors are psychologically represented in 
individuals’ minds, and (3) perhaps most important to the current thesis, how these 
processes impact self-concept. I will now review some of the key tenants of this 
approach that are specifically related to how and why social factors contribute to 
psychological well-being. I will specifically focus on the concepts of social 
identification and prototypicality, which are two SIA processes, which I propose, could 
be used to explain the differential effects of social factors on psychological well-being. 
Social identification is related to the social affinity people feel towards groups they are 
a member of and prototypicality is the individual’s subjective judgment of the degree to 
which they embody, or are representative of, the characteristics of the group. In the 
following section, I will first outline the key concepts of the SIA before reviewing the 
literature from this approach which suggests these processes could be used to explain 
how social factors influence psychological well-being. 
 
Key tenants of the social identity approach 
 The SIA is social-psychological in origin, and is first and foremost a theory of 
social relationships grounded in a social model of the self  (Turner et al., 1987). A key 
theoretical premise of the SIA is that people’s sense of self is comprised of both 
personal and social identities. On the one hand, this means that people define and 
understand themselves in terms of their personal identity (i.e. understanding of 
themselves as unique individuals) – seeing themselves in terms of interests, attitudes 
and behaviours that differ in important ways from those of other individuals. On the 
other hand, people also define and understand themselves in terms of one or more social 
identities (i.e. understanding of themselves as members of one social category or 
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another, Tajfel & Turner, 1986) – seeing themselves in terms of interests, attitudes and 
behaviours aligned with those of other members of the groups to which they belong (i.e. 
in-groups) but as different from those of groups to which they do not belong (out-
groups; Turner & Oakes, 1986).  
 This distinction between personal and social identities was explicated more 
formally in self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). Here, people’s self-concepts 
are assumed to take the form of self-categorizations, cognitive representations of the 
self as the same, identical, or interchangeable with some other class of stimuli 
(typically, other people) (Turner et al., 1987). When self is categorized with no one else, 
then people are said to be adopting a personal self-categorization, akin to a personal 
identity; when self is categorized with others, however, people are said to be adopting 
social self-categorizations, akin to social identities. In this way, self-categorisation 
represents then the psychological basis for people’s actual group memberships, 
psychological connection to others, and how individuals see themselves (Turner et al. 
1987). 
 A key idea of this perspective is that, to the extent that a given group 
membership is contextually salient or provides an ongoing basis for social 
identification, then it will provide a basis for social self-categorisation whereby, the 
group becomes “self”. In this way, social group membership forms a social identity, 
originally defined as “the individual’s knowledge that he [or she] belongs to certain 
social groups together with some emotional and value significance to him [or her] of 
this group membership’’ (Tajfel, 1972, p. 31). Within this perspective self-
categorisation processes are the means by which groups come to have a fundamental 
bearing on a person’s understanding of who they are and as a result, how they think, 
feel and behave. Social identities therefore come to restructure a person’s self-concept, 
affecting the way individuals perceive themselves and their place in the world. A 
fundamental assumption of self-categorisation theory is that: 
“self-perception or self-definition is not simply the activation of preformed, 
already stored self-concepts (whose meaning is defined prior to their activation), but are 
derived by a flexible, constructive process of judgment and meaningful inference in 
which varying self-categories are created to fit the perceiver’s relationship to social 
reality. In this way self-concepts represent the individual in terms of his or her changing 
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social contextual properties” (Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994, p. 13).  
Content of social categories 
 When people’s psychological representations of themselves as a psychological 
group member take the form of social self-categorisations, it is because they are similar 
to the social category content. Social category content defines who is a group member 
and who is not, based on consensually shared understandings of the physical attributes 
and attitudes, beliefs, ideologies and norms of behaviour of group members. The 
category content then also becomes important to how the individual perceives himself 
or herself. As an individual self-categorises, based on the category content, this then 
colours their social perceptions and evaluations of themselves and others in line with 
content of the current self-categorisation (Turner et al, 1987, 1994). I do not focus on 
social category content in the empirical work of this thesis, we know it is essential to 
self-categorisation (Turner, et al. 1987, 1994) and is highly influential to group 
members’ attitudes and behaviour (Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991; Turner et al. 1987). 
However, I will here review the evidence that demonstrates social category content is 
consensually and actively psychologically construed. In doing so, I highlight the unique 
perspective of the SIA and the value this brings to the current thesis.  
 The SIA acknowledges that people bring views about others and views about 
group members to their understandings of what the group identity is (Hogg, 2001). It 
then argues that individual’s make social categorisation judgements about who is a 
group member, or not, based upon both prior expectations and on-line active 
interpretation of the actual reality confronting them (Turner et al. 1987, 1994). These 
processes are thought to allow people to extract information and understanding about 
their own and others’ places in the social world from both the expected and perceived 
content of a social category (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 2000). Importantly for the 
current thesis, this shared understanding about the social category is shown to determine 
judgments of oneself, feelings of connection to others (Cruwys, et al., 2015) and 
experiences of stress or support (Haslam, Reicher & Levine, 2012), which are all related 
to psychological well-being.   
 Evidence that the content of a social category is consensually and actively 
psychologically construed was demonstrated by work from the SIA on stereotypes 
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(Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds & Turner, 1999), schisms (Sani & Reicher, 1998), in-group 
projection (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber & Waldzus, 2003), and more recently work 
examining high identifiers’ deviation from group norms (Crane & Platow, 2010; 
Packer, 2008). Indeed, Oakes, Turner and Haslam (1991) demonstrated that the degree 
to which individuals match stereotypical traits is used as a basis for categorisation. 
However from the SIA stereotypes are considered not simply as negative biases held 
about out-group members (Katz & Braly, 1933), but instead stereotypes are more 
broadly the understanding or impression an individual holds of a social group (Tajfel, 
1969). Therefore, from the SIA, self-stereotypes (Haslam et al., 1999) and in-group 
stereotypes (Turner, 1982) are simply the content of the social category. Haslam et al. 
(1995) demonstrated that in-group stereotype content was also dependent on 
comparative context. This showed that the formation of category content, also occurs 
through active construal by individuals in the moment. The social identity view of 
category content in this way was also demonstrated by Sani and Reicher’s (1998) study 
examining schisms. This study demonstrated that as group members’ ideologies 
changed, the content or meaning of the group also changed. Wenzel, Mummendy and 
Waldzus’s (2008) work on in-group projection also demonstrated that social category 
content was projected onto broader categories re-defining what it is to be a group 
member. Sibley & Barlow’s (2009) examination of implicit associations of race with 
national identities also demonstrated that inclusion of individual targets in the group is 
determined by the perceiver’s definition of the category. Finally, recent work by Crane 
and Platow (2010) and Packer (2008) on deviation from group norms demonstrated that 
high and low identifying group members differed in their understanding of what it 
means to be ‘us’ and, when these definitions differ in terms of norms of behaviour, it 
influenced behaviour accordingly. Combined, this work demonstrated that social 
category content defines the features, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of a group 
member (i.e. what it means to be a group member) and is consensually and actively 
psychologically construed and influences one’s view of oneself and others (Tajfel, 
1969).    
 Self-categorisation theory (SCT) (Turner et al., 1987) articulates precisely how 
social category content determines individuals’ perceptions of self and others and 
categorisation of oneself as a member of a social group. We see that considerable work 
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now supports this understanding, demonstrating that the content of a social group is 
consensually and actively psychologically construed and defines group membership 
(Crane & Platow, 2010; Oakes, Turner, Haslam, 1991; Packer, 2008; Sani & Reicher, 
1998; Sibley & Barlow, 2009; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber & Waldzus, 2003). SCT 
also describes how the interaction of perceiver readiness (an individual’s motives, goals, 
and needs) and fit (categorisation judgement) determines categorisation of self and 
others into social categories. I will now briefly describe these two self-categorisation 
processes to elucidate how they may be related to the central thesis of the current work - 
that the psychological representation of social group membership is implicated in 
psychological well-being outcomes. Specifically, that the largely beneficial effects of 
social identification on psychological well-being is also influenced by the degree to 
which one sees themselves as embodying the attributes of a social group member, as 
defined by the category content.  
Self-categorisation  
 Self-categorisation theory describes the process of self categorisation as a 
function of an interaction between the "readiness" of a perceiver to use a particular self-
category (sometimes referred to as relative accessibility) and the "fit" between category 
specifications and the stimulus reality to be represented (Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 
1987). These self-categorisation processes can be used to explain how the content of a 
social category determines judgements of who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ of the group 
(including oneself), based on the category content. 
 Relative accessibility reflects a person's past experience, present expectations 
and current motives, values, goals and needs (Oakes, 1987; Turner et al., 1987). It 
reflects the active selectivity of the perceiver in being ready to use categories that are 
central, relevant, useful or likely to be confirmed by the evidence of reality (i.e., Gurin 
& Markus, 1988). It has further been suggested that categorisations with high chronic 
accessibility (i.e. sex, race) are more likely to become salient in a person’s perception 
compared to categorisations with low chronic accessibility (i.e., Blanz, 1999; van 
Knippenberg, van Twuyver & Pepels, 1994). Therefore, perceiver readiness refers to 
how an individual’s past experiences, present expectations, motives, goals and needs 
affect the relevance of social stimuli within a particular situation. It affects the degree to 
which the perceiver will entertain certain possibilities, invoke certain knowledge, or 
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value certain traits and characteristics (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987). Perceiver 
readiness directs self-categorisation based on the degree to which the individual 
perceives their own characteristics ‘fit’ with the category specifications determined by 
experience and context combined.  
 The second aspect that determines self-categorisation is ‘fit’, which comprises 
two components: comparative fit and normative fit. Comparative fit is based on the 
principle of meta-contrast (Turner, 1985; Turner et al., 1987), which states that: 
“a collection of stimuli is more likely to be categorized as an entity to the degree 
that the average differences perceived between them are less than the average 
differences perceived between them and the remaining stimuli which comprise the 
frame of reference” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 47).  
 Stated in terms of the meta-contrast ratio, the meta-contrast principle defines 
‘fit’ in terms of the emergence of a focal category against a contrasting background. For 
example, apples and oranges were shown to be perceived as ‘fitting-in’ the ‘fruit’ 
category to differing degrees in a situation where meat and vegetables were present, 
suggesting the contrasting background influenced the perceived fit of the target in the 
with category (Turner et al., 1994). Comparative fit in this way shapes the salience of a 
dichotomous classification. For example, any collection of people will tend to be 
categorized into distinct groups to the degree that intragroup differences are perceived 
as smaller on average than intergroup differences within the relevant comparative 
context (meta-contrast ratio). 
 On the other hand, normative fit refers to the content aspect of the match 
between category specifications and the instances being represented. In order to 
categorize a group of people as old as opposed to young, they must not only differ (in 
attitudes, actions, etc.) from young people more than from each other (comparative fit), 
but must also do so in a direction consistent with the content dimensions of comparison 
and the normative beliefs (e.g., old people should prefer bowls to snowboarding). In this 
way normative fit becomes highly influential to the substantive social meaning of the 
social category.  
The concepts of comparative and normative fit in the social categorisation process 
have been empirically tested in some studies (Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991; van 
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Knippenberg et al., 1994). Oakes et al. (1991), for example, demonstrated that the 
categorisation of others and self was more pronounced when comparative fit was 
coupled with normative fit. Van Knippenberg et al. (1994) also found categorisation, 
based on values and attitudes (normative fit), only occurred when differences between 
groups (comparative fit) were highlighted (but also only when in terms of important 
values and attitudes). 
 Overall, the systematic interaction between perceiver readiness and fit is 
understood to be a key component of the categorisation process (Blanz, 1999; Oakes, 
1987). Importantly, this implies that social categorisation is inherently comparative and 
intrinsically variable, fluid and context dependent (Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al., 
1994). Thus, while social categorisation is often based upon pre-existing assumptions, 
beliefs and values about a group, it is also reliant on the fit process of matching targets’ 
attributes to these aspects and so also is contextually dependent. This is a perspective 
that dovetails with other recent theorising about the structure of the self (McConnell, 
2011), which proposes that a person’s self-concept is formed from the context-
dependent activation of self-aspects derived from the nature of the attributes made 
salient in any given context.  
 As a result, the SIA contends social and self-categorisation is a product of 
accessibly and fit judgements. This process of cognitive categorisation provides the 
basis for prototypical representation of the social category. The prototype of a social 
category is defined as the cognitive representation of the best and most typical or 
representative social group member in contrast to other groups (Turner et al., 1987). 
The prototype, therefore, informs us about what is typical of group membership (see 
Turner, 1991) not only in terms of attitude or behaviour, but also who is a typical group 
member. Prototypicality judgements (of self or others) are determined by the meta-
contrast ratio and are a reflection of comparative fit processes, where meaningfully 
related similarities within a group and differences between one group and other groups 
(meta-contrast principle), determine the prototype. In this way, social group prototypes 
characterise a group and its members, not simply in terms of typicality (e.g., an 
average), but also in relation to differences with other groups. This then forms the basis 
of individuals’ perceptions of their own degree of prototypicality, the centrality of their 
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position within the group, or the degree to which they are ‘in’ the group, relative to 
other individuals (Hogg, 2001).  
 Another important product of the categorisation process is that individuals come 
to see themselves in terms of social self-categorisations (i.e. social identities). Social 
identification with a group represents the degree to which a salient social self-category 
is contextually valued, important and central to one’s current understanding of oneself 
(e.g., Cameron, 2004; Kawasawa, 1991; Leach et al., 2008; Postmes, Haslam & Lise, 
2013). As a direct derivation from Tajfel’s (1972) original definition of social identity, 
social identification represents the degree of psychological connection, both cognitively 
and emotionally, with a salient social self-category. As such, the degree to which one 
socially identifies as a group member indicates the degree to which the group is 
important to the individual (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
 I will now examine these two specific social identity constructs, social 
identification and prototypicality, and their relationship to psychological well-being in 
more depth in the remaining sections of this chapter. In doing so, I reveal how using the 
integrated conceptual framework the SIA provides may assist us to explain how social 
factors come to influence psychological well-being. Specifically, I will seek to provide 
an explanation of how social factors may come to be psychologically represented within 
individuals. In the following section I review the literature which has already 
demonstrated the relationship between social identification and psychological well-
being. I then consider prototypicality and how this concept may assist us to explain 
when social identification may come to influence psychological well-being in a range of 
ways. In doing so, I demonstrate that the SIA provides a parsimonious theoretical 
perspective from which we may better explain the social cognitive processes that 
determine how social factors influence psychological well-being. 
 
Social Identification and Psychological Well-being 
 Recent evidence using the Social Identity Approach (SIA) to examining health 
and well-being (see Jetten, et al., 2012 for review), has shown social group membership 
is an important contributor to an individual’s psychological well-being. The total 
number of groups an individual belongs to (Brook, Garcia & Fleming, 2008; Iyer, 
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Jetten, Tsivrikos, Postmes & Haslam, 2009; Cruwys, Dingle, Haslam, Haslam, Jetten & 
Morton, 2013), the degree to which an individual identifies as a group member (Gleibs 
Haslam, Haslam & Jones, 2011), and compatibility of groups during life transitions 
(Iyer, Jetten, & Tsivrikos, 2008), have all been shown to positively predict higher levels 
of psychological well-being and less psychological distress. For instance, possessing 
multiple group memberships has been shown to protect against the development of 
depression, improve the likelihood of recovery from depression, and prevent depression 
relapse by 24% (Cruwys et. al., 2013). These effects have been shown across contexts 
and the lifespan, in high school (Turner et al., 2014), university (Cameron, 1999; Iyer et 
al. 2008) or aged care populations (Gleibs et al, 2011). In two separate studies, Gleibs et 
al. (2011) and Haslam, Haslam and Jetten, et al. (2010) found that aged care residents’ 
depression levels (as measured by the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale; Zigmond 
& Snaith, 1983) reduced as their identification as a member of their social clubs 
increased. Employees with higher levels of identification with their profession or 
organization report feeling: socially supported and experiencing less stress than those 
with lower levels of identification (Haslam, Jetten, O’Brien & Jacobs, 2004; Haslam, 
O'Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna, 2005); more comfortable, satisfied, engaged and 
productive at work (Knight, Haslam & Haslam, 2010); less depressed (Cruwys, 2013; 
Sani, Herrera, Wakefield, Boroch & Gulyas, 2012); and experience reduced 
physiological strain (Platow et al., 2007). Social identification is also shown to have 
positive implications for self-esteem (Bettencourt & Dorr, 1997; Haslam & Reicher, 
2006; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997; Wann 
& Branscombe, 1990) and self-efficacy (Dingle, Brander, Ballantyne & Baker, 2013). 
In a large representative community sample, social identification predicted life 
satisfaction and general well-being (Helliwell & Barrington-Leigh, 2010). Taken 
together we can see considerable evidence that social identification directly enhances 
psychological well-being across a wide range of indicators. We also see that this 
includes both reducing the likelihood of developing psychological ill health, but also 
protecting or enhancing positive psychological well-being. This work has informed the 
‘Social Cure’ approach to understanding the processes by which social factors come to 
influence health and well-being (Jetten et al., 2012). 
Social identification has additionally been shown to increase factors known to 
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foster psychological well-being including perceptions of social support (Haslam et al., 
2012; Gleibs et al., 2011; Morton, Wright, Peters, Reynolds & Haslam, 2012), 
resilience (Jones & Jetten, 2011), and is an important moderator of the impact of stress 
on well-being (Haslam, et al., 2005). It also appears to buffer individuals from the 
negative impact of a range of stressors, including illness (Haslam, Jetten, & Waghorn, 
2009), memory loss (Jetten, Haslam, Pugliese, Tonks & Haslam, 2010), confrontations 
(Haslam & Reicher, 2006), and discrimination (Brandscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 
1999) and prejudice (McCoy & Mavor, 2003) with enduring effects. For example, the 
number of social identities that people have prior to stroke is a good predictor of their 
recovery and well-being six months following the event (Halsam et al., 2008); and 
acquiring new group memberships protects individuals from developing PTSD 
following trauma (Jones, Williams, Jetten, Haslam, et al., 2012). 
 Life satisfaction has even been shown to increase as social identification as a 
member of a mental health support or therapy groups increases (Camp, Finlay & Lyons, 
2002; Ruble, Willis & McLaughlin Crabtree, 2008; Hall & Cheston, 2002; Jacoby, 
Snape & Baker, 2005; Shadden & Agan, 2004), despite the stigma often associated with 
inclusion in these groups. In addition, increased identification with therapy groups has 
been found to reduce symptoms associated with mental illness itself including: 
maladaptive thinking styles (Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, Haslam & Jetten, 2014), and 
negative cognitive processes associated with chronic mental health conditions (Haslam, 
Jetten, O’Brien and Jacobs, 2004; Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Haslam, 2004; Reicher 
& Haslam, 2006; McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002). Social identification has also been 
shown to modify certain personality traits (Reynolds et al., 2012) and interpersonal 
attitudes (Jetten & Iyer, 2010) which are sometimes associated with increased 
vulnerability to mental illness. The positive effect of social identification on 
psychological well-being (with stigmatised groups and in terms of clinical indicators) 
also appears to occur above and beyond social contact afforded by membership in such 
groups. For example, Sani et al. (2012) found a strong negative relationship between 
social identification and depression, but only a weak-moderate relationship between 
social contact (frequency of contact) and depression.  
 There is, however, also evidence that social identification can in some instances 
have negative implications for psychological well-being. For instance, if the normative 
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content of groups that individuals identify with is considered negatively (i.e. ‘bad’ or 
undesirable), the groups relative position in the larger social context is considered 
negatively (i.e. peripheral or low status groups) (Branscombe et al., 1999), or an 
individual’s status within the group itself is considered undesirable, the social 
identification with the social group may, in fact, be detrimental to psychological well-
being (Haslam et al., 2012). Indeed, the evidence presented in the previous chapter 
demonstrates that being a member of a stigmatised group can clearly have profound 
negatively impact psychological well-being (Eccleston, 2008). Many stigmatised group 
members report having lower self esteem than their non-stigmatised counterparts 
(Major et al., 2002). Some treatment groups for psychological disorders have also been 
shown to be harmful and impede recovery (Crabtree, Haslam, Postmes & Haslam, 2010; 
Finfgeld, 2000; Helgeson, Cohen, Schultz & Yasko, 2000). Certainly identification with 
a social group that incorporates damaging norms and practices (i.e. anti-social 
behaviour) has the potential to increase the vulnerability of members of those groups to 
develop poorer psychological well-being. One example would be being part of a peer 
group that engages in drug taking or self harm. In this instance, the shared normative 
behaviour on which the group is based is itself deleterious to psychological well-being 
(Schofield, Pattison, Hill & Borland, 2003). But we also find that when simply a 
negative aspect of the social identity is salient, group membership can have negative 
implications for well-being. This is perhaps best demonstrated by a study in which St 
Claire and He (2009) who found that when participants (all over 60) were simply made 
to think of themselves as “elderly” they were more likely to describe themselves as 
having hearing problems and needing a hearing aid, compared to those who were asked 
to think of themselves as “young”. This suggests the normative content of the group 
identity directly influences thoughts, feelings and perception (including perception of 
physical symptoms) and when the group is seen as negative, this results in negative 
perceptions of the self for individuals who identify as a member of that group. This 
relationship between the nature of the salient group membership and psychological 
well-being was also demonstrated empirically in a study conducted by Levine and 
Reicher (1996). In this study, female sports science students were found to be more 
likely to be distressed by a facial rash than a knee injury when defining themselves as a 
women, rather than sports student, but the inverse was true when defining themselves as 
sports science student. While these studies demonstrate the power of negative social 
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group content in perceptions of physical symptoms rather than psychological well-
being, the strong relationship between physical health and psychological health suggest 
negative social category content is also related to negative well-being outcomes.  
 As I illustrate above, there is a strong relationship between social identification 
and psychological well-being and it seems it is not always the case that social 
identification will afford psychological benefits. This is most clearly highlighted in the 
Social Curse literature, which has demonstrated that identification as a member of some 
groups can result in poorer well-being outcomes (Kellezi & Reicher, 2012; Stevenson, 
McNamara & Muldoon, 2014). Indeed, we find the relationship between social 
identification and well-being is complex. For instance, identifying with a stigmatised 
group appears to buffer individuals from the stress associated with discrimination in 
some instances (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1999; Molero, Fuster, Jetten 
& Moriano, 2011; Outten, Schmitt, Garcia & Branscombe, 2009; Schmit, Spears & 
Branscombe, 2003; Mossakowski, 2003) and in others decreases psychological well-
being (Eccleston, 2008; Major & Eccleston, 2005; Major, Quinton & McCoy, 2002). 
When it is difficult for individuals to leave the group (i.e. social mobility), or if the 
group represents a source of meaning or support to group members (Link, 1987) then 
the impact of identification as a group member appears to be particularly deleterious to 
psychological well-being. However, it has also been demonstrated that one strategy 
individuals may use to maintain a positive sense of well-being in the face of negative 
implications of group membership (Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996) is 
increased identification. It appears that one way individuals actively enhance their 
psychological well-being is increasing their identification with the stigmatised group 
(Branscombe et al, 1999). Taken together, this literature suggests that if we consider 
social identification alone, it does not assist us to predict when group membership will 
be more beneficial, less beneficial or even detrimental to psychological well-being. 
Clearly there still exists a significant gap in our knowledge about the social 
identification – psychological well-being relationship. It is the aim of this thesis to 
address, in part, this gap in the literature, particularly in relation to the positive end of 
the psychology well-being continuum. In the next section of this chapter I will briefly 
consider how social identification is operationalised in the literature before considering 
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another social identity concept, prototypicality, and the role it might play in the 
relationship between social identification and psychological well-being. 
Measuring Social Identification 
 Since the conception of the SIA, researchers working within this approach have 
developed numerous scales to measure social identification (Cameron, 2004; Doosje, 
Ellemers & Spears, 1995; Ellemers et al., 1999; Leach et al., 2008). Typically, these 
measures have employed items such as, “I see myself as a member of (group name)”; 
or when measured as a single item: “I identify as a member of (group name)“ (Postmes, 
Haslam, & Jans, 2013). These items measure the core conceptual component of social 
identification - the degree to which individuals see themselves as a member of a social 
group.. More recently developed scales have attempted to address concerns that some 
have articulated about treating social identification solely in terms of a “general 
connection to an in-group” as lacking specificity. These scales have instead 
operationalised social identification in terms of multiple components (for reviews, see 
Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley & 
Chavous, 1998). Some distinguish specific components of in-group identification in 
terms of distinctive cognitive, affective and self-stereotyping components (Cameron, 
2004; Ellemers et al., 1999; Jackson, 2002; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Sellers, Rowley, 
Chavous, Shelton & Smith, 1997). Work examining these separate aspects of social 
identification suggest, each may operate in different ways, to differentially effect a 
range of outcomes derived from group membership. This is pertinent to the work of the 
current thesis in which I examine the independent contribution of another self-
categorisation concept, prototypicality. In the following sections I will review how 
prototypicality has been conceptualised in the literature and how it has been 
operationalised in the past. I will then examine the ways in which it may be related to 
psychological well-being and make a case for its consideration in explaining the 
observed relationship between social group memberships and psychological well-being. 
In the end, I propose that it may not simply be whether people identify or not with a 
social group that impacts psychological well-being, but the position of people within the 
group may also matter. It is this later view that is captured in the concept of 
prototypicality. 
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Prototypicality   
 In this section I will consider the concept of prototypicality, how it has been 
defined, examined and operationalised in the literature, and how it might be related to 
the current examination of social factors relationships with psychological well-being. 
First, it is important to note that within the literature there still appears to be a lack of 
clarity around the definition of this concept, even within the self-categorisation/social 
identity framework. In light of this, I begin here with an analysis of the original 
conceptualisation of prototypicality and then review the empirical work that has 
examined this social identity concept. I will then review other ways prototypicality has 
been measured and studied, before I end this section with my own conceptualisation of 
prototypicality that I employ in the current thesis. Finally, I review a small number of 
studies that demonstrate prototypicality is related to psychological well-being before 
providing explanation of its relevance to the current thesis’s examination of social 
factors relationship with psychological well-being. 
 Originally, Turner et al. (1987) defined prototypicality as the degree to which an 
individual group member embodies contextually relevant attributes of a salient self-
category relative to a salient out-group social category (which includes attitudes or 
behaviours) (see also McGarty, 1999). This definition built upon Campbell‘s (1958) 
work on ‘entitativity’ which suggested psychological group formation is based on 
individuals perceiving themselves as similar to other in-group members. Within the 
SIA, prototypicality judgements (of self or others) are determined by the meta-contrast 
ratio and derived from calculation of the difference between a target’s position in a 
social category, relative to the position of other targets in the same category and the 
most relevant out-group social category (Hogg, 2001). The relative position of the target 
in a social category (prototypicality) is thus a calculation of the mean difference 
between a target’s typicality compared to a typical in-group member, divided by the 
mean difference between a targets typicality compared to a typical out-group member. 
The degree to which an individual is considered prototypical exists on a gradient, where 
some group members are more prototypical than others (Hogg, 2001). Prototypicality 
therefore represents a specific position of the individual in the group, on the basis of 
their similarity to the other in-group members, and difference from out-group members. 
However, because a ‘prototypical’ position in a group varies as a function of the 
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comparative context it can thus shift away from a typical or average position (e.g., 
Haslam & Turner, 1995; Hopkins, Regan & Abell, 1997). Hence, being prototypical of 
an in-group is not simply synonymous with being an average or typical member of a 
group. Indeed, van Knippenberg (2011) makes the point that in most cases, 
prototypicality does not capture the average or typical, but rather the perceived ideal 
position in a group (see also van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). Similar to 
social identification, prototypicality, is also shown to be context dependent (Haslam, 
Oakes, McGarty, Turner & Onorato, 1995) and can be represented on a gradient, from 
fully prototypical to not at all prototypical. However, while the two concepts of 
prototypicality and social identification are clearly related they differ considerably in 
their conceptualisation, with social identification representing the degree to which an 
individual feels an affiliation towards a social group, while prototypicality, represents 
the degree to which an individual represents or embodies the characteristics of the 
group members. 
 Prototypicality has been shown to be consensually shared by group members 
and forms the basis for a range of group behaviours such as liking (Hogg & Hardie, 
1992), norm conformity and group polarisation (McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David, 
Wetherell, 1992), and commitment to the group (Moreland, Levine & Cini, 1993). The 
construct of prototypicality has largely been examined in relation to social influence, 
where the focus of this work was on examining the influence of those who conform to 
the cognitive representation of the group prototype (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Mackie 
1986). This work revealed that people are more likely to attend to communication from 
prototypical group members than from non-prototypical members and people were 
more likely to align their attitudes with the attitudes of prototypical group members (van 
Knippenberg, 2011, van Knippenberg, Lossie, & Wilke, 1994; van Knippenberg, & 
Wilke, 1992). Prototypical in-group members were found to be more likely to emerge as 
leaders, be endorsed as leader (Steffens et al., 2015) and be more effective (i.e. be 
influential and be able to motivate and satisfy followers) (Moreland, Hogg, & Hains, 
1994). Most importantly, these effects were also shown to increasingly gain importance 
as group membership became salient, and social identification increased (Fielding & 
Hogg, 1997; Hogg, 2001). Necessarily, the focus of this work was largely on judgments 
of other’s degree of prototypicality, rather than self-judgments of one’s own degree of 
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prototypicality. While clearly this work elucidates the importance of the construct of 
prototypicality in social group processes, including leadership and social influence, it 
has been largely overlooked in other domains and hence the value of considering its 
effects, particularly in relation to self-judgements, has not fully been realised. This is 
evident in the absence of empirically developed measures of perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality in the literature. In the following section, I review how prototypicality 
has been measured in the past and how this has informed the development of a measure 
of perceived self-in-group prototypicality in the current thesis, to examine the 
relationship between this construct and psychological well-being. 
Measuring Prototypicality 
 Certainly, evidence of the importance of prototypicality to social influence and 
leadership has established this concept as an important component of self-
categorisation. However, some authors have argued that the conceptualisation of 
prototypicality remains unclear and its measurement has been inconsistent (Steffens et 
al., 2014). There are three factors related to the conceptualisation of prototypicality that 
appear to contribute to some difficulties with its operationalisation. These relate to 1) 
whether prototypicality is conceptualised in terms of a self-judgment or judgement of 
others, 2) whether prototypicality should be considered a component of social 
identification or as a separate construct, and 3) whether it is conceptualised in terms of 
the degree to which one is a typical group member or embodies the characteristics of the 
group as a whole. I will now consider each one in turn. 
 In the main, prototypicality has been measured in terms of the judgments of 
others as opposed to a self-judgement. This appears to be a result of the focus of interest 
of researchers on leader prototypicality and its effects. This has meant that within the 
leadership literature researchers have largely conceptualised prototypicality in terms of 
other’s judgements of a leader’s prototypicality. Of course, this has also been reflected 
in the operationalisation of prototypicality. For instance, Hogg and Hardie (1991) 
measured participants’ judgements of who they thought was the most prototypical 
member of a football team (in terms of valued dimensions of a team member) in a direct 
single item question of a realistic group. Haslam, Oakes, McGarty and Onorato (1995) 
asked participants whether the person delivering a video message was representative of 
the group, or expressed views representative of other people in the group, and used this 
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to determine the targets prototypicality. In another example, Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, 
Platow, et al. (2014) asked participants to respond to questions like whether “This 
leader embodies what (the group) stands for” to determine leader prototypicality. In 
each case, the judgments of another’s degree of prototypicality was measured, rather 
than self-judgements of one’s own prototypicality. 
 When prototypicality has been measured in terms of a self-judgement (e.g., 
Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013; Geissner, van Knippenberg, van Ginkel & Sleebos, 
2013; Hogg & Hardie, 1991; Peters, Ryan, Haslam & Fernandes, 2012), this has been 
done in diverse ways, limiting comparability of the findings across studies. For 
instance, Hogg and Hardie (1991) asked participants to judge their own prototypicality 
as a member of a football team. Once again, these authors sought to capture perceptions 
of prototypicality, this time self-in-group prototypicality, using a single item whereby 
participants rated how typical they felt they were in terms of the group prototype of 
“team spirit”. In another form, Peters et al. (2012) measured ‘prototype fit’, by asking 
women surgeons to respond to four statements which included, “Generally, I really ‘fit 
in’ with surgical consultants”. Easterbrook and Vignoles (2013) measured 
prototypicality, once again with a single item, asking “How similar do you feel to the 
average member of each group?”. In addition, Giessner, van Knippenberg, Ginkel and 
Sleebos (2013) measured leader self-perceived prototypicality through manipulation, 
via the provision of false feedback on a perception task either indicating they were 
highly prototypical or non-prototypical leaders. This was similar to the manipulation 
used by van Knippenberg and van Knippenberg (2005). They also employed the 
manipulation check item: “I represent what is characteristic about my (group name)”. 
Overall, we can see there have been very different ways of measuring self-perceptions 
of prototypicality employed across the literature. This, I suggest, results in a lack of 
consistency in how prototypicality is operationalised, which has limited the 
comparability and integration of the results from this work. 
 Secondly, we often find prototypicality is measured as part of social 
identification, and this causes some difficulties, first in examining the unique 
contribution of prototypicality to the outcome variable, but also in terms of how it is 
operationalised. Indeed, the work of some researchers (i.e. Leach et al., 2008; Cameron, 
2004) suggests that prototypicality is measured within common social identification 
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scale items. These authors argue that items such as “I have a lot in common with the 
average (in-group) person” (Cameron, 2004; Jackson, 2002; Spears, Doosje & 
Ellemers, 1997); “I am similar to the average (in-group) person” (Spears et al. 1997); “I 
am like other members” (Ellemers, Kortekas & Ouwerkerk, 1999); “I am a typical 
(group member)” (Jackson, 2002) measure a particular aspect of self-categorisation. 
Leach et al., (2008) provide empirical evidence to support a conceptual model in which 
these items all fall under a separate component of social identification. This 
understanding led Cameron (2004) and Karasawa (1991) to argue that prototypicality 
should be measured separately from the emotional ties components of social 
identification, to ensure the unique effects of this concept on outcome variables are 
examined more closely (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). 
 We also find some confusion in relation to how prototypicality is conceptualised 
being reflected in its operationalisation. For instance, researchers may emphasise 
different aspects of prototypicality, in terms of either typicality or representativeness, in 
their conceptualisation of this construct. This has clear implications for how the concept 
is measured, as reflected in the wording of the scale items themselves. For instance, 
some measures emphasise prototypicality in terms of similarity with the average 
(Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013) or ‘typical’ group member with a single item, “How 
similar do you feel to the average member of the group?” Others focus on embodiment 
of the characteristics or representativeness as a group member with measures of 
representativeness of the attitudes of the group (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner & 
Onorato, 1995), or in terms of leader prototypicality with items such as: “This leader 
embodies what (the group) stands for” and “This leader is representative of members of 
(the group)” (Steffens et al., 2014).  Then again, other authors have included scale 
items, within the same scale, which appear to measure both aspects of prototypicality. 
For example, both these items, "Represents what is characteristic about (group name)” 
and “Is very similar to most people in (group name)” are included in the same scale 
developed by Platow and van Knippenberg (2001), despite reflecting both the similarity 
and embodiment aspects of the conceptualisation of prototypicality. 
 Each of the above mentioned issues have clearly impacted the way in which 
prototypicality has been operationalised in the literature. This could have a number of 
implications for the comparability of the results between studies, and the ability of this 
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work to further theoretical understandings of the concept of prototypicality. Overall, the 
operationalisation of prototypicality appears ad hoc. For example, Hogg (1998), in some 
studies, employed a proxy measure of prototypicality (via a manipulation of 
prototypicality), but in other work just asked direct questions to measure perceptions of 
prototypicality (Hogg & Hardie, 1991). Platow and van Knippenberg (2001), in their 
work examining leader prototypicality, manipulated leader prototypicality 
experimentally and created a manipulation check to measure perceptions. This  included 
items such as: “Represents what is characteristic about (group name)”; “Is 
representative of (group name)”; “Is a good example of the kinds of people in (group 
name)”; “Stands for what people in (group name) stand for” and “Is very similar to 
most people in (group name)”. The items in this manipulation check were subsequently 
adopted by other authors to measure leader prototypicality (e.g., Steffens, Haslam, 
Reicher, Platow, et al., 2014). The Social Identity in Leadership scale (SIL), included 
items such as: “This leader embodies what (the group) stands for”; “This leader is 
representative of members of (the group)”; “This leader is a model member of (the 
group)” and; “This leader exemplifies what it means to be a member of (the group)”.  
 In conclusion there have been a number of disparate ways in which 
prototypicality has been conceptualised and measured across the small area of work that 
has examined this construct. Recently, Steffens et al. (2014) acknowledge that there 
appears to have been some confusion about the precise meaning of prototypicality in the 
literature, resulting in measurement inconsistencies (see also Bartel & Weisenfeld, 
2013, Hogg, van Knippenberg & Rast, 2012; van Knippenberg, 2011). It has also been 
identified that some social identity measures also include items which measure the 
concept of prototypicality (Leach et al., 2008; Cameron, 2004). This has led some 
authors to suggest that prototypicality should be measured separately from social 
identification (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). It has also been identified that there may be 
value in measuring self-perception of one’s own prototypicality as opposed to simply 
others judgments of one’s prototypicality (Steffens et al., 2014). By considering each of 
these points in the development and employment of a measure of prototypicality, the 
current thesis seeks to contribute to clarifying how prototypicality should be 
conceptualised and operationalised in future work.   
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Prototypicality and Psychological Well-being 
 From the SIA, prototypicality judgements are associated with self-
categorisation. However, while we know social identification is important to 
psychological well-being, we do not know how prototypicality might relate to 
psychological well-being. As noted by Jetten, Hogg and Mullin (2000, p. 186), 
“category prototypes of self-inclusive categories prescribe behaviour, locate us in the 
social world, regulate our expectations and perceptions of self and others, and furnish 
consensual validation for who we are, what we believe, and what we do”. People in 
salient groups, thus, pay close attention to the prototype, to information that delineates 
the prototype and to people who provide information about the prototype (e.g., Hogg, 
2001; van Kleef, Steinel & Homan, 2013). People care how well they, themselves, 
match the prototype (e.g., Schmitt, Branscombe, Silvia, Garcia, & Spears, 2006; see 
also Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1997), how well others match the prototype (e.g., 
Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner & Onorato, 1995; Koivisto & Lipponen, 2015), and 
how prototypical others think they are (e.g., Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001; Spears, 
Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). We know then that prototypicality is important to how 
individuals see themselves and their place in the world, so when a social group one is a 
member of is important to an individual then it is also likely that prototypicality will be 
important. More specifically, self-judgements of one’s own prototypicality may be 
particularly important. In so far as prototypicality defines the individual positively then 
it is also likely to result in positive psychological well-being. Indeed, this was stated 
most clearly by Sheeran, Abrams and Orbel (1995, p. 77), who observed “those seeing 
themselves as more prototypical can be expected to have higher self-esteem.” This 
claim received some support in a study by Jetten, Branscombe and Spears (2002) in 
which expectations of becoming more in-group prototypical enhanced group members’ 
collective self-esteem. In terms of the inverse, Turner (1982) originally stated, learning 
that one is not prototypical of a valued social group is likely to result in a negative self-
evaluation.  
 Numerous studies show the degree to which individual group members match 
the defining features of a group (i.e. are highly prototypicality) is related to intragroup 
and intergroup behaviour and the way people experience their group membership (e.g., 
Jetten et al., 2002; Jetten, Branscombe, Spears & McKimmie, 2003; Jetten et al., 1997; 
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Noel, Wann & Branscombe, 1995; Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2001; Simon & Sturmer, 2003; Turner, 1985). Prototypical group 
members, compared with more peripheral group members, are evaluated more 
positively (Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, 1993; Hogg & Hardie, 1992), are more 
likely to be group leaders (Eagly, Karau & Makhijani, 1995) and define the norms of 
the group (Oakes, 1997; Turner et al., 1987). However, as mentioned in the previous 
section, very little work has measured self-perceptions of prototypicality and in 
particular its relationship to psychological well-being. Given this, we simply do not 
know much about how self-perceptions of prototypicality may influence psychological 
well-being.   
 Drawing from other work within the SIA however, we do find some evidence to 
support the possibility that perceived self-in-group prototypicality is related to 
psychological well-being. First, we know that self-categorisation often leads to 
increased positive feelings towards oneself (i.e. self-enhancement) and increased 
positivity towards other in-group members (i.e. liking). Hogg and Hardie (1992) found 
‘liking’ fellow in-group members is positively related to the degree to which they match 
the prototype (prototypicality). Inversely, we also find, being ‘different’ from fellow in-
group members, increases self-consciousness (Kramer, 1998) and anxiety about 
acceptance in the group (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Louis, 1980; Moreland, 1985; Van 
Maanen, 1977) and, as stated above, learning that one is not prototypical of a valued 
social group is likely to result in a negative self-evaluation (Turner et al., 1987). 
 Taken together, the evidence suggests that self-judgments of one’s own 
prototypicality may in and of itself enhance positive feelings and ‘liking’ towards 
oneself. We know that the position one holds within a social group also matters to 
psychological well-being (Lewin, 1948). Marginal or peripheral position within a social 
group has been found to be an undesirable state and can increase negative emotions 
including increased insecurity (Lewin, 1948), self-consciousness (Kramer, 1998), 
anxiety (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and reduced personal and collective self-esteem 
(Jetten, Branscombe & Spears, 2002). Thus, in so far as higher self-in-group 
prototypicality represents to individuals that their position in the group is central, and/or 
secure, rather than peripheral, and/or less secure (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013), this could 
also enhance psychological well-being. Indeed, this supports the position of Ellemers 
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and Jetten (2013) who posit that higher prototypicality signifies security of one’s place 
within the group, or at least reduces the threat of expulsion. We know that threat to 
one’s acceptance in the group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002) or threat of exclusion 
from a social group is generally an aversive emotional state (Baumeister & Tice, 1990). 
So, if higher prototypicality represents increased centrality/security of one’s position 
within the social group or low prototypicality signifies a more peripheral/insecure 
position in the group then it prototypicality is will have negative implications for 
psychological well-being. Finally, we also know that group membership itself affords 
individuals an increased sense of belongingness, or social connectedness with other 
group members (Cruwys et al., 2014; Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Some authors even 
suggest belongingness is a fundamental human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, 
Tambor, Tredal & Downs, 1995) and if not realised can have negative implications for 
psychological well-being (Baumeister & Tice, 1990). We also know that prototypicality 
is positively associated with greater acceptance as a leader (Steffens et al., 2015), 
inclusion in a group by others (Pickett & Brewer, 2005) and perceptions of having 
positive personality traits (Platow, McClintock & Liebrand, 1990; van Dijke & De 
Cremer, 2008), each of which could benefit psychological well-being (see the social 
support literature) (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). Together, this suggests 
being a prototypical group member may have a direct effect on an individual’s 
psychological well-being.  
 To my knowledge, the relationship between self-perceptions of one’s own 
prototypicality and positive affect, feelings of social connection or psychological well-
being has not been examined before. However, based on the review provided here, we 
can see that the work done within the SIA so far supports the assumption that 
perceptions of self-judgements of prototypicality could positively influence 
psychological well-being. In fact, it indicates that self-judgements of prototypicality 
may enhance positive affect and self-concept, particularly if: 1) the group matters to the 
individual (one is highly identified); 2) feelings of connectedness/belonging are 
enhanced by identification; and 3) prototypicality represents increased security in one’s 
position in the group. However, we simply do not know how prototypicality, and in 
particular, self-judgements of prototypicality, may affect psychological well-being. It is 
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this gap in the literature, that I attempt to address in this thesis, but first I consider the 
relationship between social identification and prototypicality. 
The Relationship between Social identification and Prototypicality 
 The relationship between social identification, prototypicality and psychological 
well-being has not been examined extensively before. A small amount of evidence 
directly shows prototypicality judgements moderate the effects of social identification 
on psychological well-being. For example, we find two studies that test the effects of 
prototypicality judgments in terms of gender, on an individual’s emotions and 
behaviour (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001; Peters et al., 2012). The first study 
demonstrated that men, when told they were ‘non-prototypical’ of the masculine 
prototype, felt increased negative affect and increased liking towards more 
prototypically masculine targets (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2001). This study also 
demonstrated these effects were even stronger for participants who identified strongly 
as ‘male’ compared to those who did not identify as strongly. The results of this study 
demonstrate a direct link between social identification, perceived non-prototypicality 
and a negative emotional response. In the second study, women trainee surgeons, 
compared to their male counterparts, were found to be more likely to assign masculine 
attributes to their occupation than as a personal trait, and this was related to a lack of 
perceived ‘fit’ in the occupation. Additionally their perceived non-prototypicality was 
associated with less identification as a surgeon and greater expressed desire to leave the 
profession (Peters et al., 2012). The results of this study additionally demonstrated that 
social identification and self-judgements of prototypicality were related, and influenced 
behaviours associated with psychological well-being (i.e. leaving employment). Both of 
these studies examine the negative effects of lack of fit or non-prototypicality on 
psychological well-being. We still do not know the full range of the effects of 
interaction between social identification and prototypicality on positive psychological 
well-being might be. To address this gap in the literature we must consider how a desire 
to affiliate (social identification) and self-judgements of the degree to which one 
embodies the characteristics of a social category (prototypicality) might impact each 
other.  
 Before we can consider what might be the variable effects of the interaction of 
these two concepts on psychological well-being, it is first important to recognise that 
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individuals can differ in the degree to which they identity and see themselves as a 
prototypical member of a social group. Indeed, it may well be that individuals do 
endorse a range of scores on measures of social identification and prototypicality, and 
these scores can be used to predict differences in attitudes and behaviour (e.g., Platow & 
van Knippenberg, 2001; Iyer et al., 2009). To illustrate how the relationship between 
identification and prototypicality might differentially impact psychological well-being, 
let’s consider two students of the same university. First, both individuals might identify 
with their university to the same degree, but differ in how much they see themselves as 
prototypical (e.g., because they vary in their involvement in campus life). The 
individual who is less involved might feel less prototypical, and as a result consider 
their position in the social group as less secure and hence experience lower 
psychological well-being as a consequence. Conversely, two individual members might 
be similarly prototypical, but one may identify less with the university than the other 
because he or she is only a part time student (cf., Johnson & Ashforth, 2008). In this 
case, the individual may feel the group is not important to how they see themselves, 
and, while secure in their position in the group, this may have no bearing on their 
psychological well-being. In both cases, we see that different levels of social 
identification and prototypicality could be evident in the same individuals at the same 
time. We can also see the combination could also result in different outcomes for 
psychological well-being depending on the combination of, 1) the importance of the 
group membership to the individual (social identification) and, 2) the degree to which 
they perceive themselves as embodying the characteristics of members of the social 
group (prototypicality). Because the relationship between these two concepts and 
psychological well-being have not been examined before, we simply do not know how 
they might combine and it is the aim of this thesis to elucidate this further.  
 The review of prototypicality presented in this section identifies some 
difficulties in how prototypicality has been conceptualised and measured in the past. In 
this review I suggest examining self-in-group prototypicality and the interaction 
between this concept and social identification, may be valuable. To this end, I define 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality in the current thesis to be the perception of the 
degree to which individuals see themselves as prototypical (embodying/representing 
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important attributes) of a salient in-group, in the comparative context of specific out-
groups.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter presents of some of the key concepts from the SIA. The underlying 
theoretical perspectives of the SIA suggests that an individual’s self-concept is 
comprised of personal and social self categories. These self-categories have meaning, 
and the processes that lead people to construct the social category have direct 
implications for psychological well-being. The review I provide in this chapter clearly 
demonstrates that social identity processes form the basis upon which the ‘social’ is 
subjectively represented within the self and through which affiliation with others in the 
same social category occurs. We know from studies employing the SIA that people 
identify as a member of a social group (social identification) and have impressions of 
some group members as embodying important characteristics of group members 
(prototypicality) more than others. But also people can vary in terms of both (i.e. they 
can be more or less prototypical or can have greater or lesser degrees of social 
identification).  
 While considerable empirical evidence shows social identification is strongly 
related to psychological well-being, we also know that this is not always the case. In my 
analysis of another key social identity concept, prototypicality, we find that individuals’ 
perceptions of the degree to which they embody the characteristics of an in-group 
member may additionally contribute to psychological well-being. We see the work 
examining this construct, however, has tended to focus on prototypicality of others and 
not self-prototypicality. However, just as people can make self-judgements about how 
much they identify with a group, they also can have self-judgements of their own degree 
of prototypicality. We also see people care about social groups they are a member of 
(identify) and the degree to which they embody characteristics of members of the social 
category (prototypicality) and, when they do see themselves in terms of a social 
identity, or as having a central position within a social category, a variety of different 
outcomes may emerge, including to their psychological well-being. It is the aim of the 
current thesis to examine the relationship between the two social identity concepts, 
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social identification and self-prototypicality, and psychological well-being, to more 
fully answer the question - how do social factors come to influence psychological well-
being?  
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CHAPTER 5 
Propositions of the Current Thesis 
 
Discovering the social identity antecedents of psychological well-being 
 In the preceding chapters, I described what psychological well-being is and how 
it has been conceptualised and measured in the past before defining how it is 
conceptualised in the current thesis. I then reviewed the literature that demonstrates 
social factors are implicated in the biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being, 
before identifying that social factors have received limited attention, or have not been 
examined in a cohesive way to date. Therefore, I explained the key concepts of a model 
of social processes, the social identity approach (SIA), which has recently been applied 
to the examination of social factors in health and well-being (see Jetten et al., 2012 for 
review). I identified how this framework can be useful to explain the underlying social 
cognitive processes whereby the social, in particular social group identities, comes to be 
psychologically represented, shape cognition, emotion and behaviour, and ultimately 
can be used to predict psychological well-being.  
 In reviewing the literature from within the SIA, I demonstrated that social 
identification is an important predictor of psychological well-being, but that alone it 
cannot explain all the effects found. Building upon this previous work, I subsequently 
outlined another key social identity process, prototypicality, and outlined how this may 
explain this gap in the literature. In particular, I outlined how self-judgments about 
prototypicality, while not often measured in the past, may assist us to predict how social 
factors influence psychological well-being. I demonstrated that these two social identity 
concepts have validity and applicability to the examination of the social factors-
psychological well-being relationship. In doing so, I showed that the affinity people feel 
towards social groups they are members of, and the degree to which they embody 
characteristics of members of the social group, could assist the prediction of 
psychological well-being. While I demonstrated that in most instances, seeing oneself as 
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a member of a group (social identification) is better for one’s psychological well-being 
than not being a member, I also showed that when people perceive themselves to 
embody the characteristics of group members (self-prototypicality), this may also 
enhance psychological well-being. I noted that depending on the degree to which one 
perceives oneself as prototypical could potentially moderate the positive effects of 
social identification, potentially even reversing them under specific circumstances 
(Haslam et al., 2012). This forms the basis for the predictions of the current thesis, such 
that self-judgements of prototypicality could account for the observed inconsistency in 
the benefit of group membership to psychological well-being.  
This thesis represents a first attempt to examine how social identification and 
prototypicality may interact to influence psychological well-being. We know that, 1) 
people have an affinity towards social groups they are a member of (social 
identification); 2) people are afforded certain benefits through embodying the 
characteristics of group members, or inversely, are afforded less benefits if they do not 
embody the group members characteristics as much (prototypicality); 3) prototypicality 
is determined by the degree to which one embodies the characteristics of group 
members and, therefore I posit that self-judgements of prototypicality may moderate the 
positive effects of social identification on psychological well-being. However, it is 
important to note that while the review provided in the preceding conceptual chapters 
makes a clear case for using the SIA to examine the processes by which social factors 
influence psychological well-being, little in the way of empirical work has examined the 
relationship between prototypicality and psychological well-being. Hence, we simply do 
not know if self-judgements of prototypicality will have an effect, the extent of any 
effects, or how exactly this effect will manifest. 
 This leads me to the predictions of the current thesis, such that social 
identification and perceived self-in-group prototypicality will either independently, or 
multiplicatively predict psychological well-being. First, it is important to note that while 
I believe these effects will occur, the way in which they will combine is not clear and 
remains an empirical question of this thesis. For example, they could interact, combine 
additively or completely independently predict psychological well-being. Second, it is 
also important to recognise that depending on the nature of the group (i.e., whether it is 
positively or negatively valenced) then we may also find different effects. For instance, 
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it may be less beneficial to psychological well-being to see oneself as highly 
prototypical of a negatively valenced group identity. Moreover, it remains unclear 
whether the exact effect may be, in terms of when or if social identification or 
prototypicality may be more or less influential to psychological well-being. Clearly, 
only further investigation which examines this question will elucidate this. 
Nevertheless, the important contribution this work provides is a basis for which to 
understand, measure and consider the effects of social identification and self-in-group 
prototypicality judgements, first in terms of psychological well-being and perhaps in the 
future, on a whole host of outcomes.  
 We know that social identification as a social group member provides people 
with a number of different resources demonstrated to be important in the 
biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being, including knowledge of who they 
are, what they need to do, and a sense of connectedness to others (Cruwys et al., 2016). 
We also know that self-categorisation leads people to understand who is ‘in’ the social 
category and who is not, and when they are ‘in’, where they are aligned along a 
continuum of ‘in-ness’. As foreshadowed, both social identification and self-in-group 
prototypicality are self-categorisation processes that contribute to judgements of ‘in-
ness’. Given this, it is likely that the degree of ‘in-ness’ is determined by both the 
degree to which a person identifies as a member of the social group and/or the degree to 
which a person sees themself as prototypical or representative of the content or meaning 
of the category, or their prototypicality. It could be that either of these social identity 
concepts could predict psychological well-being, both could or, indeed, in some 
instances, both may not predict psychological well-being at all. In addition, different 
combinations in the degree of social identification and self-prototypicality could predict 
psychological well-being in different ways.  
 Despite some confusion about how prototypicality should be conceptualised in 
the literature, there is clear agreement that people do make judgements of their own 
prototypicality and this is integral to self-categorisation. There is some agreement that 
self-prototypicality judgements are related to perceptions of one’s degree of ‘in-ness’ 
within a social group, or centrality of marginality of one’s position in a social group 
(Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). There is also considerable evidence that marginal group 
members often have poorer psychological well-being (Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind & 
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Vedder, 2001). However, no previous work has examined the relationship between 
social identification and self-prototypicality, and psychological well-being. We would 
expect however, that the more people perceive themselves as embodying the qualities of 
social groups they identify with (assuming the groups are broadly positive to begin 
with), then they would actually have enhanced psychological well-being. I expect to 
replicate previous research which shows that the more people identify with a social 
group they are a member of, the greater their psychological well-being will be. 
However, I also expect that the more they perceive themselves as embodying the 
characteristics of a group member, the greater their psychological well-being will be.  
 To more fully ascertain the nature of these effects, I will first need to identify 
whether: 1) I can measure self-in-group prototypicality in a reliable and valid way; 2) I 
can measure this factor separately from social identification; 3) self-in-group 
prototypicality can add additional predictive power beyond social identification alone to 
predict psychological well-being.  
 In order to test the overarching prediction of this thesis, that social identification 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality will either independently, or multiplicatively 
predict psychological well-being, I first developed a scale designed to measure self-in-
group prototypicality (the Perceived Self-in-group Prototypicality Scale or PSIPS) to be 
used in the following empirical studies. Using the data collected from each of the 
empirical studies contained in this thesis, I then tested the measurement model to 
determine whether the PSIPS scale items measured a construct separate from social 
identification. This formed the basis for Hypothesis 1, summarised in Table 1 (page 79 
of this thesis). I also tested this measurement model using each data set individually, to 
confirm these results, and this is reported in the results sections of each empirical study. 
It was important to ascertain if I could, in fact, measure social identification and 
prototypicality separately for a number of reasons. First, if, in fact, the newly developed 
scale was measuring a related but separate construct from social identification, then I 
could better understand the contribution each was making in predicting the primary 
dependent variables, that being, measures of psychological well-being. Second, I could 
subsequently use the scale to test specific empirical hypotheses about the power of 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality beyond social identification, and in interaction 
with social identification, to predict various measures of psychological well-being. It is 
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important to note that two significant shortcomings of the scale analyses conducted, 
were that the scale was not developed and empirically tested prior to conducting the 
empirical work and, that the social identity scale with which the newly developed scale 
was compared with, did not include any prototypicality items. Further empirical work to 
fully validate this scale is still required.   
 There are a number of ways in which we could expect the nature of the 
relationship between social identification, prototypicality and psychological well-being 
to occur. First, it is possible that the measures of social identification and prototypicality 
will impact each psychological well-being measure separately. If this is indeed the case, 
then there are two ways in which they may be related to psychological well-being. In 
the simplest manner, one or the other (or both) may predict well-being. In this main 
effects model, social identification and perceived self-in-group prototypicality make 
independent contributions to various forms of psychological well-being. Based on 
previous findings (see Jetten et al., 2012 for review), which have shown a largely 
consistent positive relationship between social identification with various indicators of 
psychological well-being, it could be predicted that this relationship will always be 
positive, and as social identification increases, psychological well-being will also 
increase. By way of example, we may find that students who identify strongly with the 
student social category will have higher psychological well-being than those who are 
relatively less identified. While we do not have direct evidence that higher 
prototypicality is beneficial to psychological well-being, based on the analysis I provide 
in the preceding chapter, we could reasonably predict that students who perceive 
themselves as prototypical of the student social category, will also have higher 
psychological well-being than those who perceive themselves as relatively less 
prototypical. Perhaps, however, the magnitude of these effects will be less than those of 
social identification. These two predicted main effects are visually depicted in Figures 2 
and 3 with a main effect only for social identification depicted in Figure 2. This forms 
the basis of Hypothesis 2 and 3, summarised in Table 1.  
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING 
 
 
78 
 
 Figure 2. Significant main effect for social identification on psychological well-being, 
but no effect for prototypicality. 
 
Figure 3. Significant main effects for both social identification and prototypicality on 
psychological well-being. 
 
In addition to these potential main effects, the current study designs will allow for 
identification of potential interactions between social identification and perceived self-
in-group prototypicality. There could be a number of possible forms the moderation 
effect manifests, so each will be pictorially represented in Figures 4-8. 
 First, prototypicality may moderate the effects of social identification in such a 
way that its effects emerge only for those people who have relatively high levels of 
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social identification. In this way, perceived in-group prototypicality is important only 
when the group is also subjectively important to group members. The pattern of this 
effect is displayed in Figures 4 and 5 and forms the basis of hypothesis 4a. Secondly, it 
is also possible that prototypicality could moderate the effects of social identification in 
such a way that its effects emerge only for those people who have relatively low levels 
of social identification. The pattern of this possible effect is displayed in Figures 6 and 7 
and forms the basis of hypothesis 4b in Table 1. 
 The key difference between Figures 4 and 5 is that relatively low levels of in-
group prototypicality may eliminate the positive effects of high social identification on 
psychological well-being (Figure 5) or could remain, at least to some degree, even when 
people have relatively low self-in-group prototypicality (Figure 4). There are a number 
of instances where either of these possibilities could ostensibly be likely to occur. In 
each case however, one may be clearly better off if one is more highly identified, simply 
because of the previously demonstrated importance of higher identification to 
psychological well-being overall. 
 
  
Figure 4. Significant interaction effect for prototypicality for high identification on 
psychological well-being. 
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Figure 5. Significant interaction effect between social identification and high 
prototypicality on psychological well-being, with no effect for low prototypicality as 
social identification increases 
 
 Prototypicality may moderate the effects of social identification on 
psychological well-being in such a way that its effects are seen only for those people 
who have relatively low levels of social identification. In this case, the processes of 
perceived in-group prototypicality emerge only when the group is less subjectively 
important to group members. These patterns are displayed in Figure 6 and Figure 7 and 
form the basis of hypothesis 4b. The key difference between these two effects, is 
whether relatively high levels of in-group prototypicality among relatively lower 
identifiers enhances the negative effects of low identification on psychological well-
being (Figure 6), or whether the negative effects of low social identification on 
psychological well-being are reduced by having relatively higher in self-in-group 
prototypicality (Figure 7). Indeed, the negative impacts of lower identification on 
psychological well-being could be either enhanced or buffered depending on the degree 
to which the individual sees themselves as embodying the characteristics of the group. 
For example, the psychological well-being of a part time student who might not identify 
strongly as a student as a full time student, but who sees themselves as prototypical may 
have their psychological well-being buffered, because they are at least prototypical of a 
positive characteristic of that identity. Whereas a part time student who does not see 
themselves as prototypical may feel significantly less psychologically ‘well’ because 
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not only do they not have the benefits of being highly identified and they also do not 
have access to the buffering effects of seeing themselves as a prototypical.  
 
 
Figure 6. Significant interaction effect between social identification and prototypicality 
on psychological well-being, only when social identification is low 
 
 
Figure 7. Significant interaction effect between social identification and prototypicality 
on psychological well-being, only when social identification is low  
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 And of course, the final possibility is the absence of a moderating effect by 
prototypicality on the effects of social identification on psychological well-being at all 
(H4c). This is depicted in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. No significant interaction effect between social identification and 
prototypicality on psychological well-being and no main effect for prototypicality  
 
  In the following chapters, I report four unique data sets evaluating the above 
possible patterns of effects: two correlational, two experimental and a fifth analysis 
which combines the data from each of the four studies. Prior to these, I report an 
analysis that summarises the measurement of social identification and prototypicality 
employed in these studies. Given that measurement of self-prototypicality is not well 
established, I use the same data sets to examine if the scale used to measure self-
prototypicality in each of the empirical studies does measure self-prototypicality 
separately from social identification. In each of these studies, I specifically test the 
empirical hypotheses outlined in this chapter and summarised in Table 1.  Please note 
that in each instance I predict a positive effect for social identification and 
prototypicality on psychological well-being. This is because in each study I measure 
these predictors with what is considered a largely positive social identity (student 
identity). As I indicate in the above discussion, in the case of a negative identity (e.g., 
old age, unemployed, smoker) either the exact opposite effect or another pattern may 
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emerge. I do not, however, measure the effects of groups such as these in the current 
work and therefore, do not predict these patterns here. Instead, please see Table 1 for 
the operationalised hypotheses employed in the current thesis, while noting the other 
possible patterns mentioned above, which will be discussed further in the discussion. 
Table 1.  
Summary of the empirical hypotheses 
H1. Perceived self-in-group prototypicality can be measured separately from social 
identification. 
H1 (operationalised) - The Perceived Self-In-Group Prototypicality Scale 
(PSIPS) items will load separately from the items on the Social Identification 
Scale (SIS) in both a Principle Component Analysis and Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis. 
H2. Social identification and psychological well-being will be positively related (Figure 
2).  
H2 (operationalised) - Relatively higher social identification will be associated 
with higher satisfaction with life, self-esteem, positive affect, social support and 
social connection; and lower depression, anxiety, stress symptoms and negative 
affect. 
H3. Perceived self-in-group prototypicality and psychological well-being will be 
positively related (Figure 3). 
H3 (operationalised) - Relatively higher perceived self-in-group prototypicality 
will be associated with higher satisfaction with life, self-esteem, positive affect, 
social support and social connection and lower depression, anxiety, stress 
symptoms and negative affect. 
H4. Perceived self-in-group prototypicality will moderate the effects of social 
identification on psychological well-being (depicted in Figures 4-7). 
H4 (operationalised) - Relative self-in-group prototypicality will moderate the 
positive effect of social identification on satisfaction with life, self-esteem, 
positive affect, social support and social connection and lower depression, 
anxiety, stress symptoms and negative affect in a number of possible ways:  
H4a     The positive relationship between social identification and psychological 
well-being outlined in H2 will occur primarily, if not solely, among people with 
relatively high levels of perceived self-in-group prototypicality. 
H4b     The positive relationship between social identification and psychological 
well-being outlined in H2 will occur primarily, if not solely, among people with 
relatively low levels of perceived self-in-group prototypicality. 
H5     There will be no interaction between social identification and relative perceived 
self-in-group prototypicality. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Study 1: Measuring Perceived Self-in-group Prototypicality: the development of 
the PSIPS scale 
 
Chapter Overview 
 In the current chapter I describe the development and testing of a new scale, the 
Perceived Self-in-group Prototypicality Scale (PSIPS), which was created for the 
current thesis. This scale was specifically designed to measure self-judgments of 
prototypicality. In this study, I simply test the first empirical hypothesis of this thesis, 
that prototypicality can be measured separately from social identification (H1). I 
employ data from the four empirical studies reported in the following chapters of this 
thesis, in which the PSIPS and a social identity scale were both administered. 
Combining the data from the 4 empirical studies resulted in a total of 569 participants, 
for whom either a university student identity or university residential hall identity was 
made salient. Each completed both the social identity scale (Doosje, et al., 1995) and 
then the PSIPS items, in that order. The analysis provides preliminary evidence of the 
satisfactory psychometric properties of the PSIPS. I present results from a Principle 
Components Analysis (PCA) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), which show the 
PSIPS is a reliable measure of self-prototypicality and measures a construct separate 
from social identification. Finally, I discuss the importance of these findings to the 
empirical work of this thesis. 
Scale Construction 
 A review of the prototypicality literature reveals clear conceptual distinctions 
made between social identification and prototypicality (Doosje et al., 1995; Lickel et al., 
2000; Jackson, 2002; Ellemers et al., 1999), but some confusion about the precise 
meaning of prototypicality, and hence considerable variety in the way in which it is 
measured (Peters et al, 2012; Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2013; Steffens et al., 2014). We 
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also find many items which measure this construct are often included in measures of 
social identification (Leach et al, 2008). Also, there are very few measures of self 
judgements of one’s own prototypicality (Geissner et al., 2013; van Knippenberg & van 
Knippenberg, 2005). To address some of these concerns and enable the empirical work 
of this thesis I set about developing a scale to measure perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality and to ascertain if it measured a construct separately from social 
identification. To this end, I developed a number of items based on items reported in 
previous work on prototypicality. I incorporated a specific design feature in each item 
(i.e. the ability to specify the out-group comparison group in each item). The resulting 
Perceived Self-in-group Prototypicality Scale (PISPS) aimed to measure the degree to 
which individuals see themselves as a prototypical social group member. This was 
conceptualised as the perception of the degree to which individuals see themselves as 
prototypical of their in-group, in the comparative context of specific out-groups.  
 I first considered the desirable features that a measure of self-perceived 
prototypicality would ideally have and determined three criteria to satisfy two main 
goals: 1) ease of administration in research and clinical settings and 2) achieving the 
empirical work of this thesis. The first criterion was that the measure should be self-
reporting in structure; second, it should be short in length; and third, the scale should be 
related to, but measure a separate construct from, social identification. I identified and 
adapted five items from previous scales (Leach et al., 2008; Kawasawa, 1991, and 
Platow and van Knippenberg, 2001), which 1) most closely captured the 
conceptualisation of self-prototypicality outlined in this thesis, and 2) were easily 
differentiated from other aspects of social identification. The final items chosen, based 
on these criteria, were adapted from scales developed by Leach et al. (2008), Kawasawa 
(1991) and Platow and van Knippenberg (2001). If required, I then adapted the scale 
items by rewording them to reflect self-judgments of self-in-group prototypicality and 
including in each item the specification of a comparative out-group (i.e. using relative 
term such as “than (group name)”). The final five items are shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2.  
Perceived Self-in-group Prototypicality Scale (PSIPS) Items  
1. I feel more similar to other (in-group name) than I do to non-(in-group name)/(out-
group name). (Adapted from, Leach et al. 2008) 
2. I have more in common with other (in-group name) than non-(in-group name)/(out-
group name). (Adapted from, Leach et al. 2008) 
3. If I were to express my views I could be more influential with (in-group name) than 
non-(in-group name)/(out-group name). (Adapted from, Platow & van Knippenberg, 
2001) 
4. I think it would be accurate if someone described me as a typical (in-group name) 
(Adapted from, Kawasawa, 1991) 
5. I would feel good if someone described me as a typical (in-group name) (Adapted 
from, Kawasawa, 1991) 
 
 I then compared the PSIPS scale items to a social identity scale to determine if 
the items chosen measured a distinct construct from social identification. The scale 
chosen for comparison was the four item social identification scale developed by 
Doosje et al. (1995). This scale is a widely applicable measure of social identification 
and its items have been included in social identity scales developed subsequently (e.g., 
Cameron, 2004; Leach et al. 2008). It is important to note however, that the items 
included in the social identification scale developed by Doosje et al. (1995) do not 
include items which measure typicality, similarity, or difference from others, which are 
conceptually related to prototypicality or related aspects of this construct (i.e. self-
stereotyping). It is also important to note here that the choice of this social identity scale 
for comparison with the PSIPS, increased the ability of the tool to measure 
prototypicality separately from social identification. This enabled testing of the 
hypothesis of the current work and the contribution of this thesis to increasing 
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understanding of social processes that influence psychological well-being. I will 
consider the implications of this in more detail in the general discussion. 
 The analysis presented in this chapter represents a first attempt to create and test 
a measure of self-judgments of prototypicality and to determine whether this can be 
measured separately from social identification. In Table 3 I present the items of the 
Doosje et al. (1995) social identity scale. This scale has been used extensively in the 
literature and has formed the basis of comparison for most other measures of social 
identity created since (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2013). It is shorter and easier to 
administer than more recently developed multidimensional measures of social 
identification (Cameron, 2004; Jackson, 2002; Leach et al., 2008), but allows a more 
nuanced examination of the components of social identification than the also very 
reliable single item measure (Postmes, Haslam & Jans, 2013). Yet, each of the Doosje 
et al. (1995) scale’s items still align well with the three dimensions of the self-
investment component of social identification identified by Leach et al. (2008).  
 
Table 3.  
Social Identification Scale Items  
1. I see myself as (in-group name)  
2. I am pleased to be an (in-group name) 
3. I feel strong ties with (in-group name) 
4. I identify with other (in-group name) (developed by Doosje et al. 1995) 
 
 To test the validity of the PSIPS, the current study predicted that: 1) the social 
identity scale and PSIPS would have appropriate properties, including that the 
assumptions of normality, internal consistency and multi-collinarity were not violated; 
and 2) that the social identity scale items would load on a separate factor from the 
PSIPS scale items. 
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Method 
 Participants. Two hundred and forty-nine male and three hundred and twenty 
female (N=569) Australian National University (ANU) students voluntarily participated 
in four separate studies, conducted across 2 years (2014-2015) in which both the SIS 
and PSIPS were administered. Each of these studies are described in detail in the 
following chapters of this thesis. For Study 1 the data sets of Studies 2-5 were combined 
and hence include the 171 participants (30%) from Study 2, 103 participants (18%) 
from Study 3, 125 participants (22%) from Study 4, and 170 participants (30%) from 
Study 5. Ages ranged from 17 to 49 years (median=19 years). Four hundred and 
seventy-three (83%) participants reported English was their first language. 
Procedure. Data from four unique data sets were combined for analysis in this 
study. These studies are fully described in the following chapters reporting the empirical 
studies of this thesis, but here I provide a brief explanation. Participants completed a 
questionnaire administered via either computer or paper and pen. In three studies the 
specific social group membership made salient was ANU student and in the other a 
university residential hall identity as described more fully in each of the following 
empirical chapters of this thesis. Participants were asked to complete a task prior to 
completing the scale items, where they were either asked to reflect on the type, number 
and quality of their social interactions with other ANU students/ hall residents or their 
personal attributes, and then the attributes of an ANU student. Participants then 
completed all predictor and outcome variables (i.e. the SIS, PSIPS and then a battery of 
psychological well-being outcome measures). The latter are described more fully in 
each of empirical chapters of this thesis, while the SIS and PSIPS items are presented in 
Table 2 and 3 in the current chapter. Both scales measured responses on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1=”strongly disagree”; 7=”strongly agree”, with a mid-point of 4=”neither agree 
nor disagree”). Upon completion, participants were provided with an explanation of the 
study and counselling phone numbers, should they require them, before receiving either 
payment or course credit. 
 
Results: Scale Reliability 
 First, for each participant, total scores on both the SIS and PSIPS were 
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calculated and then the means and standard deviations of each scale were calculated. 
The normality of the distribution of the SIS and PSIPS scores was then examined 
visually and statistically. In this analysis the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic was not 
significant, for either scale, suggesting the distribution was not normal. Visual 
examination of histograms revealed the variables were both slightly positively skewed 
(>.7), and some kurtosis was present (.18), however, based on the recommendations of 
Tabinchnick and Fidell (2007, p. 80), due to the large sample size, these were 
satisfactory. Social identification and prototypicality scores were significantly 
correlated with each other (r=.63, p<.01), however collinarity statistics (tolerance and 
variance inflation factors (VIF)) were within acceptable limits (VIF < 2)) (Coakes, 
2005; Hair et al., 2012) and these variables’ independence could be assumed in 
regression analysis.  
 For the SIS a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient.85 was obtained, indicating internal 
consistency. For the PSIPS scale a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .83 was obtained, 
indicating internal consistency. The means, standard deviations, and Cronbach alpha’s 
for both scales are reported in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4.  
Means, standard deviations and cronbach alpha of the Social Identity and Perceived 
Self-In-Group Prototypicality Scales across four data sets. 
Scale M SD α 
1. Social IdentificationN 5.62a 1.20 .85 
2. Prototypicality (PSIPS)N 4.42a 1.17 .83 
Note. N=569; a = Measured on a scale for 1-7 
 
 To test the prediction that the PSIPS scale items load on a singled factor, 
separate from social identification, the four items of the Social Identification Scale and 
five items of the Perceived self-in-group Prototypicality Scale were subjected to a 
principle component analysis (PCA) using SPSS. Prior to performing PCA, the 
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suitability of data for factor analysis was assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix 
revealed the presence of many coefficients of .3 and above. The Kaiser Meyer-Olkin 
value was .846, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Kaiser, 1974) and Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) reached statistical significance (p<.001), supporting 
the factorability of the component matrix. 
 The PCA revealed the presence of two components with Eigen values exceeding 
1, explaining (50% and 13%) of the variance respectively. An inspection of the scree 
plot revealed a clear break after the second component. Using Catell’s (1966) scree test, 
it was decided to retain two components for further investigation. To aid in the 
interpretation of the two components, oblimin rotation was performed to account for the 
high correlation between the items. The rotated solution revealed the presence of simple 
structure (Thurstone, 1947), with the first component corresponding with the social 
identification scale items and the second with the prototypicality scale items. Both 
components showed a number of strong loadings and all variables loaded substantially 
on only one component except the fifth Perceived self-in-group Prototypicality Scale 
item (“I would feel good if someone described me as a typical …”), which only loaded 
slightly higher on the second component. This is shown in the correlation matrix 
presented in Table 5.  
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Table 5.  
PCA Component Matrix 
Scale Item Component 1 Component 2 
I see myself as (in-group name)  .717 .137 
I am pleased to be an (in-group name) .827 -.069 
I feel strong ties with (in-group name) .830 .059 
I identify with other (in-group name) .882 -.053 
I feel more similar to other (in-group name) than I do 
to non-(in-group name)/(out-group name).  
.036 .787 
I have more in common with other (in-group name) 
than non-(in-group name)/(out-group name).  
-.109 .911 
If I were to express my views I could be more 
influential with (in-group name) than non-(in-group 
name)/(out-group name) 
-.040 .808 
I think it would be accurate if someone described me 
as a typical (in-group name)  
.191 .629 
I would feel good if someone described me as a 
typical (in-group name)  
.349 .423 
 
 As all the items were shown to have a strong fit within the two component 
analysis (all communalities values were above .47 and .75), this suggested removing the 
fifth prototypicality scale item would not refine or improve the scale significantly. The 
interpretation of the two components was overwhelmingly consistent with the 
prediction, that the SIS and PSIPS scale items measure separate constructs. This was 
confirmed by Social Identification Scale items loading strongly on component 1 and 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality items loading strongly on component 2.  
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 To further test the measurement model I then conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis. I first examined a single factor model in which all four social identification 
items and five prototypicality items were entered, loading on one latent variable. The 
resulting measurement model showed inadequate fit indices according to Kline’s (2005) 
criteria 2(568)=570.23, p<.001, comparative fit index (CFI)=.76 and root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA)=.19, 90% CIs=.17, .20). This indicated that social 
identification and prototypicality scale items loaded on more than one factor, so a two 
factor solution was examined. See Figure 9 for the path analysis for the final CFA 
model. As we can see, error terms with high covariance were allowed to co-vary so that 
in the final model, we see each of the items clearly loaded on the related latent variables 
and model fit significantly improved as identified by resulting model fit indices 
(2(568)=106.49, p<.001), comparative fit index (CFI)=.96 and root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA)=.09, 90% CIs=.07, .10). The results of this analysis suggest 
that the items used to measure social identification (SIS) and perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality (PSIPS) in the current work are effectively measuring separate 
constructs. 
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Figure 9. Study 1 Path Diagram for confirmatory factor analysis 
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Discussion 
 The results presented in the current study confirmed hypothesis 1 of this thesis. 
They show that the PSIPS, a scale developed specifically for the current work to 
measure perceived self-in-group prototypicality, measured this construct separate from 
social identification. This represents an important first step towards the examination of 
the prototypicality construct (as defined in this thesis as the self-judgement of the 
degree to which one represents and embodies the characteristics of a group member). 
This is important both for the remaining empirical studies presented in the current thesis 
which employ this measure, but also for future work that can use this scale to examine 
the impact of self-judgments of degree of prototypicality on outcome variables.   
 The results of the current study also represent a first step towards attending to a 
number of concerns articulated by some theorists about the current common 
conceptualisation of prototypicality (Bartel & Wiesenfeld, 2013; Hogg et al., 2012; 
Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2011; Steffens et al., 2015). The 
first is that prototypicality has commonly been measured in terms of judgements by 
others rather than self-judgment. The second, that prototypicality is often 
conceptualised in terms of ‘similarity’ rather than ‘embodiment of the characteristics of 
the group’. Third, that items which measure prototypicality are often included within 
measures of social identification. Finally, prototypicality has almost solely been 
examined in terms of intragroup comparisons alone, without consideration of out-group 
comparisons as well. The current analysis suggests it may be possible to measure self-
judgement of prototypicality, and the PSIPS, has high internal consistency, and 
measures a construct separate from social identification.  
 While the current study does not directly test whether the PSIPS is different 
from other measures of prototypicality, it is important to note that conceptually the 
PSIPS items are different from other prototypicality scales. This suggests that the PSIPS 
does measure self-judgments of prototypicality and could be different from 
prototypicality judgments made by others. However, the results of the current study 
only show that the PSIPS measures a construct separate from social identification. The 
results also do not formally test the validity and test re-test reliability of the PSIPS, and 
further work in this regard is necessary. In addition, a significant limitation of the 
current study relates to a number of aspects of the sample itself. First, it comprised of 
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university students alone. Second, the social identity and comparison out-group 
specified in the PSIPS differed between each of the studies combined into the one data 
set used in the current study. There-fore, there is the possibility that the same 
participants could have completed the study more than once, and how participants in 
one study were answering the PSIPS may have been different to those in another Study. 
However as both of these were deemed unlikely to have occurred I decided to compare 
the data obtained from each of the four Studies in the one analysis. Another limitation 
of the current study was that the fifth PSIPS item appeared to load on both the social 
identity and prototypicality factors almost equally. Upon reflection this item could also 
be answered differently depending on whether the social identity stipulated in the item 
had a positive or negative valence (e.g. if answered in relation to a stigmatised group, 
one may not feel good to if someone described you as typical, but one might still see 
oneself as prototypical). A final, but important shortcoming of the current study that it 
did measures of validity and reliability in more depth (i.e. test-retest reliability) were not 
included. Despite these limitations, the current study is the first of it’s kind, as far as we 
are aware of, that explores  a novel approach to examining the prototypicality construct. 
The PSIPS incorporation of a specified comparison out-group into each item is a 
considerable strength of the PSIPS as it more accurately reflects the original definition 
of prototypicality (as a social cognitive process that is context dependent), than other 
measures of prototypicality. Particularly by including the ability to specify the out-
group comparison, the PSIPS acknowledges that prototypicality judgements are not 
simply based on perceived similarity to in-group members, but are based as well on 
perceived differences from out-group members. While certain design features of the 
PSIPS were incorporated to address concerns within the literature regarding how 
prototypicality is conceptualised and measured, the current study does not fully resolve 
these difficulties. Instead, it simply represents a first step towards the development of a 
formal measure of self-judgements of prototypicality, and enables the separate 
measurement of the self-categorisation variables of interest within the empirical 
program of this thesis. 
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Conclusion 
 Drawing on the analysis I provide in the preceding chapter relating to the 
conceptualisation and measurement of prototypicality in the literature to date, in this 
chapter I describe the development of the perceived self-in-group prototypicality scale 
(PSIPS), developed specifically for use in the empirical work of the current thesis. I 
show how, in the development of this scale, I attempt to address some difficulties with 
the conceptualisation and operationalisation of prototypicality in the past. The results 
provide evidence that the PSIPS successfully measures a construct separately from 
social identification and has high internal consistency. In doing so, I provide evidence to 
support the use of the PSIPS in the empirical work of this thesis, which aims to examine 
the relationship between perceived self-in-group prototypicality and social identification 
and psychological well-being. In the following empirical chapters of this thesis I report 
the results of two correlational and two experimental studies in which I employ the 
PSIPS to examine test the predictions outlined in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING  
 
  
   97 
 
CHAPTER 7 
Studies 2 and 3: Perceived self-in-group prototypicality enhances benefits of social 
identification for psychological well-being 
 
Chapter Overview 
 In this chapter I explore empirically the conceptual processes described in the 
previous chapters of this thesis. In particular, I explore the nature of the relationship, if 
any, between social identification and self-in-group prototypicality and several 
measures of psychological well-being (e.g., satisfaction with life, self-esteem, positive 
affect, depression, anxiety, stress symptoms, negative affect). To do this, I used two 
separate university-student samples. The first employed a university residential 
dormitory as the salient in-group and the second employed students from the same 
university itself as the salient in-group. In both cases the comparative out-group was 
broadly defined in terms of ‘non-in-group members’ (i.e. either residents from another 
dormitory/students from another university). In both studies, the same measures of 
psychological well-being were included except for two in Study 3. First, Study 3 used a 
different measure of depression than Study 2. This was done for two reasons: (1) to 
determine if the alternative measure would yield the same or different results from that 
employed in Study 2, and (2) to examine specifically other aspects of psychological 
well-being that were measured in the Study depression measure (i.e. anxiety, stress and 
overall distress). Second, an additional measure of state affect (the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale; PANAS) was included in Study 3 to further explore the effects 
across these other aspects of psychological well-being and to observe any potential 
relationship between our predictors and more state-based psychological well-being.  
As Studies 2 and 3 represent the first analyses of their type, they had an 
exploratory component to them; however they did serve as a test of the empirical 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5.  
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Overview of Materials 
Because the majority of the measures employed were similar across both studies, I 
now provide an overview of the materials before going on to present the method, results 
and discussion of each study in turn. 
Predictor Variables 
The primary predictor variables employed across the two samples included a 
Social Identification Scale (SIS) and the Perceived Self-In-Group Prototypicality Scale 
(PSIPS), both of which measured responses on 7-point Likert scales (1=“strongly 
disagree”; 7=“strongly agree”). For the former, I used the four-item social identification 
scale created by Doosje et al. (1995). This scale was shown in the original paper to be a 
reliable measure (α=.83) and is comprised of four items, “I see myself as (group 
name)”, “I am pleased to be an (group name)”, “I feel strong ties with (group name)”, 
and “I identify with other (group name)”. 
Perceived self-in-group prototypicality was measured using a scale (described and 
examined in the preceding Chapter 6) which was developed specifically for the current 
studies. It contained five items, some of which were derived from pre-existing scales 
(i.e., Kawasawa, 1991; Leach et al., 2008; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001). 
Consistent with the broader concepts of relative in-group prototypicality, each item of 
the PSIPS was designed to incorporate a comparative out-group in addition to social 
comparisons within the in-group. Thus, for each item of the PSIPS scale in Study 2, the 
specified in-group was fellow residents from the university dormitory (ie., Bruce Hall 
Residents) while the comparison out-group was residents from another dormitory, (ie., 
non-Bruce Hall residents); in Study 3, the specified in-group was fellow university 
students (ie., ANU students) while the comparison out-group was students from other 
tertiary education institutions (ie., non-ANU students). The five items of this perceived 
self-in-group prototypicality scale (with these specifications entered) were: “I feel more 
similar to other (in-group name) than I do to non-(in-group name)”, “I have more in 
common with other (in-group name) than non-(in-group name)”, “If I were to express 
my views I could be more influential with (in-group name) than non-(in-group name)”, 
“I think it would be accurate if someone described me as a typical (in-group name)”, 
and “I would feel good if someone described me as a typical (in-group name)”. 
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 In addition to the above two variables, age, gender and a single-item measuring 
whether participants had experienced a life stressor in the previous six months also 
served as covariates in all analyses. These variables have been demonstrated to be 
significant predictors of psychological well-being in previous work that examines the 
relationship between social identification an psychological well-being (Lucus, 2007; 
Rosenfield, 1999). Thus, for comparability and to determine the independent 
contribution of social identification and prototypicality on psychological well-being 
they were included as covariates in the current thesis. Of course other covariates such as 
socioeconomic status were considered, but given this was not a differentiating feature of 
the population of participants for the current studies it was not included here. 
Participants were asked to specify their age and gender, and to respond to the statement: 
“I have experienced a major life stressor in the last 6 months (i.e. death of a loved one, 
legal or financial hardship)” on the same Likert scale as above where obtaining a score 
between 1 and 7 indicating the degree to which the participant agreed with the 
statement. Participants were unable to specify the stressor. One final covariate included 
was whether participants’ first language was English, given that many of the students 
sampled at our English-speaking university did not have English as their first language; 
and potential language barriers can have a negative impact on psychological well-being 
(Dao, Lee, & Chang, 2007; Jung, Hecht & Wadsworth, 2007). 
Psychological Well-being Measures 
For both Study 2 and Study 3, I included at least two measures of psychological 
well-being (self-esteem, satisfaction with life), two measures of social coping 
mechanisms (perceived social support, social connectedness; Branscombe et al., 1999; 
Branscombe, Fernandez, Gomez & Cronin, 2012; Cobb, 1976; Cornwell & Waite, 
2009; Holt & Espelage, 2005; Plant & Sachs-Ericsson, 2004), and at least one measure 
of psychological distress (i.e., depression or depression, stress and anxiety). All 
measures, except the depression measure (as noted above), remained constant across the 
two studies with the addition of a measure of affect in the second study. To measure 
self-esteem, I used the single item self-esteem scale (SES) (Robins, Hendin & 
Trzesniewski, 2001), which is reported to have as high validity as the 10-item 
Rosenberg measure (Gray-Little, Williams & Hancock, 1997). The short version has the 
obvious advantage of being relatively easy to administer without reduced reliability 
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(Gray-Little, et al., 1997). Respondents rated the degree to which they agreed with the 
statement, “I have high self-esteem” on the same seven-point Likert scale, as described 
above. To measure satisfaction with life, I used the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) 
developed by Diener, Emmons, Larsen and Griffin (1985). This is a measure of 
subjective well-being that is recommended for use with measures of psychopathology or 
emotional well-being (Pavot & Deiner, 1993), shows good reliability (α=.87; Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) and is comprised of five items: “In most ways my 
life is close to ideal”, “The conditions of my life are excellent”, “I am satisfied with my 
life”, “So far I have gotten the important things I want in life”, and “If I could live my 
life over, I would change almost nothing”. Participants responded to each of these on 
same seven-point Likert scale. 
I measured perceived social support with four items adopted from Jetten, Haslam 
and Haslam (2012, p. 351; see also Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet & Farley, 1988). The four 
items are, “I get the emotional support I need from people”, “I get the help I need from 
other people”, “I get the resources I need from other people” and “I get the advice I 
need from other people”. The original reliability was reported as α=.87. I measured 
social connectedness with four items adapted from a measure of social isolation used by 
Reicher and Haslam (2006), and outlined in Jetten et al. (2012, p. 351). The four-item 
Social Connectedness Scale (SCS) included the items: “I have someone close in whom I 
can confide”, “I see myself as a loner” (reverse coded), “I see myself as a sociable 
person” and “My relationships are important to me”. I was guided in my choice of this 
four-item scale by the goal to keep the overall research questionnaire at a relatively 
small size to enhance participants’ likelihood of completing it. Responses on both the 
SCS and the Perceived Social Support Scale (PSSS) were measured on the above seven-
point Likert scale. 
The Centre for Epidemiological Studies Rating Scale for Depression (CES-D) 
(Radloff, 1977) was used in Study 2. This 20-item measure has been shown to have 
good reliability (α=.87). Respondents rate the degree to which each of the 20 statements 
reflecting depression symptoms applied to them over the previous week (e.g., “I felt 
depressed,” “I felt that life had been a failure”, and “I was happy” (reverse scored)).  
Participants responded using a four-point scale ranging from 1 (“rarely”) to 4 (“most of 
the time”). 
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In Study 3, I replaced the CES-D with a different measure of depression (as noted 
above), the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 
1995). The DASS-21, in addition to its depression (e.g., “I felt that life was 
meaningless,” anxiety (“I felt I was close to panic”), and stress (“I found myself getting 
agitated”) subscales, shows good internal reliability, with α’s ranging between .81 and 
.99 (Henry & Crawford, 2005). Participants rated the degree to which each of 21 
symptom-defining statements has applied to them over the last week, using a four-point 
scale from 1 (“never”) to 4 (“always”). 
Again, as noted above, in Study 3 I also included an additional scale to measure 
both well-being (i.e. positive affect) and distress (i.e. negative affect) - the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). Each subscale 
possesses good reliability (α=.89 for the Positive Affect subscale and α=.85 for the 
Negative Affect subscale; Crawford & Henry, 2004). Participants were presented with 
10 positive emotion words (e.g., “excited,” “inspired”) and 10 negative emotion words 
(e.g., “upset,” “afraid”), and asked to rate the extent to which they were currently 
experiencing each emotion on a five-point scale (1=“slightly or not at all,” 2=“a little,” 
3=“moderately,” 4=“quite a bit,” 5=“very much”). 
These measures were specifically employed to determine if another measure of 
depression would yield different results from Study 2 and to examine specifically other 
aspects of psychological well-being (i.e. anxiety, stress and overall distress, as measured 
by the DASS-21).   
In each of the studies, the scales described above were presented in the following 
order: Social Identification Scale, Perceived Self-In-Group Prototypicality Scale, 
Perceived Social Support Scale, Social Connectedness Scale, Self-Esteem Scale, 
Satisfaction with Life Scale and CES-D (depression) or the DASS-21 and PANAS.  
Participants then answered demographic questions, including, age, gender, whether 
English was their first language (measured dichotomously) and whether or not they had 
experienced a major life stressor in the past six months (measured on a seven-point 
scale). 
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Study 2 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-one male and 90 female (N=171) residents of Bruce Hall, an 
Australian National University (ANU) residential dormitory, voluntarily participated in 
this study. Ages ranged from 18 to 28 years (median=20 years). One hundred and thirty 
four participants (78.36%) indicated that English was their first language. One hundred 
and twenty-five participants completed the questionnaire in paper-and-pencil format, 
with the remaining 46 participants completing it electronically. Participants were 
recruited by student leaders of the residential hall and were offered the chance to win an 
iPad mini upon completion. 
Procedure. The questionnaire was entitled the “Bruce Hall Residents Social Well-
being Survey”. As the questionnaire had been developed in tandem with the staff and 
student well-being officers of the dormitory, it incorporated a number of items of 
specific interest to them that are not included in these analyses (e.g., items that asked 
residents to rate the facilities and services provided by the university residential hall, 
including social and academic activities and relationships with other residents). 
However, by working with the officers of the dormitory, I hoped to enhance 
engagement and face validity of the study as well as increase the salience of the social 
group membership of interest. Upon completion, participants were provided with an 
explanation of the study and counselling phone numbers if they required them.  
Participants who responded to the paper-and-pencil version of the questionnaire placed 
it in a secure box upon completion. 
Results 
I first completed a principal components analysis on the four social identification 
items and the five perceived self-in-group prototypicality items. Using an oblimin 
rotation, two components with eigen values greater than one emerged, accounting for 
65.49% of the variance. These two components corresponded to the two scales 
confirming the results obtained in Study 1. As the results of the PCA reported in 
Chapter 6 included this data set, I do not fully report the result of the separate PCA here, 
instead I only report the results of the CFA to reduce repetition. To further examine the 
measurement model, whereby items assessing social identification and prototypicality 
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loaded on their corresponding yet distinct factors, I conducted a confirmatory factor 
analysis. I first examined a single factor model in which all four social identification 
items and five prototypicality items were entered. The resulting measurement model 
showed inadequate fit indices according to Kline’s (2005) criteria 2(96)=243.82, 
comparative fit index (CFI)=.74 and root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA)=.22, 90% CIs=.19, .24). This indicated that social identification and 
prototypicality scale items loaded on more than one factor. Therefore a two-factor 
solution was examined in which scale items which exhibited high covariance (that were 
part of the same factor) were allowed to co-vary (Kenny, 2014). In this final model, 
each of the items clearly loaded on the related latent variables and model fit indices 
(2(96)= 56.07, p<.001, comparative fit index (CFI)=.98 and root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA)=.06 , 90% CIs=.04, .07) were greatly improved. See Figure 
10 for the path analysis for the final CFA model. 
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Figure 10. Study 2 Path analysis of confirmatory factor analysis of social identity and 
prototypicality scale items 
 
I then calculated an average of the items within the SIS and PSIPS for each 
participant. I also calculated the average of each of the other multi-item measures that 
were used. Table 6 presents Cronbach’s alphas for each of these, as well as the means, 
standard deviations and pair-wise correlations for each measure. Responses on all scales 
were significantly greater than the scale mid-point (ps<.001), except for: (1) life stressor 
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(p=.075) and (2) depression (which was significantly lower than the scale mid-point 
(imputed at 2.5), p<.001). Participants had higher levels of social identification than 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality, t(170)=20.64, p<.001. Notably, the negative 
psychological well-being measure (depression) negatively correlated with each of the 
positive well-being measures, indicating divergent and convergent validity. Social 
identification was significantly positively correlated with each of the positive well-
being outcome variables (i.e. satisfaction with life, social support, social connectedness) 
and negatively correlated with depression. Self-in-group prototypicality significantly 
positively correlated with self-esteem, satisfaction with life, social support and social 
connectedness. Social identification and perceived self-in-group prototypicality were 
also significantly positively correlated with each other. Because the independent 
variables were highly correlated, I examined the collinarity statistics (tolerance and 
variance inflation factors (VIF)) and all were within acceptable limits (VIF < 2), 
indicating the assumption for multi-collinarity was met (Coakes, 2005; Hair, Sarstedt, 
Ringle & Mena, 2012). 
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Table 6.  
Study 2 means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas and correlations between variables 
Scale M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Social Identification 6.09a 1.01 .90 -   .   
2. Prototypicality 4.58a 1.08 .81 .59*** -     
3. Self Esteem 4.85a 1.52 ----- .14 .01 -    
4. Satisfaction with Life 5.17a 1.26 0.89 .42*** .27*** .56*** -   
5. Social Support 5.52a 1.14 0.91 .59*** .39*** .33*** .53*** -  
6. Social Connectedness 5.72a 1.01 0.76 .68*** .39*** .23** .41*** .62*** - 
7. Depression (CES-D) 1.90b 0.47 0.87 -.29*** -.25*** -.50*** -.61*** -.39*** -.26** 
**p<.01, ***p<.001 aMeasured on a scale from 1 – 7. bMeasured on a scale from 1 – 4.
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I next conducted separate regression analyses for each outcome variable, with 
predictors for each analysis being gender, age, English as a first language, major life 
stressor, relative levels of social identification, relative perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality and the interaction between the latter two (each mean-centered; Aiken & 
West, 1991). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 7.  
 
Table 7.  
Models Tested in Study 2 
Outcome Variables  AdjR2 
change 
B Std. 
Er. 
β t 95% CI 
1. Self-Esteem Constant  2.49 1.28    
 Age  .14 .07 .17 2.17* .01, .27 
 Gender  -.10 .23 -.03 -.45 -.56, .35 
 ESL  -.21 .32 -.05 -.66 -.84, .42 
F (4, 166)=2.25 Stressor .03 -.14 .05 -.19 -2.56* -.24, -.03 
 Social 
Identification 
 .44 .16 .28 2.77** .13, .76 
F (6, 164)=2.50* Prototypicality .05 -.15 .13 -.11 -1.17 -.41, .11 
F (7, 163)=2.45* Interaction .09 .14 .09 .13 1.52 -.04, .33 
2. Satisfaction with 
Life 
Constant  3.17 .95    
 Age  .12 .05 .16 2.32* .02, .21 
 Gender  .15 .17 .06 .86 -.19, .49 
 ESL  .18 .24 -.05 .73 -.29, .65 
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F (4, 166)=1.63 Stressor .01 -.11 .04 -.20 -2.85** -.19, -.03 
 Social 
Identification 
 .63 .12 .49 5.24*** .39, .86 
F (6, 164)=8.41*** Prototypicality .21 .02 .10 .02 .19 -.17, .21 
F (7, 163)=7.47*** Interaction .21 .09 .07 .10 1.21 -.05, .22 
3. Social Support Constant  4.88 .77    
 Age  .03 .04 .05 .89 -.04, .11 
 Gender  -.12 .14 -.05 -.88 -.40, .15 
 ESL  .16 .19 .05 .82 -.22, .54 
F (4, 166)=.03 Stressor -.02 -.03 .03 -.07 -1.06 -.10, .03 
 Social 
Identification 
 .83 .10 .70 8.59*** .64, 1.01 
F (6, 164)=15.77*** Prototypicality .34 .07 .08 .06 .88 -.09, .22 
F (7, 163)=16.70*** Interaction .39 .21 .06 .27 3.81*** .10, .32 
4. Social 
Connectedness 
Constant  3.74 .59    
 Age  .10 .03 .18 3.35*** .04, .16 
 Gender  .21 .11 .10 2.00* .003, .42 
 ESL  -.27 .15 -.09 -1.81 -.56, .02 
F (4, 166)=2.13 Stressor .03 -.03 .02 -.07 -1.39 -.08, .01 
 Social 
Identification 
 .82 .07 .81 11.24** .69, .97 
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F (6, 164)=29.92*** Prototypicality .50 -.02 .06 -.02 -.28 -.13, .10 
F (7, 163)=28.69*** Interaction .53 .14 .04 .20 3.27*** .06, .23 
5. Depression 
(CES-D) 
Constant  1.46 .39    
 Age  .002 .02 .006 .08 -.04, .04 
 Gender  .11 .07 .11 1.59 -.03, .26 
 ESL  -.20 .10 -.14 -2.07* -.40, -.01 
F (4, 166)=6.65*** Stressor .12 .08 .02 .36 5.22*** .05, .12 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.17 .05 -.32 -3.44*** -.27, -.07 
F (6, 164)=9.31*** Prototypicality .23 -.05 .04 -.10 -1.19 -.13, .03 
F (7, 163)=8.15*** Interaction .23 -.03 .03 -.08 -1.05 -.09, .03 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
For “ESL”, English as a second language was coded as 1 and English as a first language 
was coded as 0.  
For gender, male was coded 0 and female was coded 1. 
 
Age served as a significant predictor of self esteem, satisfaction with life and 
social connectedness (p<.001). Women were significantly more likely to endorse 
feeling socially connected (M= 5.92, SD=.93) than men (M=5.60, SD=1.03), 
t(169)=2.08, p<.05. The mean difference between those for whom English was a second 
language (M= 1.69, SD=.38) and those for whom English was their first language 
(M=1.84, SD=.55) was significant for depression. Participants whose second language 
was English were significantly less likely to endorse depression symptoms than those 
for whom English was their first language. Whether participants had a major life 
stressor in the past six months also predicted significantly lower self-esteem, 
satisfaction with life and increased depression. These later results confirm previous 
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findings that experiencing a recent major life stressor is a significant negative predictor 
of psychological well-being.  
After accounting for age, gender, whether participants had experienced a recent 
major life stressor, and whether English was their second language, relative levels of 
social identification served as a significant predictor of each of the five outcome 
variables. Higher levels of social identification with students’ residential dormitory 
predicted higher levels of self-esteem, satisfaction with life, perceived social support, 
social connectedness and lower levels of depression. Interestingly, relative levels of 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality were not separately related to any of the 
outcome variables. Perceived self-in-group prototypicality did, however, significantly 
moderate the social identification main effect on two of the outcome variables (social 
support and connectedness). These interactions are presented in Figures 11a - 11b, with 
values estimated at one standard deviation above and below the mean. 
 
 
Figure 11a. Study 2 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on perceived social support. 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
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Figure 11b. Study 2 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on social connectedness. 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
As can be seen, in each instance the positive relationship between social 
identification and the outcome variable is stronger when participants also perceive 
themselves as being relatively high in self-in-group prototypicality. The slope of the 
lines for both higher and lower perceived self-in-group prototypicality, for both 
outcome variables, were statistically significant. For perceived social support, the slope 
for the line for higher prototypicality (t(168)=8.05, p<.001) and for lower 
prototypicality (t(168)=6.79, p<.001) were both significant. This was also the case for 
social connectedness, where the slope for the line for higher prototypicality 
(t(168)=9.79, p<.001) and lower prototypicality (t(168)=9.94, p<.001) were both 
significant. Overall, relatively higher social identification predicted increased 
perceptions of social support and social connectedness, and this positive relationship 
was further enhanced when participants also saw themselves as relatively higher in 
prototypicality.  
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Discussion Study 2 
 The results of this study provide support for Hypothesis 2, with a main effect for 
social identification found on each of the five outcome variables. There was no 
evidence to support Hypothesis 3, as no main effect for prototypicality on any of the 
outcome variables was revealed. In support of Hypothesis 4, these results also show 
prototypicality significantly moderated the positive relationship between social 
identification and both social support and social connectedness. As relative in-group 
prototypicality increased, social factors that contribute to psychological well-being (i.e. 
perceptions of social support and connectedness) also increased, and these effects were 
even greater for those who identified most strongly as a group member.  
 Overall, the results of this study provide further evidence that social 
identification is an important predictor of psychological well-being. Most notably, it 
demonstrated that even amongst the most highly identified group members there can be 
differences in psychological well-being, with relatively higher levels of identification 
being the most beneficial. The results of this study also extends previous work by 
revealing that perceived self-in-group prototypicality can enhance the positive effects of 
social identification on at least two social factors related to psychological well-being. 
Although there was no support for a main-effects model in terms of in-group 
prototypicality, prototypicality was shown to be an important moderator of the positive 
effects of relative social identification. Specifically, perceiving oneself to be highly 
prototypical played a relatively stronger role among those who were relatively higher in 
social identification.  
  In Study 3, I sought to examine these same processes in a separate sample with a 
different social identity, this time, identification as university student.  As depression 
was arguably the most severe outcome variable measured in Study 2 – and yet a 
variable that was unrelated to perceived self-in-group prototypicality in the regression 
analyses – I decided to employ a different scale of depression in Study 3 to continue to 
explore the potential role of perceived self-in-group prototypicality on depression. As 
noted above, this new measure (the DASS-21) allowed me to measure not only 
depression, but also anxiety and stress. Finally, I included the Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale (PANAS) to measure these emotional states as well. 
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Study 3 
Method 
Participants. Thirty-nine male and 64 female (N=103) Australian National 
University (ANU) students voluntarily participated in this study. Ages ranged from 18 
to 28 years (median=20 years). Eighty-four participants (87.50%) indicated that English 
was their first language. Participants were recruited via posters distributed on campus 
noticeboards and invited to complete an online questionnaire. Each was offered either 
course credit if they were a first-year psychology student or AU$5.00 remuneration. 
Procedure. This study was entitled the “Australian National University (ANU) 
Students Social Life Study”. In order to maintain the face validity of the study and 
increase the salience of the specific social group membership, participants were first 
asked to reflect on the type, number and quality of their social interactions with other 
ANU students over the past week and consider the attributes of an ANU student.  
Participants then completed all predictor and outcome variables (as described above).  
Upon completion, participants were provided with an explanation of the study and 
counselling phone numbers should they require them before receiving either payment or 
course credit. 
Results 
To check the consistency of the measurement model examined in Study 1, I began 
again by completing a principal components analysis on the four social identification 
items and the five perceived self-in-group prototypicality items. Using an oblimin 
rotation, two components with eigen values greater than one again emerged, where the 
two components accounted for 60.88% of the variance and corresponded to the two 
scales.  
To further confirm the measurement model, I then conducted a confirmatory 
factor analysis. I first examined a single factor model in which all four social 
identification items and five prototypicality items were entered. The resulting 
measurement model showed adequate fit indices according to Kline’s (2005) criteria 
2(96)=56.07, comparative fit index (CFI)=.98 and root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA)=.06, 90% CIs=.04, .07). This indicated that social 
identification and prototypicality scale items loaded on one factor. After scale items that 
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exhibited high covariance were allowed to co-vary, a two-factor solution was examined 
to determine if the scale items would load successfully on the latent variables. While 
each of the scale items loaded less parsimoniously on two factors, with model fit indices 
(2(96)= 207.72, p<.001, comparative fit index (CFI)=.94 and root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA)=.12 , 90% CIs=.10, .13) this was still adequate model fit to 
assume the items loaded separately. I decided for subsequent analyses to use the scales 
separately, despite the CFA indicating the scale items loaded on both a single or two 
factor solution equally well. This was because the results of Study 1, conducted with a 
larger sample size more clearly indicated they scale items load separately, and the 
results of the PCA indicated social identification and prototypicality scale items loaded 
appropriately on two constructs. See Figure 12 for the path analysis for the final CFA 
model. 
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Figure 12. Study 3 Path analysis of confirmatory factor analysis of social identity and 
prototypicality scale items 
 
I then calculated an average of the items within the SIS and PSIPS for each 
participant and the average of each of the other multi-item outcome measures for use in 
subsequent regression analyses. Table 8 presents Cronbach’s alphas, means, standard 
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deviations and pair-wise correlations for each scale. Notably, the internal reliability for 
the social connectedness scale was relatively low; although I could have increased this 
reliability slightly to .68 by removing one item (“I have someone close in whom I can 
confide”), I decided to maintain the four-item scale to be comparable to Study 3. 
Consistent with the PANAS scales design, expressed positive and negative affect were 
independent of each other and negatively correlated. The negative psychological well-
being measures all negatively correlated with positive well-being measures, but 
positively correlated with each other, indicating divergent and convergent validity of 
these measures. Social identification and prototypicality were significantly positively 
correlated with each of the positive well-being outcome variables and negatively 
correlated with each of the negative well-being outcome variables. Social identification 
and measured self-in-group prototypicality were also significantly correlated with each 
other. Therefore, I examined the collinarity statistics (tolerance and variance inflation 
factors (VIF)) and all were within acceptable limits (VIF < 2) indicating the assumption 
for multi-collinarity was met (Coakes, 2005; Hair et al., 1998).
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Table 8. Study 3 means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas and correlations between variables 
Scale M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Social Identification 5.07a 1.05 .77 -           
2. Prototypicality 4.12a 1.17 .83 .58***      -          
3. Self Esteem 4.27a 1.71 ----- .13 .05 -         
4. Satisfaction with Life 4.42a 1.36 .89 .21** .16 .57*** -        
5. Social Support 5.02a 1.05 .86 .39*** .28*** .40*** .48*** -       
6. Social Connectedness 5.17a 0.97 .58 .47*** .21** .36*** .33*** .51*** -      
7. Distress (DASS-21) 1.76b 0.57 .92 -.16 -.13 -.49*** -.59*** -.41*** -.32*** -     
8. Depression (DASS-D) 1.80b 0.75 .91 -.24** -.15 -.48*** -.58*** -.39*** -.38*** .90*** -    
9. Anxiety (DASS-A) 1.59b 0.51 .72 -.10 -.08 -.41*** -.45*** -.29*** -.20** .87*** .66*** -   
10. Stress (DASS-S) 1.90b 0.67 .83 -.08 -.10 -.41*** -.53*** -.42*** -.27*** .92*** .71*** .75*** -  
11. Negative Affect 2.26c 0.82 .88 -.10 -.09 -.47*** -.50*** -.27*** -.22** .74*** .61*** .67*** .71*** - 
12. Positive Affect 2.93c 0.77 .88 .26*** .18 .30*** .40*** .26*** .42*** -.42*** -.55*** -.25** -.30*** -.13 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; aMeasured on a 1 – 7 scale; bMeasured on a 1 – 4 scale; cMeasured on a 1 – 5 scale.  
Note: correlations between the DASS-21 and its subcomponents are inflated as the full DASS-21 includes those subcomponents
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Reported social identification (p<.001), satisfaction with life (p<.01), social 
support (p<.001) and social connectedness (p<.001) were all significantly greater than 
the scale mid-point; perceived self-in-group prototypicality, self-esteem and positive 
affect each did not differ significantly from their respective scale mid-points. All 
DASS-21 scales and negative affect scales were significantly lower than their respective 
scale mid-points (ps<.001) indicating endorsement of largely non-clinical symptom 
levels. As in Study 2, participants had higher levels of social identification than 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality, t(101)=9.20, p<.001. 
Again, I then conducted separate regression analyses for each outcome variable, 
with the same predictors for each analysis as were employed in Study 2: gender, age, 
English as a first language, major life stressor, relative levels of social identification, 
relative perceived self-in-group prototypicality and the interaction between the latter 
two (each mean-centred; Aiken & West, 1991). The results of these analyses are 
presented in Table 9.   
Age served as a significant predictor of anxiety (p<.001); as age increased so too 
did anxiety scores. Women (M= 1.92, SD=.62) were significantly more likely to endorse 
feeling negative affect than men (M=1.60, SD=.54). Those for whom English was their 
first language (M=1.84, SD=.55) were significantly more likely to endorse higher levels 
of self esteem, than those for whom English was a second language (M= 1.69, SD=.38). 
Those for whom English was a second language were significantly more likely to 
endorse depression symptoms (p<.01) than those whose first language was English. 
Surprisingly, whether participants had a major life stressor in the past six months did 
not predict any outcome variables.  
Similar to Study 2, relative levels of social identification served as significant 
predictors of five of the outcome variables: social support, social connectedness, 
depression and positive affect, while being marginally significant for satisfaction with 
life (p=.052). Moreover, relative perceived self-in-group prototypicality once again did 
not serve as an independent predictor of any of the outcome variables. Nevertheless, it 
did serve as a reliable moderator of social identification in three instances (satisfaction 
with life, social connectedness and positive affect). Figures 13a-c presents these 
moderation effects, again with values estimated at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean. 
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Table 9.  
Models Tested in Study 3 
Outcome 
Variables 
 AdjR
2 
change 
B Std. 
Error 
β t 95% CI 
1. Self-Esteem Constant  2.18 1.57    
 Age  .09 .08 .11 1.10 -.07, .25 
 Gender  .42 .36 .12 1.20 -.28, 1.1 
 ESL  1.02 .51 .20 1.10* .00, 2.03 
F(4, 98)=2.03 Stressor .04 -.00 .10 .00 -.02 -.20, .20 
 Social 
Identification 
 .37 .20 .23 1.89 -.02, .76 
F(6, 96)=1.86 Prototypicality .05 -.43 .18 -.03 -.24 -.40, .32 
F(7, 95)=1.97 Interaction .06 .20 .12 .16 1.58 -.49, .43 
2. Satisfaction 
with Life 
Constant  3.84 1.23    
 Age  .04 .06 .07 .64 -.85, .17 
 Gender  -.27 .28 -.10 -1.00 -.82, .27 
 ESL  .26 .40 .07 .66 -.53, 1.05 
F(4, 98)=1.40 Stressor .02 -.09 .08 -.12 -1.18 -.24, .06 
 Social 
Identification 
 .30 .15 .24 1.97+ -.03, .61 
F(6, 96)=1.54 Prototypicality .03 .05 .14 .04 .35 -.23, .33 
F(7, 95)=2.26* Interaction .08 .09 .25 .25 2.47** .05, .42 
3. Social 
Support 
Constant  4.12 .91    
 Age  .05 .05 .11 1.10 -.04, .14 
 Gender  .03 .21 .02 .17 -.37, .44 
 ESL  .32 .30 .10 1.09 -.27, .91 
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F(4, 98)=1.09 Stressor .00 -.05 .06 -.09 -.95 -.16, .06 
 Social 
Identification 
 .38 .11 .39 3.30** .15, .60 
F(6, 96)=3.77** Prototypicality .14 .06 .11 .07 .56 -.15, .27 
F(7, 95)=3.32** Interaction .14 .06 .07 .08 .83 -.08, .20 
4. Social 
Connectedness 
Constant  5.61 .79    
 Age  -.03 .04 -.06 -.64 -.11, .06 
 Gender  -.15 .18 .07 .82 -.21, .50 
 ESL  .26 .26 .09 1.02 -.25, .77 
F(4, 98)=1.15 Stressor .01 -.03 .05 .06 -.63 -.13, .07 
 Social 
Identification 
 .54 .01 .60 5.48*** .35, .74 
F(6, 96)=5.42*** Prototypicality .21 -.08 .09 -.09 -.86 -.26, .10 
F(7, 95)=6.26*** Interaction .27 .18 .06 .27 2.95** .06, .30 
5. Depression 
(DASS-D) 
Constant  2.97 .67    
 Age  -.05 .04 -.16 -1.55 -.12, .02 
 Gender  .21 .15 .14 -1.41 -.51, .09 
 ESL  -.38 .22 -.17 -1.76 -.82, .05 
F(4, 98)=1.98 Stressor .04 .03 .04 .07 .66 -.06, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.21 .08 -.30 -2.48* -.38, -.04 
F(6, 96)=2.77* Prototypicality .09 -.02 .08 -.03 -.24 -.17, .14 
F(7, 95)=2.55* Interaction .10 -.06 .05 -.11 1.09 -.16, .05 
6. Distress 
(DASS-21) 
Constant  2.74 .53    
 Age  -.05 .03 -.17 -1.66 -.10, .01 
 Gender  -.19 .12 -.16 1.58 -.43, .05 
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 ESL  -.20 .17 -.11 -1.13 -.54, .15 
F(4, 98)=1.85 Stressor       .03 .02 .03 .07 .68 -.04, .09 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.13 .07 -.23 -1.88 -.26, .01 
F(6, 96)=2.11 Prototypicality .06 -.04 .06 -.07 -.06 -.16, .09 
F(7, 95)=2.21** Interaction .08 -.07 .04 -.17 -1.62 -.15, .02 
6. Anxiety 
(DASS-A) 
Constant  2.69 .49    
 Age  -.05 .03 -.21 -2.04* -.10, -.00 
 Gender  -.08 .11 -.07 -.69 -.29, .14 
 ESL  -.03 .16 -.02 -.17 -.34, .29 
F(4, 98)=1.22 Stressor .01 .01 .03 .02 .17 -.06, .07 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.09 .06 -.18 -1.46 -.21, .03 
F(6, 96)=1.28 Prototypicality .02 .03 .06 -.06 -.48 -.14, .09 
F(7, 95)=1.50 Interaction .03 -.06 .04 -.17 -1.63 -.14, .01 
7. Stress  
(DASS-S) 
Constant  2.59 .63    
 Age  -.03 .03 -.10 -.98 -.10, .03 
 Gender  .28 .14 -.20 1.96+ -.56, .00 
 ESL  -.18 .21 -.09 -.86 -.58, .23 
F(4, 98)=1.79 Stressor .03 .04 .04 .09 .89 -.04, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.08 .08 -.13 -1.09 -.24, .08 
F(6, 96)=1.54 Prototypicality .03 -.06 .07 -.10 -.80 -.20, .09 
F(7, 95)=1.74 Interaction .05 -.08 .05 -.17 -1.67 -.18, .15 
8.Negative 
Affect 
Constant  2.85 .77    
 Age  -.01 .04 -.04 -.37 -.09, .06 
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 Gender  -.47 .17 -.27 -2.75** -.82, -.13 
 ESL  -.06 .25 -.02 -.23 -.55, .44 
F(4, 98)=1.77 Stressor .03 -.01 .05 -.01 .91 -.10, .09 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.14 .10 -.17 -1.41 -.33, .06 
F(6, 96)=1.69 Prototypicality .04 -.07 .09 -.09 -.74 -.24, .11 
F(7, 95)=2.04 Interaction .07 -.12 .06 -.20 -1.97+ -.23, .00 
9. Positive 
Affect 
Constant  1.88 .68    
 Age  .05 .04 .16 1.54 -.02, .12 
 Gender  .07 .15 .04 .43 -.24, .37 
 ESL  .22 .22 .09 .33 -.22, .66 
F(4, 98)=1.39 Stressor .01 -.04 .04 -.10 -1.04 -.13, .04 
 Social 
Identification 
 .24 .09 .33 2.79** .07, .41 
F(6, 96)=2.41* Prototypicality .08 .03 .08 .05 .39 -.13, .19 
F(7, 95)=2.97** Interaction .12 .12 .05 .24 2.38** .02, .23 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
For “ESL”, English as a second language was coded as 1 and English as a first language 
was coded as 0. 
For gender, male was coded 0 and female was coded 1. 
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Figure 13a. Study 3 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on satisfaction with life 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
 
Figure 13b. Study 3 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on social connectedness. 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
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Figure 13c. Study 3 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on positive affect 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
As can be seen, in each instance the positive relationship between social 
identification and the outcome variable is stronger when participants also perceive 
themselves as having relatively high self-in-group prototypicality. For satisfaction with 
life, the slope of the line for higher perceived self-in-group prototypicality (t(101)=2.73, 
p<.01) was statistically significant, but not the slope for lower prototypicality 
(t(101)=.43, p=.66). Higher prototypicality enabled the positive effect of social 
identification on satisfaction with life to be revealed. For perceived social 
connectedness, both the slope for the line for higher prototypicality (t(101)=5.73, 
p<.001) and lower prototypicality (t(101)=3.46, p<.001) were significant. The 
significant interaction, however, indicates that prototypicality enhanced the positive 
relationship between social identification and social connectedness. For positive affect, 
the slope for the line for higher prototypicality (t(101)=3.33, p<.001) was significant but 
not for lower prototypicality (t(101)=1.25, p=.24). Relatively higher levels of 
prototypicality enabled the positive effect of social identification on positive affect to be 
revealed. Overall, relatively higher social identification positively predicted perceptions 
of satisfaction with life, social connectedness and positive affect. It appears the 
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increased relative in-group prototypicality, when combined with high social 
identification, afforded ANU students with higher psychological well-being. These 
results were consistent with those found in Study 2, except now we find a significant 
moderation effect for more direct measures of psychological well-being such as 
satisfaction with life and positive affect. However, there was no significant moderation 
effect for either measures of depression in either study. Because Study 3 employed a 
different social identity from that in Study 2 (i.e. university student rather than 
university hall resident identity) these results additionally suggest that, for different 
social identities, perceived self-in-group prototypicality may have different effects on 
psychological well-being. Overall, the results of Study 3 further support the findings of 
Study 2, that prototypicality is an important moderator of the social identification – 
psychological well-being relationship as it was not simply enhancing the intensity of the 
relationship between social identification and positive well-being, but was enabling it to 
emerge. 
Discussion Study 3 
  The results of Study 3 provide support for H2, with a significant main effect for 
social identification found for three of the outcome variables and a marginal effect on a 
fourth. There was no evidence to support H3, as no main effect for prototypicality on 
any of the outcome variables was revealed. In support of H4, the results of Study 3 
show prototypicality significantly moderated the positive relationship between social 
identification and satisfaction with life, social connectedness, and positive affect. 
Interestingly only a marginally significant moderation effect was found for the negative 
well-being measure (negative affect), but not for the clinical screening measure of 
distress, depression, anxiety, stress (DASS-21).  
 
General Discussion 
I set out in the current chapter to evaluate the predictive role of relative levels of 
social identification and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on various measures of 
psychological well-being. From previous research (e.g., Gleibs et al., 2011), I 
anticipated that social identification would serve as a significant predictor of this well-
being. The potential role of perceived self-in-group prototypicality, however, 
represented a novel step forward. Although the concept of relative in-group 
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prototypicality is well grounded in extant theory (e.g., McGarty, 1999; Turner et al., 
1987) and research (e.g., Koivisto, Lipponeen, & Platow, 2013; Platow, van 
Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg & Spears, 2006), how precisely it might be 
related to the outcome measures has not been examined before. However, drawing on 
previous findings in the literature I could hypothesise that there could be both main 
effects and interactions. Specifically, I suggest that higher levels of both social 
identification and prototypically, either separately or multiplicatively, would predict 
positive psychological well-being. In the end, the results of the two studies confirmed 
the previous findings of a positive relationship between social identification and 
psychological well-being. Moreover, perceived self-in-group prototypicality enhanced 
these positive effects on several measures, including social support (in Study 2), 
satisfaction with life and positive affect (in Study 3) and social connectedness (in 
Studies 2 and 3). Indeed, without including perceived self-in-group prototypicality, the 
full impact of social identification processes would not be revealed. Clearly, not only is 
it beneficial to identify with one’s social group, it is also beneficial (at least to those 
who do strongly identify) to see oneself as a prototypical member of that group. 
There are at least four key features of the patterns of data observed thus far. First, 
social identification and perceived self-in-group prototypicality (as conceptualized in 
this thesis at least) can, in fact, be separately measured. Second, social identification 
remains an independent predictor of positive psychological well-being across a variety 
of outcome measures. In contrast, relative perceived self-in-group prototypicality had 
no independent effects. Third, relative perceived self-in-group prototypicality tended to 
moderate social identification effects more on socially-oriented measures (support and 
connectedness) and positive well-being measures (positive affect). And fourth, both the 
social identification main effect and the interactions with perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality varied as a function of the salient in-group. This suggests that the nature 
and meaning of the in-group are likely to function as a further moderator of the 
observed effects. Below I consider each of these, excluding the separate measurement 
of social identification and prototypicality which was discussed at length in the 
preceding chapter. 
On its own, participants’ relative levels of social identification currently played a 
prominent role in predicting psychological well-being in both studies. Indeed, social 
identification was a significant predictor of every outcome variable in Study 2 (four 
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positive well-being measures and one negative well-being measure (depression)). In 
Study 3, social identification predicted three positive well-being outcome variables and 
a different measure of depression. This is wholly consistent with the original 
observations that social identities afford individuals certain benefits that enhance their 
psychological well-being.  
At the same time, although I was able to measure it separately, perceived self-in-
group prototypicality alone made no independent contribution to any well-being 
measure in either study. This is an intriguing finding when we further interrogate the 
prototypicality concept. On the one hand, relative in-group prototypicality represents an 
aspect of a person as a group member; the concept itself (and our current 
operationalization of it) is inexorably tied to group membership, so that in the absence 
of group membership in-group prototypicality simply makes no sense. It is a 
psychological-group concept. On the other hand, there is an element of individuation 
bound to the concept. Certainly the manner of the current operationalization asked 
participants to judge themselves relative to other in-group members. The absence of a 
prototypicality main effect, then, reaffirms the broader social identity analysis by 
highlighting the importance of social identification above individuation, even 
individuation within the context of a group. Individuation within the context of a group 
appears to be important only when people already highly identify with that group; on its 
own, individuation – or, at least, this type – appears impotent to effect psychological 
well-being outcomes. This is a remarkably challenging contention, as both social and 
clinical psychology remain highly individualistic (Jetten et al., 2012; Platow & Hunter, 
2014; Turner & Oakes, 1986). I would not want to overstate my position here, as 
individualistic analyses have progressed both fields substantially. Nevertheless, if seen 
as part of a broader nomological net, the absence of a prototypicality main effect can 
potentially validate further the relative power of collectivistic processes. Once again, 
this is consistent with the social identification analysis presented in this thesis, that 
social group membership comes to influence psychological well-being only when 
individuals identify as a group member and the nature of this effect alters depending on 
the degree to which one sees oneself as a prototypical group member. 
So when did perceived relative self-in-group prototypicality moderate the effects 
of social identification? While in Study 2 we only find significant multiplicative effects 
for social support and social connectedness; in Study 3, we additionally find this effect 
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for two direct well-being measures, namely positive affect and satisfaction with life. 
Participants were most satisfied with life, felt good and perceived themselves as having 
more social resources when they were relatively highly in-group prototypical of a group 
with which they identified highly. For these people, their group membership was likely 
to be particularly and powerfully self-defining, affording them happiness and 
satisfaction. However, as noted above, consistent across the two studies, the two 
outcome variables for which an identification-prototypicality interaction was observed 
were both socially-oriented. On the one hand, this might seem like a relatively trivial 
finding as social-oriented predictors predict socially-oriented outcomes. On the other 
hand, it is a direct confirmation of Cruwys et al.’s (2014, p. 219) hypothesis that, “social 
identification will determine the impact of the various social factors (e.g., social 
support) that are implicated in depression.” We know already that social support and 
social connectedness have positive consequences for mental health (Cohen & Wills, 
1985; Kessler & McLeod, 1985; Lee & Robbins, 1998). The current findings, however, 
point to (a) a path to support and connectedness that (b) is not associated with 
interpersonal social-psychological processes. These interpersonal processes may well 
remain important, but we have long known that a separate collectivistic path yields 
positive outcomes for both organizations (Haslam, van Knippenberg, Platow & 
Ellemers, 2014) and their leaders (Haslam, Reicher & Platow, 2011), and individuals 
and their productivity (Wegge & Haslam, 2003), motivation (Haslam, Powell & Turner, 
2000) and their self-esteem (Platow, Byrne & Ryan, 2005). That collectivistic path 
emerged again as an important component of support and connectedness. 
Finally, an obvious outcome of the two studies is the simple fact that the exact 
same patterns of significant and non-significant effects did not emerge in both.  
Certainly, social identification and the moderating role of in-group prototypicality were 
important in both.  This was consistent across both studies, along with the finding of no 
main effect for prototypicality. We also see both studies reveal a significant moderation 
effect of prototypicality on social identification for social connectedness. However, only 
in Study 2 do we find the effect for social support and in Study 3 we additionally find 
the effect for satisfaction with life and positive affect – more direct measures of 
psychological well-being. Interestingly, in both studies we find no significant 
moderation effects for the different negative well-being measures. However, in Study 3 
we do find a marginally significant moderation effect for negative affect, whereby as 
social identification increased and prototypicality increased negative affect, was found 
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to decrease. This suggests we may still find effects for negative psychological well-
being variables, particularly for those who are highly identified but do not see 
themselves as prototypical, or for negative social identities. Because the primary 
difference between Study 2 and Study 3 was the salient social identity, this also could 
explain the difference in significant moderation effects across the two studies. It is a 
fundamental premise of the social identity approach that groups with which people 
identify vary in their normative meanings (Turner et al., 1987). This has been confirmed 
empirically in analyses of schisms (Sani & Reicher, 1998), in-group projection (Wenzel 
et al., 2003), in-group dissent (Crane & Platow, 2010) and stereotyping (Oakes, Turner 
& Haslam, 1994). So, while the fundamental principles underlying a relationship 
between social identification and well-being may remain true (e.g., Cruwys et al., 2014; 
Jetten et al., 2012), the very meaning of the groups with which people identify may 
moderate those processes. In the current studies more consistent relationships were 
observed in the context of a broader university than a dormitory residence. These two 
group contexts vary not only in their likely normative content (e.g., “home” vs. 
“study”), but also along other dimensions such as inclusiveness (Brewer, 1991), and 
even interpersonal friendships (the points above not withstanding). This means that 
inconsistency in exact patterns does not necessarily translate into a replicability 
problem. It simply points to other social and psychological processes that need to be 
considered in future work. 
Conclusion 
Despite the two caveats discussed above, the two studies that were presented in 
the current chapter provide strong evidence in support of a social identity analysis of 
psychological well-being. Enhanced levels of social identification were associated with 
relatively positive well-being across a variety of measures in both studies. Moreover, 
and as a novel contribution of the current work, these positive effects were enhanced 
multiplicatively on several measures when people also saw themselves as relatively 
highly in-group prototypical. The effects of relative perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality do not seem to emerge independently of social identification but, 
instead, are predicated upon and facilitate the effects of social identification. Not only is 
identifying strongly with a salient psychological (and positively valenced) group good 
for us, but seeing ourselves as relatively prototypical of that group enhances our well-
being even further. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Studies 4 and 5: Investigating the effect of manipulating perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality on an group members’ psychological well-being 
 
Chapter Overview 
 In the previous chapter I presented results from two studies that provided 
preliminary support for the conceptual underpinnings of this thesis, specifically, that 
prototypicality is an important moderator of the effects of social identification on 
psychological well-being. I now build upon the primary findings of these studies to 
further test the hypotheses related to the nature of the relationship between social 
identification, prototypicality and psychological well-being. I report two studies 
(Studies 4 and 5 of this thesis) that examine these same variables, but this time using an 
experimental study design. Specifically, in these studies I undertook to determine if an 
individual’s perceived self-in-group prototypicality could be manipulated 
experimentally, and, if so, whether this manipulation could further reveal any causal 
effects of higher or lower self-perceived prototypicality on the relationship between 
social identification and psychological well-being. In both samples, the ANU student 
identity was made salient.  
 To manipulate perceived self-in-group prototypicality, in both studies I provided 
false feedback to participants about their degree of prototypicality as determined by 
their completion of two different tasks. Each task purported to measure the individual’s 
own perceptions of their degree of ‘typicality’ as an ANU Student. At the same time, I 
also measured self-in-group prototypicality explicitly to determine if the effect of the 
manipulation could also be predicted by changes on the PSIPS. For the explicit measure 
of prototypicality though, this time I specified a lower status out-group comparison in 
Study 4 (i.e., Technical college (TAFE) student) as the comparison out-group, while in 
Study 5 I kept the broadly specified out-group comparison (i.e., students from other 
institutions). This was done to additionally explore if differences between comparative 
out-groups would have any effect on prototypicality judgments and consequentially its 
effects on psychological well-being. As previously stated, we know comparative 
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context has important implications for social identity processes. We also know that 
perceptions of status differences between groups can have implications for an 
individual’s psychological well-being (O’Brien & Major, 2005) and generally it can be 
more detrimental to psychological well-being of members of low status groups when 
they compare themselves to higher status groups (Wolf et al. 2010). Thus, while it 
would be equally valid to examine the effects of either a high or low status out-group as 
the comparison out-group, in the current study a low status out-group was chosen as the 
comparison out-group simply to explore any possible effects. 
Method 
 Two experimental studies, with two samples of university students were 
conducted, manipulating prototypicality via two different strategies. The primary 
dependent measures were the same for both studies. 
Measures Used 
 Because the same measures that were used in Studies 2 and 3 were employed for 
Studies 4 and 5, I only summarise and report below the differences in measures used 
particular to Studies 4 and 5. For a full description of the scales themselves and the 
items, please refer to the previous chapter of this thesis. 
Independent Measures 
 The primary independent measures employed across these two samples were a 
self-report measure of social identification (SIS) and the experimental manipulation of 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality (as provided by bogus feedback following 
participants completion of a task). Before beginning the experiment participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two between subjects conditions: low prototypicality and 
high prototypicality. 
Prototypicality Manipulation 
 In each sample, participants completed a bogus task, which purported to 
measure the degree to which individuals saw themselves as ‘typical’ ANU students. 
While the tasks were slightly different in each sample, both (described below) 
essentially involved assigning attributes to different categories, including the salient 
social identity of ANU Student. This both assisted in making the ANU Student social 
identity salient and provided face validity to the false feedback provided, which 
constituted the prototypicality manipulation.  
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 Upon completion of the task, participants were provided with bogus feedback 
about their degree of prototypicality depending on the condition they were assigned to. 
The feedback was presented in the same format for both studies (i.e. written and 
graphical representation) and either indicated the participant was low in prototypicality 
or high in prototypicality. The format of the presentation of the prototypicality feedback 
was derived from previous studies that have attempted to manipulate perceptions of 
leader prototypicality (Hogg, 2001; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001). In Study 4, 
participants randomly assigned to the low prototypicality condition were presented with 
the information presented in Figure 14, while those randomly assigned to the high 
prototypicality condition were presented with the information presented in Figure 15 
below. In Study 5, the bogus feedback was presented in the same format but with the 
comparison group being ‘students from other institutions’.  
 There are a number of features of the design of the feedback that were 
specifically included to enhance the believability of the manipulation that I wish to draw 
attention to here. Firstly, as can be seen, there is considerable emphasis given to 
explaining what the score means and the fact that the score might not be what the 
participant expects. This is because it was important to increase the participants’ beliefs 
that the level of prototypicality they were told the test determines is accurate, 
particularly because it may be different from how they actually felt. This is, of course, a 
very difficult thing to do successfully. There is always a high likelihood that when the 
bogus feedback is presented, participants will reject it, make explanations or react 
defensively because that is not how they see themselves (e.g., being told they are 
different to how they see themselves could represent a threat to their identity). 
Secondly, the out-group comparison (Study 4 – TAFE Student, Study 5 – students from 
another institution) was explicitly included in the feedback to increase the comparative 
out-groups salience. This enabled me to explore if differing out-group comparisons 
(comparative fit) had an effect on determining self-in-group prototypicality judgements. 
Finally, the visual depiction of the position of the participant’s typicality rating in 
relation to the ‘majority’ of group members highlights to the participant their intragroup 
position in relation to others, as either peripheral or central. Each of these features of the 
manipulation feedback were employed to enhance the believability of the (bogus) 
feedback.  
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RESULTS 
Prototypicality Level: LOW 
Among other things, having a LOW prototypicality level means you are more like other 
TAFE students than ANU students, this suggests: 
- deep down, on a subconscious, fundamental level, you DO NOT see yourself as a 
Prototypical ANU student 
- even if you had not realized it before this experiment, you see yourself as more 
similar to TAFE Students than other ANU Students. 
- you have more in common with TAFE Students than ANU Students 
- when push comes to shove, you feel you have more influence with TAFE Students 
than ANU Students, 
Things to remember: 
 Attributing words related to a group with certain self-categories, as measured 
with the IAT, has been shown to tap into psychological processes that fall 
outside people's conscious thought processes. 
 We recognise that these findings may sometimes come as a surprise to our 
participants, but there is no reason to see these results as any less valid.  
 
From the graph above, you can see that: 
- your score fell OUTSIDE the range of that recorded by the majority of ANU Students 
(indicated by the shaded box) 
- you have a very low typicality rating 
Among other things, this means that you: 
- do NOT embody many of the qualities that typify an ANU Student  
- do NOT have a lot of influence with other ANU students compared to TAFE 
students 
- are on many dimensions, more similar to a TAFE student 
Figure 14. Study 4 and 5 Prototypicality manipulation materials – low prototypicality 
condition (note: different comparison group specified in Study 5 version) 
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RESULTS 
Prototypicality Level: HIGH 
Among other things, having a HIGH prototypicality level means you are more like 
other ANU students than TAFE students, this suggests: 
- deep down, on a subconscious, fundamental level, you see yourself as a Prototypical 
ANU student 
- even if you had not realized it before this experiment, you see yourself as more 
similar to other ANU Students than TAFE Students. 
- you have more in common with ANU Students than TAFE Students 
- when push comes to shove, you feel you have more influence with ANU Students 
than TAFE Students, 
- and, it is likely that it would feel good if someone to described you as an ANU 
Student 
Things to remember: 
 Attributing words related to a group with certain self-categories, as measured 
with the IAT, has been shown to tap into psychological processes that fall 
outside people's conscious thought processes. 
 We recognise that these findings may sometimes come as a surprise to our 
participants, but there is no reason to see these results as any less valid.  
 
From the graph above, you can see that: 
- your score fell INSIDE the range of that recorded by the majority of ANU 
Students (indicated by the shaded box) 
- you have a very high typicality rating 
Among other things, this means that you: 
- embody many of the qualities that define ANU Students 
- have more in common with other ANU Students compared to TAFE students 
- are on many dimensions, you are more similar to an ANU Student than a TAFE 
student  
Figure 15. Study 4 and 5 Prototypicality manipulation materials – high prototypicality 
condition (note: different comparison group specified in Study 5 version) 
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 The two bogus tasks participants completed also differed between Study 4 and 
5. In Study 4, the task participants completed was structured after the Implicit Attitudes 
Test (IAT) (developed by Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT has been 
extensively used in social psychological research as it measures implicit associations 
between concepts by measuring differences in reaction time when participants 
categorize words or images. I adopted the structure of the IAT, a measure of implicit 
attitudes, to provide some face validity to why the prototypicality feedback provided to 
participants might have differed from their own perceptions of their degree of 
prototypicality. The task’s purpose and procedure were explained to the participants 
before they began. Participants were told that the IAT was designed to measure the 
degree to which they saw themselves as a prototypical ANU student. Participants then 
assigned stimulus words (presented in the centre of the screen) to either the category 
‘Self’ or ‘Other’ and ‘ANU Student’ or ‘TAFE Student’ (presented at the top right or 
left side of the screen in various combinations). They did this by pressing the 
corresponding key on either the right or left side of the keyboard. They were informed 
they needed to work as quickly as possible throughout the task as their reaction time 
was being measured. They were also told that the IAT, in this way, measures sub-
conscious attitudes, below their level of awareness. The IAT was specifically chosen for 
this inherent quality, as it was considered more likely to enhance participants’ 
acceptance of being randomly told how they feel about themselves (i.e. self perceptions 
of prototypicality). If the attitudes measured in the IAT were believed to be sub-
conscious, then there may have been a greater chance that participants would believe 
what they were told, even if it conflicted with their conscious beliefs.  
   In Study 5, participants completed a Personal Attributes Test (PAT), a bogus test 
developed by the author for the purpose of this study in an attempt to manipulate 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality. Participants were informed the PAT measured 
how ‘typical’ a group member they were by informing them that: “People vary in terms 
of their typicality, which is the degree to which they have qualities that best capture 
what it means to be a member of the group and not a member of another group”. They 
were told their responses on the three sections of the PAT - rating their personal 
attributes, rating the attributes of typical ANU Students, and rating the attributes of an 
ideal ANU Students - would be compared to determine their personal “typicality” score, 
which they would be provided feedback at the completion of the task. Like the IAT, the 
PAT attempted to manipulate individual’s self-perceptions.  
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 Participants were presented with 21 target words which described desirable and 
undesirable personal attributes. They were then required to rate the degree to which 
each target word (e.g., logical, thoughtful, imaginative) was “descriptive of me”. 
Participants responded by dragging a bar on a sliding scale (presented on the screen). 
The scale ranged from 0 = “not at all” to 100 = “extremely”. Participants then rated 
another 14 target words (e.g., extraverted, critical, dependable, anxious) as to what 
degree each word describes a ‘typical’ ANU Student; and finally they rated an ‘ideal’ 
ANU Student, on the same scale. The PAT task was developed for the purpose of this 
thesis as an alternative to the IAT and its design conceptually drew upon a number of 
approaches, including the self-concept (McConnell, 2011), self-discrepancy (Higgins, 
1987) and self-complexity (Linville, 1985/1987) literatures. These approaches suggest 
an individual’s self-concept is comprised of salient attributes (McConnell, 2011) and 
people feel better about themselves when they see their ‘actual’ attributes as matching 
the attributes of the ‘ideal’ self (Higgins, 1987). Consistent with these perspectives, the 
PAT asked participants to rate attributes of the self and the social group (ANU student) 
and then purported to develop a typicality score based on the discrepancy between their 
responses. Also, the target words chosen for use in the PAT were adapted from those 
used in the self-complexity card sorting task (Linville, 1985/1987; Koch & Shepperd, 
2004). These words were adapted in regards to the specificity, valence and contextual 
meaning of the words, as suggested by Showers (1999) and Rafaeli-Mor, Gotlin and 
Revelle (1999). As a result, participants were expected to accept being randomly told 
how they feel about themselves (i.e. self perceptions of prototypicality). 
 Following completion of the IAT and PAT and presentation of the feedback that 
attempted to manipulate the participants’ degree of self-in-group prototypicality (see 
Figures 14 and 15), participants were asked to confirm if they were either “Low in 
Prototypicality” (coded as “0”) or “High in Prototypicality” (coded as “1”); this served 
as a manipulation check. In addition, participants were then asked an open-ended 
question about how they felt about the feedback provided. This provided some 
qualitative evidence that some participants did not like being provided feedback that 
they were non-prototypical as some responded somewhat defensively with comments 
like “ I don’t care really”, whereas, some who received feedback that they were highly 
prototypical were more likely not to respond at all. In some instances participants’ 
responses also indicated that they understood the meaning of prototypicality, and the 
term was not overly ‘technical’. Of course, the feedback provided in the IAT and PAT 
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was also designed to make it easier to understand this concept by using visual and 
simplified words (see Figures 14 and 15). 
I then measured the second (non-manipulated) independent variable, the degree to 
which participants identified as an ANU Student. The same four-item social 
identification scale (SIS) used in Studies 2 and 3 was used to measure this construct. 
Participants then also completed the perceived self-in-group prototypicality scale 
(PSIPS). This measure served two purposes. First, it provided an additional 
manipulation check in that it enabled me to determine if the manipulation had been 
successful in changing actual self-perceptions. Second, it was also employed for use in 
other analyses. For the manipulation to be considered successful, I considered those 
assigned to the high prototypicality condition would report higher scores on the PSIPS 
then those in the low prototypicality condition. Participants responded to each item of 
both the SIS and PSIPS on the same 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree.   
Psychological Well-being Measures 
For both samples, I included two measures of psychological well-being (positive 
affect, satisfaction with life), two measures of social coping (perceived social support, 
social connectedness; Branscombe et al., 1999; Cobb, 1976; Cornwell & Waite, 2009), 
and six measures of psychological distress (distress, 2 measures of depression (DASS-
21 and CES-D), anxiety, stress and negative affect).  All measures were consistent 
across the two samples with the measures used in Study 2 and 3 more fully described in 
the previous chapter of this thesis.   
Immediately following the manipulation and completion of the SIS and PSIPS 
scales, participants completed a measure of state affect, both positive and negative, the 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). 
Participants responded to 10 randomly presented words representing both positive or 
negative emotions and were asked to indicate the degree to which they felt this emotion 
currently on a five-point scale ranging from: very slightly, slightly, somewhat, extremely 
to very extremely. 
Next I used the five-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS) developed by 
Diener et al. (1985), the four item perceived social support scale (adopted from Jetten et 
al. (2012, p. 351), and the four item social connectedness scale (Reicher & Haslam, 
2006) (adapted from a measure of social isolation).  
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I then included commonly employed clinical measures of psychological distress, 
including stress, anxiety and depression. These were measured using the DASS-21 and 
its three subscales (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). Participants rated the degree to which 
each of 21 symptom-defining statements has applied to them over the last week, using a 
four-point scale from 1 (“never”) to 4 (“always”). I also included in each sample, the 
Centre for Epidemiological Studies Rating Scale for Depression (CES-D) (Radloff, 
1977). Participants responded using a four-point scale ranging from 1 (“rarely”) to 4 
(“most of the time”). These measures were specifically employed to further determine 
which measure of depression would yield results. I wished to further investigate the 
differential effects that these scales had shown across Studies 2 and 3. 
Covariates 
In addition to the above variables, age, gender and a single-item measuring the 
experience of a major life-stressor in the previous six months also served as covariates 
in all analyses. One final covariate included was whether participants’ first language 
was English, given that many of the students sampled at our English-speaking 
university did not have English as their first language. Finally, participants also 
answered demographic questions, including their ethnicity and nationality.  
 
Study 4 
Method 
Participants. Forty-five male and eighty female (N=125) Australian National 
University students voluntarily participated in this study. Ages ranged from 17 to 39 
years (median=19 years). Of the one hundred and twenty-five participants who 
completed the experiment, 97 (77.6%) reported English was their first language. 
Participants were recruited on-campus and received either $5 or course credit for their 
involvement.  
Procedure. The experiment was entitled the “ANU Students’ Well-being Study” 
and was administered on-line using Qualtrics software. Participants were told the 
purpose of the study was to determine the impact various social factors have on their 
well-being. Participants were asked to compete the mock IAT described above (not 
administered in a lab); again, this reported to measure the degree to which the 
participant was a typical ANU Student. Upon completion of this task, participants were 
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then presented with feedback (see Figures 14 and 15), and told the test showed they 
were either high or low in degree of prototypicality as an ANU Student. Participants 
then completed all the other measures described previously in Chapter 7. Upon 
completion, participants were provided with an explanation of the study and counselling 
phone numbers in case they required them. 
Results 
I began by completing a principal components analysis on the four social 
identification items and the five perceived self-in-group prototypicality items. Using an 
oblimin rotation, two components with eigen values greater than one again emerged 
accounting for 65.2% of the variance.  These two components largely corresponded to 
the two scales, except in the case of the last two social identity scale items (“I see 
myself as (group name)” and “I am pleased to be a member of (group name)”), which 
either loaded on the other component or equally on both. In addition, the first PSIPS 
item (“I feel more similar to other (in-group name) than I do to non-(in-group name)”) 
also equally loaded on both components positively.  
So, to further test the measurement model, whereby items assessing social 
identification and prototypicality loaded on their corresponding yet distinct factors, I 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis. I first examined a single factor model in 
which all four social identification items and five prototypicality items were entered. 
The resulting measurement model showed inadequate fit indices according to Kline’s 
(2005) criteria 2(124)=229.69 comparative fit index (CFI)=.68 and root mean square 
error of approximation [(RMSEA)=.25, 90% CIs=.22, .28)]. This indicated that social 
identification and prototypicality scale items loaded on more than one factor. So, a two- 
factor solution was examined after scale items that exhibited high covariance were 
allowed to co-vary. In the final model, each of the items clearly loaded on the related 
latent variables and model fit indices (2(124)=107.08, p<.001, comparative fit index 
(CFI) =.96 and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)=.08 , 90% CIs=.07, 
.10) were greatly improved. See Figure 16 for the path analysis for the final CFA 
model. 
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Figure 16.  Study 4 Path analysis of confirmatory factor analysis of social identity and 
prototypicality scale items 
 
I then calculated an average of the items within the SIS and PSIPS for each 
participant and the average of each of the other multi-item measures that were used. 
Table 10 presents Cronbach’s alphas, means, standard deviations and pair-wise 
correlations for each scale. Average scores on social identification (p<.001), satisfaction 
with life (p<.01), social support (p<.001) and social connectedness (p<.01) were all 
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significantly greater than the sale mid-point; positive affect, negative affect, stress, 
anxiety, depression and distress, were significantly lower than their respective scale 
mid-points (ps<.001). As in Studies 2 and 3, the negative psychological well-being 
measures all negatively correlated with positive well-being measures, but positively 
correlated with each other, indicating divergent and convergent validity. 
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Table 10. Study 4 Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, and correlations between variables 
Scale M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Social Identification 5.38a 1.21 .86 -           
2. Prototypicality (PSIPS) 5.02a 1.28 .84 .69*** -          
3. Positive Affect 2.64b 0.84 .93 .21** .27*** -         
4. Negative Affect 1.66b 0.80 .94 .10 .16 .27*** -        
5. Satisfaction with Life 5.01a 1.30 .87 .27*** .16 .23*** -.01 -       
6. Social Support 5.57a 1.16 .89 .30*** .14 .21** -.16 .30*** -      
7. Social Connectedness 4.97a 0.59 .78 .21** .19** .28*** .08 .01 .49*** -     
8. Stress (DASS-S) 1.82c 0.69 .89 .02 -.05 .05 .38*** -.09 -.10 .10 -    
9. Anxiety (DASS-A) 1.50c 0.53 .84 .09 .01 .09 .44*** -.05 -.09 .05 .76*** -   
10. Depression (DASS-D) 1.67c 0.65 .90 -.11 -.14 -.06 .33*** -.31*** -.25*** .04 .75*** .68*** -  
11. Distress (DASS-21) 1.67c 0.57 .94 -.01 -.07 .02 .42*** -.17 -.16 .07 .93*** .88*** .90*** - 
12. Depression (CES-D) 1.85c 0.45 .85 -.04 -.07 .01 .28 -.14 -.12 .12 .76*** .67*** .79*** .82*** 
**p<.01, ***p<.001aMeasured on a scale from 1 – 7.; bMeasured on a scale from 1 – 5.; cMeasured on a scale from 1 – 4.  
 Note: Correlations between the DASS-21 and its subcomponents are inflated as the full DASS-21 includes those subcomponents.
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Analyses Based on Manipulated Self-In-Group Prototypicality  
I next examined whether being in the low prototypicality condition (M=5.09, 
SD=1.15) or high prototypicality condition (M=4.96, SD=1.40) predicted scores on 
measured perceived self-in-group prototypicality (PSIPS). In this case, there was no 
relationship found between manipulated perceived self-in-group prototypicality and 
responses on the explicit measure of prototypicality (PSIPS) (t(123)=-.57, p=ns). This 
suggests that the manipulation had been unsuccessful. However, it is important to note 
that participants’ responses to a manipulation check question presented immediately 
post the manipulation (i.e. “How prototypical did the IAT task indicate you were?”), 
was in each instance (100%) consistent with the condition to which the participant had 
been randomly assigned (i.e. those provided feedback they were highly prototypical 
endorsed high prototypicality rather than low prototypicality when responding to this 
question). While this item was intended to serve as a manipulation check, it appears the 
question might not have been an accurate reflection of participants’ actual perceptions 
of themselves as prototypical. Indeed, taken together the evidence suggests that 
difficulties may have occurred with the manipulation; I will consider this further in the 
discussion.   
Because it was unclear if the above findings actually meant there was a failure of 
the manipulation to successfully alter perceptions of self-in-group prototypicality, it was 
still considered important to investigate the effects of the manipulation on the outcome 
variables. So, I proceeded simply by conducting separate stepwise hierarchical 
regression analyses for each outcome variable in the same manner that I did in Studies 2 
and 3. Included in these analyses as predictors were: gender, age, English as a first 
language, major life stressor, relative levels of social identification (mean-centered; 
Aiken & West, 1991), manipulated perceived self-in-group prototypicality (either low = 
-1 or high = +1) and the interaction between the latter two in that order. The results of 
these analyses are presented in Table 11.   
Recent life stressor was a significant predictor for each of the psychological 
distress measures (i.e., DASS-21, Depression, Anxiety, Stress subscales, & CES-D). 
While gender significantly predicted both affect measures, the mean difference between 
females (M=2.57, SD=.77) and males (M=2.75, SD=.96) was not significant (t(123)=-
1.108, p=ns) for positive affect, or negative affect (Females (M=1.57, SD=.77); Males 
(M=1.82, SD=1.01), t(123)=-1.69, p=ns). However, the mean difference between 
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participants whose second language was English (M=4.57, SD=.63) and for those whose 
first language was English (M=5.09, SD=.54) was significant for social connectedness, 
t(123)=-4.35, p<.001. Those whose second language was English endorsed significantly 
fewer feelings of social connectedness. 
Higher levels of social identification as a university student significantly predicted 
higher levels of psychological well-being, in particular, positive affect, satisfaction with 
life, social support and social connectedness. This effect was found even after 
controlling for age, gender, English as a second language and the recent experience of a 
major life stressor. While there was a significant main effect for social identification for 
each of these outcome measures, interestingly, relative levels of manipulated perceived 
self-in-group prototypicality itself was not independently related to any of the outcome 
variables. Manipulated perceived self-in-group prototypicality did, however, 
significantly moderate the effects of social identification on two of the outcome 
variables, namely positive affect and depression. These interactions are presented in 
Figures 17a-17b, with values estimated at one standard deviation above and below the 
mean. 
 
Table 11.  
Models Tested in Study 4 (Manipulated Prototypicality) 
Outcome 
Variables 
 AdjR2 
change 
B Std. 
Error 
β t 95% CI 
1. Positive Affect Constant  3.89 .72    
 Age  -.05 .04 -.13 -1.52 -.12, .02 
 Gender  -.32 .16 -.19 -2.06* -.63, -.01 
 ESL  .02 .18 .01 .09 -.33, .36 
F(4, 120)= .90 Stressor -.003 .01 .04 .02 .23 -.06, .08 
 Social 
Identification 
 .15 .06 .22 2.36* .02, .28 
F(6, 118)=2.15+ Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.05 -.06 .07 -.07 -.76 -.20, .09 
F(7, 117)=2.67* Interaction .09 .15 .06 .21 2.31* .02, .27 
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2.Negative Affect Constant  .41 .70    
 Age  .07 .03 .17 1.90 -.003, .13 
 Gender  -.33 .15 -.20 -2.15* -.63, -.03 
 ESL  .26 .17 .14 1.57 -.07, .60 
F(4, 120)=2.32 Stressor .04 .04 .04 .10 1.09 -.03, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 .08 .06 .12 1.29 -.04, .20 
F(6, 118)= 2.16 Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.05 -.08 .07 -.10 -1.08 -.21,.07 
F(7, 117)=1.90 Interaction .05 .04 .06 .06 .60 -.08, .16 
3. Satisfaction 
with Life 
Constant  5.99 1.13    
 Age  -.04 .06 -.06 -.66 -.15, .07 
 Gender  -.01 .25 -.01 -.02 -.49, .48 
 ESL  -.36 .27 -.12 -1.30 -.90, .19 
F(4, 120)=.76 Stressor -.01 -.05 .06 -.08 -.84 -.16, .06 
 Social 
Identification 
 .25 .10 .23 2.52* .05, .45 
F(6, 118)=2.05 Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.05 -.09 .11 -.07 -.80 -.32, .14 
F(7, 117)=1.98 Interaction .05 .12 .10 .11 1.22 -.08, .32 
4. Social Support Constant  4.59 .99    
 Age  .04 .05 .07 .80 -.06, .13 
 Gender  .25 .21 .10 1.15 -.18, .67 
 ESL  -.37 .24 -.13 -1.54 -.84, .11 
F(4, 120)=2.13 Stressor .04 .05 .05 .08 .96 -.05, .14 
 Social 
Identification 
 .23 .09 .24 2.61** -.05, .40 
F(6, 118)=3.02** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.09 .02 .10 -.01 .87 -.21, .18 
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F(7, 117)=2.97** Interaction .10 .13 .09 .14 1.56 -.04, .31 
5. Social 
Connectedness 
Constant  4.86 .49    
 Age  .004 .02 .01 .15 -.04, .05 
 Gender  .06 .11 .05 .56 -.15, .27 
 ESL  -.51 .12 -.36 -4.30*** -.74, -.28 
F(4, 120)=5.83*** Stressor .14 .04 .02 .13 1.51 -.01, .09 
 Social 
Identification 
 .09 .04 .19 2.14** .01, .18 
F(6, 118)=5.15*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.17 .07 .05 .11 1.36 -.03, .17 
F(7, 117)=4.43*** Interaction .16 .02 .04 .05 .56 -.06, .11 
6. Stress    
(DASS-S) 
Constant  2.39 .59    
 Age  -.05 .03 -.14 -1.64 -.10, .01 
 Gender  .05 .13 .04 .40 -.20, .30 
 ESL  -.23 .14 -.14 -1.62 -.51, .05 
F(4, 120)=5.12** Stressor .12 .11 .03 .34 3.92*** .06, .17 
 Social 
Identification 
 .03 .05 .05 .60 -.07, .13 
F(6, 118)=3.55** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.11 -.05 .06 -.08 -.88 -.17, .07 
F(7, 117)=3.28** Interaction .11 -.06 .05 -.11 -1.25 -.17, .04 
7. Anxiety 
(DASS-A) 
Constant  1.83 .46    
 Age  -.03 .02 -.13 -.1.45 -.08, .01 
 Gender  -.01 .10 .01 -.07 -.19, .20 
 ESL  .07 .11 .05 .59 -.15, .29 
F(4,120)=4.04** Stressor .09 .09 .02 .34 3.93*** .04, .13 
 Social  .06 .04 .13 1.46 -.02, .14 
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Identification 
F(6,118)=3.01** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.09 -.02 .05 -.03 .69 -.11, .07 
F(7, 117)=2.74* Interaction .09 .-04 .04 -.10 -1.05 -.12, .04 
8. Depression 
(DASS-D) 
Constant  2.06 .56    
 Age  -.04 .03 -.12 -1.44 -.09, .02 
 Gender  .11 .12 .08 .90 -.13, .35 
 ESL  -.06 .13 -.04 -.41 -.32, .21 
F(4,120)=3.35* Stressor .07 .01 .03 .31 3.54*** .04, .15 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.03 .05 -.06 -.65 -.13, .07 
F(6,118)=2.44* Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.07 -.01 .06 -.02 -.25 -.13, .10 
F(7, 117)=2.93** Interaction .10 -.11 .05 -.21 -2.32* -.21, -.02 
9. Distress 
(DASS-21) 
Constant  2.10 .48    
 Age  -.04 .02 -.14 -1.69 -.09, .01 
 Gender  .06 .10 .05 .53 -.15, .26 
 ESL  -.07 .12 -.05 -.63 -.30, .16 
F(4, 120)=4.95** Stressor .11 .10 .02 .36 4.22*** .05, .15 
 Social 
Identification 
 .02 .04 .04 .45 -.06, .10 
F(6, 118)=3.32** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.10 -.03 .05 -.05 -.58 -.12, .05 
F(7, 117)=3.33** Interaction .12 -.07 .04 -.16 -1.74 -.16, .01 
10. Depression 
(CES-D) 
Constant  1.73 .40    
 Age  -.01 .02 -.02 -.26 -.04, .03 
 Gender  .15 .09 .16 1.70 -.02, .32 
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 ESL  -.07 .10 -.07 -.76 -.26, .12 
F(4, 120)=2.19 Stressor .04 .04 .02 .20 2.26* .01, .08 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.02 .04 -.06 -.66 -.09, .05 
F(6, 118)=1.55 Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.03 -.01 .04 -.01 -.13 -.08, .07 
F(7, 117)=1.34 Interaction .02 -.02 .04 -.04 -.44 -.08, .05 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
For “ESL”, English as a second language was coded as 1 and English as a first language 
was coded as 0. 
For gender, male was coded 0 and female was coded 1. 
For “Prototypicality Manipulation”, low prototypicality was coded -1 and high 
prototypicality was coded +1.  
 
As can be seen, the positive relationship between social identification and positive 
affect was stronger among participants who had received feedback that they were also 
relatively high in prototypicality. Participants also endorsed significantly fewer 
depression symptoms as social identification increased, but only when participants had 
received feedback that they were also relatively higher in prototypicality. When they 
had received feedback they were relatively lower in prototypicality, high identifiers 
rated themselves as more depressed. The slope of the line for higher prototypicality was 
statistically significant for both positive affect [t(123)=3.48, p<.001] and depression 
[t(123)=-2.36, p<.05], but not the slope for low prototypicality in both cases. Higher 
prototypicality enabled us to see the positive effect of higher social identification on 
depression (i.e. reduced endorsement of depression symptoms), but only for those 
higher in social identification. Overall, the multiplicative and different effects of 
manipulated perceived self-in-group prototypicality on social identification’s effect on 
depression occurred only for those with higher levels of social identification. For the 
first time, these results demonstrate a significant moderation effect for prototypicality 
on social identification for a negative well-being measure. This is an important finding 
and will be discussed further in the Discussion. In the case of positive affect we find 
higher prototypicality enabled us to see the differential effects of levels of social 
identification on how positive an individual feels. These results indicate being told one 
is high in self-in-group prototypicality enhances the positive effects of social 
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identification for both positive and negative measures of psychological well-being, and 
particularly when the comparative out-group is a lower status group (i.e. TAFE 
students).   
 
 
Figure 17a. Study 4 Statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and manipulated self-in-group prototypicality on positive affect  
Note: * denotes significant slope 
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Figure 17b. Study 4 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and manipulated self-in-group prototypicality on depression (DASS-D) 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
Analyses Based on Measured Self-In-Group Prototypicality 
Because the effect of the manipulation on participants’ actual self-perceptions of 
their own relative in-group prototypicality was questionable, I then explored the effects 
of the explicit measure of perceived self-in-group prototypicality (PSIPS). To do this I 
conducted a series of hierarchical linear regressions with this measured prototypicality 
variable included. Each model employed the same variables described in the previous 
analysis, however, instead of entering the manipulation of prototypicality, the explicit 
measure of prototypicality (PSIPS) was included. Because it was possible the 
manipulation of prototypicality had been unsuccessful (see previous analysis) it was 
important to examine if the explicit measure of prototypicality yielded different results. 
This enabled further clarification of the relationship between prototypicality and 
psychological well-being, but also whether being told one is either high/low in 
prototypicality (the manipulation) was different to the effect of measured prototypicality 
on the outcome variables. To this end, the explicit measure of prototypicality (PSIPS) 
variable was entered as both a main effect and as an interaction term with social 
identification (each mean-centered, Aiken & West, 1991). The results of these analyses 
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are presented in Table 12. 
After controlling for age, gender, English as a second language and recent 
stressor, there was a main effect for social identification on satisfaction with life (p<.01) 
and social support (p<.05). Participants who identified as an ANU student felt greater 
psychological well-being as a consequence. In addition, perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality independently positively predicted positive affect (p<.05). In addition, 
measured self-in-group prototypicality significantly moderated the positive impact of 
levels of social identification on positive affect and depression. These interactions are 
presented in Figures 18a-18c, with values estimated at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean. 
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Table 12.   
Significant Models Tested in Study 4 (Measured Prototypicality) 
Outcome Variables  AdjR2 
change 
B Std. 
Error 
β t 95%CI 
1. Positive Affect Constant  3.95 .72    
 Age  -.07 .04 -.17 -2.01* -.14, -.001 
 Gender  -.22 .16 -.13 -1.40 -.53, .09 
 ESL  .04 .17 .02 .21 -.31, .38 
F(4, 120)=.90 Stressor -.003 .04 .04 .10 1.09 -.03, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 .11 .09 .15 1.19 -.07, .28 
F(6, 118)=2.85* Prototypicality  .08 .18 .08 .27 2.23* .02, .34 
F(7, 117)=3.07** Interaction .11 .07 .04 .19 1.99* .00, .14 
2. Negative Affect Constant  .46 .70    
 Age  .06 .03 .15 1.68 -.01, .13 
 Gender  -.29 .15 -.18 -1.92+ -.59, .01 
 ESL  .26 .17 .14 1.57 -.07, .60 
F(4, 120)=2.32 Stressor .04 .05 .04 .13 1.42 -.02, .12 
 Social 
Identification 
 .04 .09 .07 .51 -.13, .22 
F(6, 118)=2.21* Prototypicality .06 .10 .08 .16 1.25 -.06, .25 
F(7, 117)=2.01 Interaction .06 .03 .04 .09 .91 -.04, .10 
3. Satisfaction with 
Life 
Constant  5.97 1.14    
 Age  -.04 .06 -.07 -.79 -.15, .07 
 Gender  .03 .25 .01 .11 -.46, .52 
 ESL  -.33 .27 -.11 -1.20 -.87, .21 
F(4, 120)=.76 Stressor -.01 -.04 .06 -.06 -.70 -.15, .07 
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING  
 
  
   153 
 Social 
Identification 
 .38 .14 .35 2.69** .10, .66 
F(6, 118)=1.98 Prototypicality .05 -.04 .13 -.04 -.35 -.30, .21 
F(7, 117)=1.99 Interaction .05 .08 .06 .14 1.39 -.03, .19 
4. Social Support Constant  4.62 1.00    
 Age  .04 .05 .06 .72 -.06, .13 
 Gender  .27 .22 .11 1.23 -.16, .69 
 ESL  -.33 .24 -.12 -1.39 -.81, .14 
F(4, 120)=2.76 Stressor .04 .05 .05 .09 1.00 -.05, .15 
 Social 
Identification 
 .31 .12 .33 2.53* .07, .56 
F(6, 118)=3.10** Prototypicality .09 -.07 .11 -.08 -.67 -.30, .14 
F(7, 117)=2.63* Interaction .08 .00 .05 .00 .04 -.10, .10 
5. Social 
Connectedness 
Constant  4.86 .49    
 Age  .00 .02 .00 .03 -.05, .05 
 Gender  .10 .11 .08 .91 -.11, .31 
 ESL  -.51 .12 -.36 -4.29*** -.74, -.27 
F(4, 120)=5.83*** Stressor .13 .05 .03 .17 1.96+ -.00, .10 
 Social 
Identification 
 .03 .06 .06 .48 -.09, .15 
F(6, 118)=5.23*** Prototypicality .17 .08 .06 .18 1.49 -.03, .19 
F(7, 117)=4.45*** Interaction .16 -.00 .03 -.01 -.10 -.05, .05 
6. Stress     
(DASS-S) 
Constant  2.37 .59    
 Age  -.05 .03 -.14 -1.56 -.10, .01 
 Gender  .03 .13 .02 .22 -.23, .28 
 ESL  -.25 .14 -.15 -1.72 -.53, .04 
F(4, 120)=5.12** Stressor .12 .11 .03 .32 3.65*** .05, .17 
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 Social 
Identification 
 .04 .07 .06 .48 -.11, .18 
F(6, 118)=3.39** Prototypicality .10 -.00 .07 .00 -.00 -.13, .13 
F(7, 117)=2.95** Interaction .10 .02 .03 .06 .61 -.04, .08 
7. Anxiety  
(DASS-A) 
Constant  1.77 .45    
 Age  -.03 .02 -.12 -.1.43 -.08, .01 
 Gender  -.00 .10 .01 .06 -.19, .20 
 ESL  .06 .11 .04 .52 -.16, .27 
F(4, 120)=4.04** Stressor .09 .09 .02 .34 3.90*** .04, .13 
 Social 
Identification 
 .08 .06 .17 1.36 -.04, .19 
F(6, 118)=2.98* Prototypicality .09 .01 .05 .03 .23 -.09, .11 
F(7, 117)=3.13** Interaction .11 .04 .02 .18 1.91 -.00, .09 
8. Depression 
(DASS-D) 
Constant  1.97 .56    
 Age  -.03 .03 -.11 -1.25 -.09, .02 
 Gender  .08 .12 .06 .67 -.16, .32 
 ESL  -.08 .14 -.05 -.58 -.35, .19 
F(4, 120)=3.35* Stressor .07 .09 .03 .29 3.21*** .04, .15 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.02 .07 -.03 -.25 -.16, .12 
F(6, 118)=2.43* Prototypicality .07 -.00 .06 -.00 -.04 -.13, .12 
F(7, 117)=2.48* Interaction .08 .05 .03 .16 1.62 -.01, .10 
9. Distress   
(DASS-21) 
Constant  2.04 .48    
 Age  -.04 .02 -.14 -1.58 -.08, .01 
 Gender  .04 .11 .03 .37 -.17, .25 
 ESL  -.09 .12 -.07 -.77 -.32, .14 
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F(4,120)=4.95** Stressor .11 .10 .02 .35 3.97*** .05, .14 
 Social 
Identification 
 .03 .06 .07 .53 -.09, .15 
F(6, 118)=3.25** Prototypicality .10 .00 .05 .01 .06 -.10, .11 
F(7, 117)=3.13** Interaction .11 .04 .02 .14 1.48 -.01, .08 
10. Depression 
(CES-D) 
Constant  1.67 .39    
 Age  -.01 .02 -.03 -.30 -.04, .03 
 Gender  .16 .08 .17 1.89 -.01, .32 
 ESL  -.08 .09 -.07 -.81 -.26, .11 
F(4, 120)=2.19* Stressor .04 .05 .02 .22 2.45* .01, .09 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.003 .05 -.01 -.05 -.10, .09 
F(6, 118)=1.55 Prototypicality .03 .02 .04 .03 .43 -.07, .10 
F(7, 117)=2.28* Interaction .09 .05 .02 .24 2.50* .01, .09 
+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
For “ESL”, English as a second language was coded as 1 and English as a first language 
was coded as 0. 
For gender, male was coded 0 and female was coded 1. 
 
 
As can be seen, the positive relationship between social identification and positive 
affect is stronger among participants who perceived themselves to be relatively high in 
prototypicality. The slope of the line for higher prototypicality is significant 
(t(123)=3.48, p<.001), but not the slope for the line for lower prototypicality (p=ns) . 
Different from the previous analysis, however, participants endorsed relatively more 
depression symptoms as social identification increased but only when they also 
perceived themselves as relatively higher in prototypicality. However when they saw 
themselves as lower in prototypicality, high identifiers endorsed relatively fewer 
depression symptoms. Neither of the slopes of the lines for higher and lower 
prototypicality, however, were significant for depression (p=ns).  
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Figure 18a. Study 4 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on positive affect 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
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Figure 18b. Study 4 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on depression 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
Discussion Study 4 
 The results of this study provide further support for social identification’s 
positive relationship with psychological well-being (H2), and evidence to support a 
relationship between prototypicality (H3) and psychological well-being directly, but 
also that prototypicality does moderate of the effects of social identification on 
psychological well-being (H4). Interestingly, despite the manipulation of prototypicality 
having no significant effect on the measured self-in-group prototypicality (PSIPS), the 
results of the separate analyses (which included either the manipulated or measured 
prototypicality variables) were largely similar. Both analyses yielded main effects for 
social identification on satisfaction with life and social support, while the analysis 
which included the manipulated prototypicality variable additionally yielded a main 
effect for social identification on positive affect and social connectedness. Surprisingly, 
and in direct contrast to Studies 2 and 3, social identification did not significantly 
predict any other outcome variables. In addition, the results of Study 4 found a 
significant main effect for measured prototypicality on positive affect. There was also 
consistency between the two analyses (which included either the prototypicality 
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manipulation or the explicit measure of prototypicality) in terms of the significant 
moderation effects found. In both analyses, prototypicality moderated the effects of 
social identification on positive affect and depression, providing evidence to support 
H4. In both instances, higher prototypicality enabled the positive effects of higher social 
identification on psychological well-being to be seen (i.e. higher positive affect and 
lower depression).  
 Finally, despite some difficulty in determining whether the manipulation was 
successful, both the manipulated prototypicality variable and the measured 
prototypicality variable predicted the same outcome variables (positive affect and 
depression). This suggests that the manipulation of perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality, in the current study, may have been successful, despite the inherent 
difficulties in manipulating participants’ perceptions of their own prototypicality. Thus, 
the results of this study provide some evidence that prototypicality does moderate the 
positive relationship between social identification and psychological well-being. 
Specifically it provides causal evidence that self-prototypicality judgements moderate 
the effects of social identification on depression and positive mood. This is a somewhat 
surprising result, given participants were asked to endorse the extent to which they had 
experienced depression symptoms ‘recently’ as opposed to ‘right now’ as the 
manipulation was framed. Indeed the manipulation would be considered more likely to 
have had an effect on current mood such as positive affect/negative affect (measured by 
the PANAS) than the measure of depression (DASS-21). This suggests that either the 
participants’ responses on the depression measure were more easily influenced by 
situational factors (i.e. the manipulation) and present mood than has previously been 
thought (Roberts & Venon, 1983). To further test the veracity of these results, in Study 
5 I developed and tested a slightly different manipulation task, to see it this made any 
difference to the pattern of findings. 
Study 5 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-nine male and 111 female (N=160) ANU students voluntarily 
participated in this study. Ages ranged from 17 to 42 years (median=19 years). One 
hundred and forty-two (83.5%) reported English was their first language. Participants 
were recruited via posters distributed on campus noticeboards and invited to complete 
an online questionnaire. Each was offered either course credit if he or she was a first-
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year psychology student or AU$5.00 remuneration. 
Procedure. Participants completed the manipulation task (which in this study was 
the Personal Attributes Test (PAT) not the IAT used in Study 4) and dependent 
measures (as described above). Upon completion, participants were provided with an 
explanation of the study, counselling phone numbers if they required them, before 
receiving either payment or course credit. 
 
Results 
As with the previous studies, I began by completing a principal components 
analysis on the four social identification items and the five perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality items. Using an oblimin rotation, two components with eigen values 
greater than one again emerged accounting for 60.76% of the variance. These two 
components corresponded to the two scales in all cases except for the final two 
prototypicality scale items (i.e. “I think it would be accurate if someone described me as 
a typical (in-group name)” and “I would feel good if someone described me as a typical 
(in-group name)”), which either loaded equally on both or in one case loaded more on 
social identification. Removal of these items, however, did not improve the scales’ 
reliability, and to remain consistent with all the previous studies, I decided to keep the 
full five item PSIPS items in further analyses.  
To further test the measurement model, whereby items assessing social 
identification and prototypicality loaded on their corresponding factors, I conducted a 
confirmatory factor analysis. I first examined a single factor model in which all four 
social identification items and five prototypicality items were entered. The resulting 
measurement model showed inadequate fit indices according to Kline’s (2005) criteria 
2(170)=130.34, p<.001, comparative fit index (CFI)=.82 and root mean square error of 
approximation [(RMSEA)=.15, 90% CIs=.12, .18]. This indicated that social 
identification and prototypicality scale items may load on more than one factor. So, a 
two-factor solution was examined with social identification and prototypicality. To 
account for high covariance between item error terms, these were first allowed to co-
vary. In this final model, each of the items clearly loaded on the related latent variables 
and model fit indices (2(170)=115.26, p<.001, comparative fit index (CFI)=.96 and 
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)=.81, 90% CIs=.07, .10 were greatly 
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improved. See Figure 19 for the path analysis for the final CFA model. 
 
Figure 19. Study 5 Path analysis of confirmatory factor analysis of social identity and 
prototypicality scale items 
 
I then calculated an average of the items within the SIS and PSIPS for each 
participant. I also calculated the average of each of the other multi-item measures that 
were used. Table 13 presents Cronbach’s alphas, means, standard deviations and pair-
wise correlations for each scale.   
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Reported social identification (p<.001), perceived self-in-group prototypicality 
(p<.01), satisfaction with life (p<.001), social support (p<.001), social connectedness 
(p<.001) and positive affect (p<.001) were all significantly greater than the scale mid-
point. In contrast, the CDS-E, all DASS scales and negative affect were all significantly 
lower than their respective scale mid-points (ps<.001). As in Study 4, participants had 
higher levels of social identification than measured perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality, t(170)=10.29, p<.001. 
Notably, the negative psychological well-being measures all negatively correlated 
with positive well-being measures, but positively correlated with each other, indicating 
divergent and convergent validity. Social identification was significantly positively 
correlated with each of the positive well-being outcome variables and negatively 
correlated with each of the negative well-being outcome variables. Self-in-group 
prototypicality significantly positively correlated with positive affect, satisfaction with 
life and social connectedness. Social identification and measured self-in-group 
prototypicality were also significantly correlated with each other. However, as the 
collinarity statistics (tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF)) were within 
acceptable limits (VIF < 2), the assumption for multi-collinarity was met (Coakes, 
2005; Hair et al., 2012). 
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Table 13. Study 5 means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas and correlations between variables 
Scale M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Social Identification 5.26a 1.26 .81 -            
2. Prototypicality (PSIPS) 4.30a 1.22 .79 .63*** -           
3. Positive Affect 2.51b .80 .91 .31*** .22*** -          
4. Negative Affect 1.66b .70 .90 -.12 .02 -.00 -         
5. Satisfaction with Life 4.53a 1.52 .85 .42*** .21*** .27*** -.12 -        
6. Social Support 5.33a 1.46 .96 .39*** .11 .19** -.21*** .56*** -       
7. Social Connectedness 5.61a 1.15 .71 .46*** .19** .23*** -.11 .47*** .51*** -      
8. Stress (DASS-S) 2.06c .71 .85 -.29*** -.07 -.21*** .33*** -.37*** -.32*** -.30*** -     
9. Anxiety (DASS-A) 1.65c .63 .84 -.25*** -.02 -.10 .42*** -.39*** -.40*** -.35*** .74*** -    
10. Depression (DASS-D) 1.87c .74 .90 -.41*** -.10 -.25*** .28*** -.61*** -.46*** -.39*** .72*** .67*** -   
11. Distress (DASS-21) 1.86c .62 .94 -.36*** -.07 -.21*** .39*** -.51*** -.44*** -.39*** .92*** .88*** .90*** -  
12. Depression (CDS-E) 1.88c .58 .92 -.45*** -.12 -.23*** .39*** -.59*** -.50*** -.47*** .78*** .77*** .89*** .91*** - 
**p<.01, ***p<.001; aMeasured on a scale from 1 – 7; bMeasured on a scale from 1 – 5; cMeasured on a scale from 1- 4.                  
Note: Correlations between the DASS-21 and its subcomponents are inflated as the full DASS-21 includes those subcomponents.
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING  
 
  
   163 
Analyses Based on Manipulated Self-In-Group Prototypicality 
I next examined whether the condition in which participants were randomly 
assigned (i.e., low prototypicality or high prototypicality) led to differences in their 
scores on the PSIPS. Similar to Study 4, there was no significant mean difference 
between the scores of participants in the low prototypicality condition (M=4.14, 
SD=1.26) or the high prototypicality condition (M=4.47, SD=1.15) on the measured 
prototypicality scale (t(168)=1.79, p=ns). This suggests that, similar to Study 4, the 
manipulation may not have successfully altered participants’ perceptions of their own 
prototypicality, or at least did not directly predict their explicit responses to perceptions 
of their own prototypicality. However, 100% of participants did respond in the single 
item manipulation check consistent with the condition to which they had been randomly 
assigned (i.e., those provided with feedback they were highly prototypical endorsed 
high prototypicality rather than low prototypicality when responding to the question 
“How prototypical did the PAT indicate you were.”). 
To examine the relationship between prototypicality and each of the outcome 
variables, a step-wise hierarchical regression analysis was then conducted with the same 
predictors for each analysis as were employed in Study 4: gender, age, English as a first 
language, major life stressor, relative levels of social identification (mean-centered; 
Aiken & West, 1991), manipulated perceived self-in-group prototypicality and the 
interaction between the latter two were entered in that order. The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 14.   
As can be seen, relative levels of social identification served as a significant 
predictor for all of the outcome variables except negative affect (p=ns). These effects 
were found even after accounting for the other covariates, in-particular experience of a 
recent life stressor, which significantly predicted most outcome variables (i.e., positive 
affect, satisfaction with life, social connectedness, stress, anxiety, both measures of 
depression, negative affect and overall psychological distress). Interestingly, 
manipulated prototypicality alone did not serve as an independent predictor of any 
outcome variables. Respondents in either the low or high prototypicality condition did 
not endorse any psychological well-being measure significantly differently from each 
other.  Most notably, manipulated self-in-group prototypicality also did not serve as a 
reliable moderator of social identification for any of the outcome variables. This, of 
course, was somewhat surprising, given the strength of the findings in previous studies 
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presented in this empirical work. However, it is possible these results were a reflection 
of the lack of success of the manipulation and suggests the manipulation in Study 4 may 
have been more effective than that employed in Study 5. Despite this, these results do 
provide evidence to confirm previous work that demonstrates higher social 
identification is positively related to psychological well-being measures.
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Table 14.   
Models Tested in Study 5 (Manipulated Prototypicality) 
Outcome Variables  AdjR2 
change 
B Std. 
Error 
β t 95% CI 
1. Positive Affect Constant  2.66 .46    
 Age  -.01 .02 -.02 -.23 -.05, .04 
 Gender  -.20 .13 -.12 -1.59 -.45, .05 
 ESL  .26 .16 .12 -1.65 -.05, .58 
F(4, 165)=1.03 Stressor .00 .01 .03 .03 .44 -.04, -.07 
 Social 
Identification 
 .22 .05 .33 4.40*** .12, .32 
F(6, 163)=3.89** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.09 .04 .06 .04 .59 -.08, .15 
F(7, 162)=3.68** Interaction .10 .08 .05 .11 1.50 -.02, .17 
2. Negative Affect Constant  1.53 .41    
 Age  -.01 .02 -.03 -.38 -.05, .03 
 Gender  -.01 .11 -.01 -.07 -.23, .21 
 ESL  -.00 .14 -.00 -.02 -.29, .28 
F(4, 165)=3.21* Stressor .05 .09 .03 .27 3.53** .04, .14 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.07 .05 -.11 -1.48 -.16, .02 
F(6, 163)=2.58* Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.05 -.04 .05 -.06 -.73 -.14, .07 
F(7, 162)=2.27* Interaction .05 -.03 .05 -.05 -.71 -.12, .06 
3. Satisfaction with 
Life 
Constant  4.29 .80    
 Age  .04 .04  .96 -.04, .12 
 Gender  .16 .22  .73 -.27, .60 
 ESL  -.44 .28  -1.57 -1.0, .11 
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F(4, 165)=3.56** Stressor .06 -.16 .05  -3.34*** -.26, .06 
 Social 
Identification 
 .52 .09  5.91*** .35, .70 
F(6, 163)=8.60*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.21 .01 .11  .12 -.20, .22 
F(7, 162)=7.60*** Interaction .22 .11 .08  1.22 -.06, .28 
4. Social Support Constant  4.78 .80    
 Age  .04 .04 .07 .94 -.04, .12 
 Gender  .21 .22 .07 .97 -.22, .65 
 ESL  -.02 .28 -.00 -.05 -.57, .54 
F(4, 165)=1.26 Stressor .006 -.09 .05 -.14 -1.92 -.19,-.003 
 Social 
Identification 
 .47 .09 .38 5.32*** .29, .64 
F(6, 163)=6.38*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.16 -.18 .10 -.13 -1.77 -.39, .02 
F(7, 162)=5.53*** Interaction .16 .06 .09 .05 .73 -.11, .24 
5. Social 
Connectedness 
Constant  4.85 .60    
 Age  .04 .03 .10 1.47 -.02, .10 
 Gender  .25 .17 .10 1.49 -.08, .57 
 ESL  -.06 .21 -.02 -.28 -.47, .36 
F(4, 165)=1.54 Stressor .01 -.07 .04 -.14 -1.99* -.14,-.00 
 Social 
Identification 
 .44 .07 .46 6.68*** .31, .57 
F(6, 163)=9.15*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.22 -.13 .08 -.11 -1.61 -.28, .03 
F(7, 162)=8.26*** Interaction .23 .10 .07 .11 1.56 -.03, .23 
6. Stress      
(DASS-S) 
Constant  1.28 .39    
 Age  .02 .02 .08 1.10 -.02, .06 
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 Gender  .21 .11 .14 1.95 -.00, .42 
 ESL  -.25 .14 -.13 -1.81 -.51, .02 
F(4, 165)=5.92*** Stressor .10 .08 .02 .26 3.59*** .04, .13 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.16 .04 -.27 -3.78** -.25, -.08 
F(6, 163)=6.70*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.17 .01 .05 .01 .18 -.09, .11 
F(7, 162)=5.72*** Interaction .16 .01 .04 .02 .26 -.07, .10 
7. Anxiety   
(DASS-A) 
Constant  1.57 .35    
 Age  -.01 .02 -.05 -.62 -.05, .02 
 Gender  .14 .10 .11 1.43 -.05, .33 
 ESL  -.16 .12 -.09 -1.28 -.40, .09 
F(4, 165)=3.96** Stressor .07 .07 .02 .25 3.36*** .03, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.13 .04 -.25 -3.38** -.21, -.05 
F(6, 163)=4.84*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.12 .02 .05 .04 .49 -.07, .11 
F(7, 162)=4.26*** Interaction .12 .04 .04 .07 .91 -.04, .11 
8. Depression 
(DASS-D) 
Constant  1.55 .40    
 Age  .004 .02 .01 .18 -.04, .04 
 Gender  -.008 .11 -.01 -.08 -.22, .21 
 ESL  -.15 .14 -.08 -1.08 -.42, .12 
F(4, 165)=3.98** Stressor .07 .09 .02 .25 3.64*** .04, .13 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.24 .04 -.39 -5.56*** -.33, -.16 
F(6, 163)=8.32*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.21 .02 .05 .03 .37 -.08, .12 
F(7, 162)=7.16*** Interaction .20 -.03 .04 -.05 -.64 -.11, .06 
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9. Distress    
(DASS-21) 
Constant  1.47 .33    
 Age  .01 .02 .02 .28 -.03, .04 
 Gender  .11 .09 .09 1.22 -.07, .29 
 ESL  -.18 .12 -.11 -1.58 -.42, .05 
F(4, 165)=5.35*** Stressor .09 .08 .02 .28 4.01*** .04, .12 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.18 .04 -.34 -4.85*** -.25, -.11 
F(6, 163)=8.08*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.20 .02 .04 .03 -.42 -.07, .10 
F(7, 162)=6.89*** Interaction .20 .01 .04 .01 .17 -.07, .08 
10. Depression 
(CES-D) 
Constant  1.52 .30    
 Age  .004 .02 .02 .26 -.03, .03 
 Gender  .11 .08 .09 1.32 -.05, .27 
 ESL  -.12 .10 -.08 -1.12 -.32, .09 
F(4, 165)=5.01** Stressor .09 .07 .02 .27 4.03*** .04, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.21 .03 -.43 -6.40*** -.27, -.14 
F(6, 163)=11.15*** Prototypicality 
Manipulation 
.27 .02 .04 .04 .54 -.06, .10 
F(7, 162)=9.50*** Interaction .26 -.004 .03 -.01 -.12 -.07, .06 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
For “ESL”, English as a second language was coded as 1 and English as a first language 
was coded as 0. 
For gender, male was coded 0 and female was coded 1. 
For “Prototypicality Manipulation”, low prototypicality was coded -1 and high 
prototypicality was coded +1.  
 
Analyses Based on Measured Self-In-Group Prototypicality 
Finally, the same analysis, but this time replacing the manipulation of 
prototypicality with the explicit measure of self-in-group prototypicality (the PSIPS), 
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was conducted. Again, responses to the PSIPS were entered as both a main effect and as 
an interaction term with social identification (each mean-centered before entering, 
Aiken & West, 1999). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 15.  
The pattern of significant effects was equivalent to the previous analysis with 
some additions. Once again, after controlling for age, gender, English as a second 
language and recent stressor, social identification significantly predicted all the outcome 
variables (p<.001) except for negative affect (p=ns). In addition, a significant main 
effect was also found for prototypicality for social support, anxiety (all p<.05)., both 
measures of depression (DASS-D and CDS-E) (p<.01) and psychological distress 
(DASS-21) (p<.05). Participants in this sample, with higher scores on the PSIPS, 
reported lower perceptions of social support and higher depression, anxiety and overall 
psychological distress. The explicit measure of prototypicality also moderated the 
positive impact of higher social identification on negative affect. The interaction is 
presented in Figure 20, with values estimated at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean.  
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Table 15.   
Models Tested in Study 5 (Measured Prototypicality) 
Outcome Variables  AdjR2 
change 
B Std. 
Error 
β t 
95%  
1.Positive Affect Constant  2.69 .45    
 Age  -.01 .02 -.03 -.43 -.05, .03 
 Gender  -.21 .13 -.13 -1.68 -.46, .04 
 ESL  .26 .16 .12 1.59 -.06, .57 
F(4, 165)=1.03 Stressor .001 .02 .03 .05 .63 -.04, .07 
 Social 
Identification 
 .23 .07 .34 3.40*** .10, .37 
F(6, 163)=3.86** Prototypicality  .09 .02 .06 .04 .37 -.10, .15 
F(7, 162)=3.68** Interaction .10 .05 .04 .12 1.54 -.02, .12 
2.Negative Affect Constant  1.48 .40    
 Age  -.01 .02 -.03 -.42 -.05, .03 
 Gender  -.04 .11 -.03 -.38 -.26, .17 
 ESL  .01 .14 .01 .06 -.27, .28 
F(4, 165)=3.22* Stressor .05 .09 .02 .27 3.64*** .04, .13 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.05 .06 -.09 -.89 -.17, .06 
F(6, 163)=2.81* Prototypicality  .06 .06 .06 .11 1.16 -.04, .17 
F(7, 162)=3.81** Interaction .10 .09 .03 .24 3.00** .03, .15 
3. Satisfaction with 
Life 
Constant  4.38 .80    
 Age  .03 .04 .06 .78 -.05, .11 
 Gender  .18 .22 .06 .80 -.26, .62 
 ESL  -.49 .28 -.12 -1.70 -1.05, .08 
CI 
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F(4, 165)=3.56** Stressor .06 -.15 .05 -.22 -3.13** -.25, -.05 
 Social 
Identification 
 .59 .12 .47 4.90*** .35, .83 
F(6 163)=8.77*** Prototypicality  .22 -.10 .11 -.08 -.91 -.32, .12 
F(7, 162)=7.47*** Interaction .21 .01 .06 .01 .18 -.11, .14 
4. Social Support Constant  4.91 .79    
 Age  .03 .04 .05 .73 -.05, .11 
 Gender  .26 .22 .08 1.17 -.18, .69 
 ESL  -.08 .28 -.02 -.29 -.63, .47 
F(4, 165)=1.26 Stressor .01 -.08 .05 -.12 -1.65 -.17, .02 
 Social 
Identification 
 .63 .12 .52 5.31*** .40, .86 
F(6, 163)=7.01*** Prototypicality  .18 -.27 .11 -.22 -2.44* -.48, -.05 
F(7, 162)=6.01*** Interaction .17 -.03 .06 -.04 -.47 -.15, .09 
5. Social 
Connectedness 
Constant  4.99 .60    
 Age  .03 .03 .08 1.15 -.02, .09 
 Gender  .27 .17 .12 1.72 -.04, .61 
 ESL  -.10 .21 -.03 -.48 -.52, .32 
F(4, 165)=1.54 Stressor .01 -.06 .04 -.11 -1.65 -.13, .01 
 Social 
Identification 
 .52 .09 .55 5.82*** .35, .70 
F(6, 163)=9.27*** Prototypicality  .23 -.14 .08 -.15 -1.70 -.31, .02 
F(7, 162)=7.91*** Interaction .22 -.02 .05 -.02 -.32 -.12, .08 
6. Stress   (DASS-
S) 
Constant  1.28 .38    
 Age  .02 .02 .08 1.08 -.02, .06 
 Gender  .20 .11 .13 1.87 -.01, .40 
 ESL  -.23 .13 -.12 -1.71 -.50, .04 
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F(4, 165)=5.92*** Stressor .10 .08 .02 .25 3.60*** .04, .13 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.20 .06 -.34 -3.50*** -.31, -.09 
F(6, 163)=7.33*** Prototypicality  .18 .09 .05 .15 1.67 -.02, .19 
F(7, 162)=6.47*** Interaction .19 .03 .03 .09 1.12 -.02, .09 
7. Anxiety (DASS-
A) 
Constant  1.57 .34    
 Age  -.01 .02 -.06 -.76 -.05, .02 
 Gender  .13 .10 .10 1.33 -.06, .31 
 ESL  -.14 .12 -.09 -1.18 -.38, .10 
F(4, 165)=3.96** Stressor .07 .07 .02 .25 3.45*** .03, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.17 .05 -.33 -3.35*** -.27, -.07 
F(6, 163)=5.73*** Prototypicality  .14 .10 .05 .19 2.08+ .005, .19 
F(7, 162)=5.33*** Interaction .15 .04 .03 .12 1.61 -.01, .10 
8. Depression 
(DASS-D) 
Constant  1.52 .39    
 Age  .01 .02 .02 .31 -.03, .04 
 Gender  -.02 .11 -.02 -.15 -.23, .20 
 ESL  -.12 .14 -.06 -.85 -.39, .15 
F(4, 165)=3.98** Stressor .07 .08 .02 .24 3.45** .03, .13 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.33 .06 -.53 -5.64*** -.44, -.21 
F(6, 163)=9.79*** Prototypicality  .24 .14 .05 .23 2.60** .03, .25 
F(7, 162)=8.35*** Interaction .23 .01 .03 .02 .22 -.05, .07 
9. Distress (DASS-
21) 
Constant  1.45 .32    
 Age  .004 .02 .02 .28 -.03, .04 
 Gender  .10 .09 .08 1.14 -.08, .28 
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 ESL  -.16 .12 -.10 -1.42 -.39, .06 
F(4, 165)=5.35*** Stressor .09 .08 .02 .27 3.99*** .04, .12 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.23 .05 -.45 -4.78*** -.33, -.14 
F(6, 163)=9.39*** Prototypicality  .23 .11 .05 .21 2.41* .02, .20 
F(7, 162)=8.23*** Interaction .23 .03 .03 .08 1.09 -.02, .08 
10. Depression 
(CES-D) 
Constant  1.49 .29    
 Age  .004 .01 .02 .29 -.02, .03 
 Gender  .09 .08 .08 1.16 -.07, .25 
 ESL  -.09 .10 -.06 -.93 -.29, .11 
F(4, 165)=5.01** Stressor .09 .07 .02 .26 4.03*** .04, .10 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.26 .04 -.54 -6.03*** -.34, -.17 
F(6, 163)=13.07*** Prototypicality  .30 .11 .04 .23 2.79** .03, .19 
F(7, 162)=11.80*** Interaction .31 .04 .02 .12 1.77 -.01, .08 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
For “ESL”, English as a second language was coded as 1 and English as a first language 
was coded as 0.  
For gender, male was coded 0 and female was coded 1. 
 
Measured prototypicality moderated the positive impact of higher social 
identification on negative affect. The slope of the line for lower prototypicality was 
statistically significant t(126)=-2.53, p<.05, but not the slope of the line for higher 
prototypicality t(126)=.053, p=.59. Interestingly, for this negative indicator of 
psychological well-being it appears low prototypicality was not so much enhancing the 
negative relationship between social identification and negative affect, but enabling it to 
emerge, but only for those highly identified.  
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Figure 20. Study 5 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity and 
perceived self-in-group prototypicality on negative affect 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
Discussion Study 5 
The results of Study 5 support the main effects model for social identification 
(H2). Social identification significantly predicted scores on all of the psychological 
well-being measures. However, despite the manipulation of self-in-group 
prototypicality not significantly predicting any outcome variables independently, in 
Study 5 we found a significant main effect for measured prototypicality on a clinical 
measure of overall distress, both measures of depression, anxiety and social support. 
This provides considerable evidence to support Hypothesis 3 that prototypicality 
independently predicts psychological well-being. However, given these results 
demonstrating a main effect for prototypicality are inconsistent with the findings of the 
previous three studies contained in the current thesis, they are to be treated cautiously, 
especially given we do not find the same effect for the manipulated prototypicality 
variable. It is possible that the manipulation of prototypicality may have also influenced 
responses on the PSIPS. Finally, the results of Study 5 show that measured self-in-
group prototypicality moderated the positive effects of social identification on 
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psychological well-being (H4), but for only one outcome variable – negative affect. 
Relatively lower perceived self-in-group prototypicality predicted significantly less 
negative affect when participants were relatively higher in identification.  
 
General Discussion 
I set out in the current chapter to evaluate the predictive role of relative levels of 
social identification and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on various measures of 
psychological well-being. In particular, the experimental design of Studies 4 and 5 
sought to specifically determine if there was any causal influence of perceived self-in-
group prototypicality on psychological well-being. Drawing on findings in the 
literature, I hypothesised that higher levels of both social identification and 
prototypically, either separately or multiplicatively, would predict increased 
psychological well-being. In the end, the results of the two studies confirmed the 
previous findings of a positive relationship between social identification and 
psychological well-being. Manipulated perceived self-in-group prototypicality did not 
predict any psychological well-being measures independently, however it was shown to 
enhance the positive effects of social identification on several measures, including 
positive affect and depression in Study 4, but for no outcome measures in Study 5. This 
is an important finding given the manipulation of prototypicality accurately predicted 
both positive and negative psychological well-being measures. This result was further 
supported by finding that measured prototypicality enhanced the effects of social 
identification on positive affect and depression in Study 4, (albeit with a different 
measure of depression). For the first time we find causal evidence that self-in-group 
prototypicality interacts with social identification to predict psychological well-being. 
However, unfortunately we do not find a consistency of these results with those found 
in Study 5. This is possibly a function of a different manipulation task being used in 
Study 5 (although the bogus feedback about self-prototypicality was presented in the 
same format in both studies), however we can not be certain. However, given that in 
both studies participants assigned to either the high/low prototypicality conditions did 
not have corresponding scores on the prototypicality measure (PSIPS), this raises 
questions around whether the manipulation was actually successful in changing 
participants’ self-perception of prototypicality. Below I will discuss issues relating to 
manipulation of self-in-group prototypicality and its measurement before considering 
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the pattern of results evident from the analysis that included the measured 
prototypicality variable. 
While similar attempts to manipulate social self-attitudes have been used in 
previous studies in similar ways (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001) 
the current studies’ manipulations did not predict responses on the PSIPS. There are a 
number of reasons which may have contributed to this that should be considered here. 
Firstly, the manipulation task for Study 4 (the IAT) and for Study 5 (the PAT) may 
simply not have been convincing enough; participants may have not accepted the task 
was actually measuring what it said it was and, hence, the feedback that they were 
high/low in prototypicality was not believable. If this occurred then participants may 
have simply ignored it. Given how difficult it can be to get participants to accept that 
their perceptions of their own prototypicality are incorrect (i.e., they actually see 
themselves as highly prototypical but the feedback informs them they are low in 
prototypicality), this would not have been an entirely unexpected result. In fact, 
participants, instead of simply discounting the feedback, may have reacted to being 
provided feedback about their prototypicality status in a defensive way. Certainly for 
those who care about the degree to which they are a prototypical group member (high 
identifiers), being provided feedback that they were low in prototypicality may have 
done just that, largely because this would have been considered an undesirable state for 
these individuals. They may have actively denied the results of the manipulation to 
protect their psychological well-being. Consistent with the self categorisation analysis 
presented in this thesis, peoples’ reactions to being told they are not prototypical may be 
negative, as low prototypicality may also signal increased threat of exclusion as a 
consequence of the individual maintaining a peripheral or marginal position in the 
group (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). Combined with evidence that individuals are 
motivated to maintain a good impression of themselves and the impressions others have 
of them (Leary & Kowalski, 1990), we can see these factors are likely to have had a 
contributing effect to responses on the PSIPS, which did not coincide with the effects of 
the prototypicality condition alone. In addition, because both Studies 4 and 5 were 
conducted on participants’ personal computers, wherever participants chose (i.e. not in a 
laboratory setting), we cannot rule out that the presence of others may have influenced 
participants’ responses to being told they were low in prototypicality. It could also be 
that the task made participants feel as if they were being ‘tested’ and or judged and this 
itself influenced psychological well-being rather than prototypicality. Certainly, future 
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studies that intend to manipulate self-in-group prototypicality should consider these 
aspects in their study and manipulation design to determine which, if any, of these 
possible impacts contributes to the manipulation’s successful alteration of perceptions 
of one’s own prototypicality. 
 A fundamental requirement of the self-categorisation analysis of psychological 
well-being outlined in this thesis is that social identification and perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality (as I conceptualise it) can be measured separately. Indeed, if I found this 
was not the case, I would not be able to examine the effects of these factors 
(independently or multiplicatively) on psychological well-being. As in Studies 1, 2 and 
3, I find here that the PSIPS scale items measured a construct separate from the social 
identification scale items. One aspect of the order of the presentation of the PSIPS in the 
study design, however, may have had a number of unforeseen consequences. The first is 
that because the PSIPS needed to be administered prior to the outcome measures, it is 
possible this altered the effect of the manipulation on participants’ responses to the 
psychological well-being measures. While I acknowledge this potentially confounding 
aspect of the study design, there was little that could have been done about it, except by 
altering the order of administration of this scale too, which would have had its own 
complications. For instance, it could have influenced participants’ responses on other 
measures included in the study and hence reduced the ability to compare results 
between each empirical study within the current thesis. Removing the scale all together 
would have posed its own problems as well, because an aim of the current work was to 
determine if prototypicality could be measured separately from social identification. 
Once again, this issue will be an important consideration in future study designs. 
Let us now consider the pattern of results of both studies in terms of the measured 
prototypicality variable (the PSIPS) alone. We find three key features. First, social 
identification was further demonstrated to be a strong independent predictor of positive 
psychological well-being across a variety of outcome measures. Second, for the first 
time perceived self-in-group prototypicality was found to have an independent effect on 
a number of outcome variables. Third, relative perceived self-in-group prototypicality 
tended to moderate social identification’s effects on a number of outcome measures, 
including positive affect and depression. Below I consider each one of these in turn. 
On their own, participants’ relative levels of social identification played a 
prominent role in predicting psychological well-being in both studies. In the case of 
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Study 4, social identification was a significant predictor of only two variables 
(satisfaction with life and social support). In Study 5, social identification predicted all 
of the positive well-being (social connectedness and positive affect) and negative well-
being outcome measures (overall distress, both measures of depression, anxiety and 
stress). The exact pattern is not wholly consistent across both studies, although, when 
taken together, the results are consistent with the original observations that social 
identification is largely beneficial to psychological well-being. In Study 4, we find 
social identification only predicts social support and satisfaction with life and not the 
affect and distress related measures of psychological well-being. This leads us to ponder 
why and examine the differences between Study 4 and Study 5 to determine this. It 
could be that the manipulation task itself directly influenced the category content or 
meaning of the identity, participants’ degree of identification as an ANU student, or 
their actual self-in-group prototypicality judgment. For instance, in Study 4 a low status 
out-group comparison was included in the IAT task, and academically positive qualities 
were ascribed to the ANU student category. Both of these artefacts of the manipulation 
task could have enhanced identification and reduced the effect of the prototypicality 
feedback to manipulate actual perceptions of participants.  
In contrast to the findings of Studies 2 and 3, the results of the studies presented in 
this chapter show perceived self-in-group prototypicality can make an independent 
contribution to a number of well-being measures. This is an important finding and 
suggests further interrogation of the prototypicality concept is warranted and required. 
Indeed, finding perceived self-in-group prototypicality has an effect on psychological 
well-being separate to social identification provides further evidence for the need to 
measure these two concepts separately. It could be that prototypicality represents an 
equally important route to psychological well-being as social identification, one that has 
been overlooked prior to now. Finding a main effect for prototypicality in no way 
detracts from the importance of social identification to psychological well-being. 
Instead it provides support for the consideration of another aspect of self-categorisation. 
Certainly, this thesis represents the first step in this direction, and suggests 
prototypicality may assist us to explain the differential effects of social identification on 
psychological well-being demonstrated in the literature. Certainly the results of the 
current empirical work potentially validates the relative power of perceived self-in-
group prototypicality in determining the effects of social identification on psychological 
well-being.  
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  Finally, let us consider when perceived self-in-group prototypicality moderated 
the effects of social identification. While in Study 4 we find significant multiplicative 
effects for both variables on psychological well-being, specifically positive affect and 
depression, in Study 5 we find this effect only for negative affect. Individuals’ 
psychological well-being is clearly being enhanced by participants’ perceiving 
themselves as high in relative prototypicality. For these people, their group membership 
was likely to be particularly powerful in defining who they are and higher 
prototypicality enhanced the value of this to their psychological well-being. However, 
as noted above, these effects were inconsistent across the two studies. Once again, the 
effects of the different manipulation tasks on the measures administered subsequently 
(i.e. being either told about one’s degree of self-in-group prototypicality, or having 
prototypicality tested), could be playing a part in these observed inconsistencies across 
the studies. It is also a fundamental premise of the social identity approach that the 
groups with which people identify vary in normative meanings (Turner et al., 1987) and 
comparative fit processes (in-particular the nature of the out-group in relation to the 
salient social identity). Certainly, Studies 4 and 5 do differ in regards to this second 
point. This points to other social and psychological processes that need to be considered 
in future work. Finally, we find the significant moderation effects for depression and 
negative affect were in a surprising direction. The positive benefits of high 
identification (predicting less negative affect and depression) were only revealed when 
participants also saw themselves as lower in prototypicality. Despite this, the strongest 
finding of the current studies was that manipulated prototypicality, significantly 
moderated the effects of high identification on scores on the depression measure. The 
positive effects of high identification on depression were only able to be seen once we 
considered self-judgments of prototypicality.   
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the two studies that were presented in the current chapter provide 
evidence to support the social identity analysis of psychological well-being presented in 
the current thesis. Having relatively higher social identification is clearly associated 
with greater psychological well-being. Moreover, and as a novel contribution of the 
current work, these positive effects were shown to be enhanced multiplicatively when 
people also saw themselves as relatively highly in-group prototypical in some instances 
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and relatively lower in-group prototypical in other instances. As discussed, there are a 
number of reasons that could occur including the category content or meaning of the 
social identity, valence of the social identity itself and individual factors including 
impression management. In addition, we find that participants’ assigned to the higher 
prototypicality condition, who were also highly identified as an ANU student, endorsed 
significantly less symptoms of depression than those who reported being lower in 
identification (only in Study 4). In addition, those assigned to the higher prototypicality 
condition, who were also lower in identification , endorsed significantly less positive 
affect (once again only in Study 4). It is worth noting here, however, that while the 
range of the scores on the measure of depression were at no time indicative of clinical 
levels of depression (i.e. diagnosable depression) higher prototypicality significantly 
enhanced the positive effects of social identification in reducing endorsement of overall 
depression symptoms. This result is particularly noteworthy as it provides the first 
causal evidence for prototypicality moderating of the positive effects of social 
identification on psychological well-being. 
On a final note, Studies 4 and 5 also demonstrated that seeing oneself as a highly 
prototypical group member (as measured by the PSIPS) in some cases also 
independently predicted higher psychological well-being. This further highlights the 
importance of considering prototypicality in the social identity analysis of psychological 
well-being provided by this thesis. While the results of the studies reported here support 
previous evidence that higher social identification with a salient psychological (and 
positively valenced) group is positively related to psychological well-being, it 
demonstrates for the first time that seeing oneself as relatively prototypical of an 
important social identity can both enable these effects to be seen and is in some 
instances equally important to psychological well-being as social identification itself. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Study 6: Social Identification and perceived self-in-group prototypicality predicts 
overall psychological well-being 
 
Chapter Overview 
 The four empirical studies reported in the previous two chapters of this thesis 
aimed to examine the role of social factors in psychological well-being by examining 
two self-categorisation theory concepts, social identification and prototypicality. 
Overall, the results provide evidence to support the empirical hypotheses that 
prototypicality and social identification independently and multiplicatively explain the 
differential impacts of social group membership on people’s psychological well-being. 
However, as previously mentioned, there are some inconsistencies in the patterns of 
results found across each of the previously reported studies (e.g., each study found 
significant effects on different outcome measures and social identification and self-in-
group prototypicality interacted in a number of ways). Thus, in one final study, Study 6, 
I combined the data from each of the empirical studies conducted, into one large data 
set and conduct a final hierarchical regression (consistent with the used in the 
individuals studies) to test the consistency and validity of the effects. Therefore, this 
study enabled evaluation of the same hypotheses with a much larger sample size. 
Specifically for the outcome variables - satisfaction with life, social support and social 
connection (N=569), positive affect, negative affect and depression (N=464), stress, 
anxiety, depression and distress – as measured by the DASS-21 (N=398) and self 
esteem (N=274).  
 Because the current study utilised the same measures employed in the previous 
four studies (reported in the previous two chapters), I do not repeat them here. Instead, 
please refer to previous chapters for a detailed description. Note however that not all 
measures were employed across all studies, resulting in differences in the sample size 
for each outcome variable reported in this study. Social support, social connectedness 
and satisfaction with life were measured across all four studies; positive and negative 
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affect, depression (CES-D) and (DASS-21) were measured in three studies; and self 
esteem was measured in only two studies. 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and forty-nine male and three hundred and twenty 
female (N=569) ANU students voluntarily participated in three separate samples that 
measured the same variables. Of the final data set, sample 1 comprised 171 participants 
(30%), sample 2, 103 participants (18%), sample 3, 125 participants (22%) and sample 
4, 170 (30%). Ages ranged from 17 to 49 years (median=19 years). Four hundred and 
seventy-three (83%) participants reported English was their first language. 
 
Results 
  As I tested whether the social identity and prototypicality scale items measured 
separate constructs previously (see Study 1 of this thesis) I do not report this again here, 
but simply note that the measurement model of these scales items supported hypothesis 
1, that they do indeed measure separate constructs.  
 Thus, I calculated an average of the items within the social identity and 
prototypicality scales for each participant. I also calculated the average of each of the 
other multi-item measures that were used and examined their relationship with other 
scales. Table 16 presents Cronbach’s alphas, means, standard deviations and pair-wise 
correlations for each scale.  
 As can be seen, reported social identification was significantly higher than the 
midpoint of the scale, t(568)=33.5, p<.001, suggesting participants strongly identified as 
an ANU Student or University Hall Resident across the entire dataset. Similarly, self-in-
group prototypicality was significantly higher than the scale’s midpoint (which was 4), 
suggesting participants saw themselves as generally highly prototypical group members. 
Participants also had significantly higher levels of social identification than 
prototypicality, t(568)=18.32, p<.001. Satisfaction with life, social support, social 
connectedness, positive affect, and self-esteem (ps<.001) were all significantly greater 
than the sale mid-point; whereas the depression measures (i.e., CES-D, all the DASS-21 
subscales and negative affect (as measured by the PANAS)) were all significantly lower 
than their respective scale mid-points (ps<.001).  
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 The negative psychological well-being measures (i.e., stress, anxiety, depression 
and psychological distress) all significantly negatively correlated with each of the 
positive well-being measures (i.e., positive affect, satisfaction with life, social support, 
social connectedness, and self-esteem). Each negative well-being measure also 
positively correlated with each other, suggesting divergent and convergent validity 
between the well-being scales. Social identification and self-in-group prototypicality 
were also significantly correlated with each other (p<.001). Closer examination of the 
collinearity statistics (tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF)) found these were 
all within acceptable limits (VIF < 2) and the assumption for multi-collinearity was met 
(Coakes, 2005; Hair et al., 2012). 
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Table 16. Study 6 means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas and correlations between variables 
Scale M SD α 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Social Identification! 5.62a 1.20 .85 -            
2. Prototypicality (PSIPS)! 4.42a 1.17 .83 .60*** -           
3. Positive Affect$ 2.68b .82 .88 .25*** .20*** -          
4. Negative Affect$ 1.89b .81 .86 -.06 -.02 -.12** -         
5. Satisfaction with Life! 4.81a 1.40 .87 .39*** .24*** .27*** -.22*** -        
6. Social Support! 5.36a 1.23 .90 .42*** .24*** .18*** -.23*** .50*** -       
7. Social Connectedness! 5.58a 1.05 .70 .49*** .20*** .23*** -.11** .35*** .51*** -      
8. Stress (DASS-S)@ 1.99c .70 .88 -.14*** -.10 -.16*** .41*** -.33*** -.27*** -.15*** -     
9. Anxiety (DASS-A)@ 1.63c .59 .86 -.12** -.05 -.08 .46*** -.32*** -.30*** -.20*** .75*** -    
10. Depression(DASS-D)@ 1.84c .75 .84 -.28*** -.15*** -.27*** .37*** -.53*** -.38*** -.26*** .73*** .67*** -   
11. Distress (DASS-21) @ 1.82c .61 .90 -.21*** -.11** -.20*** .45*** -.44*** -.36*** -.23*** .92*** .88*** .90*** -  
12. Depression (CES-D) $ 1.86c .54 .88 -.30*** -.15*** -.14** .34*** -.45*** -.39*** -.29*** .76*** .74*** .85*** .87*** - 
13. Self-Esteem# 4.68a 1.65 --- .17*** .05 .30*** -.47*** .58*** .37*** .30*** -.41*** -.41*** -.48*** -.49*** -.50*** 
**p<.01, ***p<.001; aMeasured on a scale from 1 – 7; bMeasured on a scale from 1 – 5; cMeasured on a scale from 1- 4. ! N=569; $ N=464; @ N=398 ; # 
N=274. Note: correlations between the DASS-21 and its subcomponents are inflated as the full DASS-21 includes those subcomponents
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Main Analysis 
 To analyse the relationship between social identification, prototypicality and 
measures of psychological well-being, I conducted a series of linear hierarchical 
regressions following the same models I used in the previous chapters. As noted in the 
individual descriptions of each study, some measures were not employed across all 
samples, so the sample size for each model varied. However, each of these sample sizes 
were deemed adequate for the large number of independent variables included in each 
analysis (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). It should also be noted that in Studies 4 and 5, an 
experimental manipulation of prototypicality as well as the explicit measure of 
prototypicality (PSIPS) was employed. As reported in Chapter 6 of this thesis, because 
the manipulation did not significantly predict responses on the PSIPS, this suggests the 
manipulation had not been successful. Thus, the explicit measure of prototypicality 
(PSIPS) was used in all models in this study. Each of the predictors and their interaction 
were grand mean-centred (Aiken & West, 1991) prior to entering them into the models.  
 A four stage multiple hierarchical regression was then conducted for each of the 
measures of psychological well-being, with the same predictors entered at the same 
stages in each hierarchical regression model. Firstly, I included the sample from which 
the data were derived to control for differences across samples. Second, age, gender, 
English as a first language and whether the participant had experienced a major life 
stressor in the past six months were entered. Third, social identification and 
prototypicality were entered and then the interaction between them was entered in the 
final step. I conducted a total of eleven hierarchical regression analyses, the results of 
which are presented in Table 17.  
The results of the hierarchical multiple regression revealed that whether 
participants had a stressor in the last six months significantly predicted self-esteem, 
satisfaction with life, both measures of depression (CES-D) and (DASS-D), stress, 
anxiety, negative affect and overall distress (DASS-21). The mean differences between 
men (M=1.99, SD=.90) and women (M=1.68, SD=.72) for negative affect were 
significant (p<.05), as was the mean difference between men (M=1.78, SD=.48) and 
women (M=1.89, SD=.55) for depression (p<.05) and social connectedness between 
men (M=1.67, SD=.44) and women (M=1.87, SD=.57)(p<.05). Women were more 
likely to endorse higher levels of negative affect, depression symptoms and social 
connectedness. The mean difference was also significant between those who have 
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English as a second language (ESL) (M=5.24, SD=.96) compared to those whose first 
language was English (EFL) (M=5.48, SD=1.03) on: social connectedness; stress ESL 
(M=1.74, SD=.59), EFL (M=1.98, SD=.72); depression (DASS-D) ESL (M=1.62, 
SD=.66), EFL (M=1.81, SD=.73), and distress ESL (M=1.63, SD=.52), EFL (M=1.80, 
SD=.61). 
Participants’ relative levels of social identification served as a significant 
predictor for all the outcome variables (ps<.001), except negative affect. This occurred 
even after controlling for sample, age, gender, English as a second language and the 
recent experience of a major life stressor. Higher levels of social identification with a 
university student or university dormitory predicted higher levels of psychological well-
being. Prototypicality was also found to be significantly and independently related to 
anxiety (p<.05) and marginally related to positive and negative affect. Higher perceived 
relative in-group prototypicality predicted lower levels of anxiety symptoms. In 
addition, prototypicality significantly moderated the effects of social identification on 
self-esteem, satisfaction with life, social connectedness, depression (CES-D), anxiety, 
stress, and positive affect. These interactions are presented in Figures 21a – 21f, with 
values estimated at one standard deviation above and below the mean. 
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Table 17.   
Models Tested in Study 6 
Outcome Variables  AdjR2 
change  
B Std. 
Error 
β t 95% CI 
1. Self-esteem Constant  2.32 .99    
F(1, 272)=5.79* Sample 2 .02 -.23 .22 -.07 -1.04 -.68, .21 
 Age  .13 .05 .16 2.52* .03, .23 
 Gender  .05 .20 .02 .25 -.33, .43 
 ESL  .19 .27 .04 .71 -.34, .73 
F(5, 268)=3.03* Stressor .04 -.11 .05 -.04 -2.36* -.21, -.02 
 Social 
Identification 
 .41 .12 .28 3.29** .17, .65 
F(7, 266)=3.33** Prototypicality  .06 -.15 .11 -.10 -1.38 -.36, .06 
F(8, 265)=3.47** Interaction .07 .14 .07 .13 2.03* .004, .27 
2. Satisfaction with 
Life 
Constant  4.58 .49    
 Sample 2  -.28 .17 -.08 -.169 -.61, .05 
 Sample 3  .20 .17 .06 1.21 -.12, .52 
F(3, 565)=9.83*** Sample 4 .05 -.26 .15 -.08 -1.77 -.55, .03 
 Age  -.26 .02 .05 1.25 -.02, .08 
 Gender  .04 .11 .01 .33 -.18, .25 
 ESL  -.12 .14 -.03 -.82 -.40, .16 
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F(7, 561)=6.52*** Stressor .06 -.10 .03 -.15 -3.91*** -.15, -.05 
 Social 
Identification 
 .51 .07 .43 7.81*** .40, .63 
F(9, 559)=14.72*** Prototypicality  .18 -.04 .06 -.04 -.71 -.16, .07 
F(10, 558)=13.91*** Interaction .19 .08 .03 .10 2.36* .01, .14 
3. Social Support Constant  4.70 .43    
 Sample 2  .02 .15 .01 .11 -.27, .31 
 Sample 3  .46 .15 .15 3.17** -.18, .74 
F(3, 565)=4.40* Sample 4 .02 .23 .13 .08 1.74 -.03, .48 
 Age  .03 .02 .05 1.30 -.01, .07 
 Gender  .08 .10 .03 .81 -.11, .27 
 ESL  -.02 .13 -.00 -.12 -.26, .23 
F(7, 521)=2.37* Stressor .02 -.03 .02 -.05 -1.43 -.08, .01 
 Social 
Identification 
 .56 .06 .53 9.73*** .45, .67 
F(9, 559)=15.97*** Prototypicality  .19 -.09 .05 -.09 -1.77 -.19, .01 
F(10, 558)=14.72*** Interaction .20 .05 .03 .07 1.72 -.01, .10 
4. Social 
Connectedness 
Constant  5.01 .33    
 Sample 2  -.12 .11 -.05 -1.10 -.34, .10 
 Sample 3  -.42 .11 -.17 -3.82*** -.64, -.21 
F(3, 565)=19.85*** Sample 4 .09 .22 .10 .10 2.22* .03, .41 
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 Age  .02 .02 .05 1.44 -.01, .06 
 Gender  .15 .07 .07 1.99* .01, .29 
 ESL  -.19 .10 -.07 -2.01* -.38, -.01 
F(7, 561)=10.10*** Stressor .10 -.02 .02 -.04 -1.21 -.06, .01 
 Social 
Identification 
 .49 .04 .57 11.16*** .40, .57 
F(9, 559)=28.58*** Prototypicality  .30 -.07 .04 -.08 -1.69 -.14, .01 
F(10, 558)=26.36*** Interaction .31 .05 .02 .08 2.15* .01, .09 
5. Depression (CES-D) Constant  1.47 .20    
 Sample 3  -.09 .06 -.07 -1.42 -.21, .03 
F(2, 463)=.65 Sample 4 -.001 -.06 .06 -.06 -1.09 -.17, .05 
 Age  .01 .01 .03 .60 -.01, .03 
 Gender  .13 .05 .12 2.89** .04, .22 
 ESL  -.12 .06 -.09 -2.08* -.23, -.01 
F(6,459)=9.14*** Stressor .10 .07 .01 .30 7.00*** .05, .09 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.15 .03 -.35 -5.68*** -.21, -.10 
F(8,457)=14.56*** Prototypicality  .19 .04 .02 .08 1.49 -.11, .08 
F(9, 456)=13.47*** Interaction .19 .03 .01 .09 2.00* .00, .05 
6. Positive Affect Constant  2.77 .33    
 Sample 2  .42 .11 .22 3.84*** .21, .64 
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F(2, 395)=9.74*** Sample 4 .04 -.03 .10 -.02 -.35 -.22, .15 
 Age  -.01 .02 -.03 -.62 -.04, .02 
 Gender  -.05 .08 -.09 -1.85 -.31, .01 
 ESL  .18 .10 .08 1.77 -.02, .38 
F(6, 391)=4.17*** Stressor .05 .01 .02 .03 .65 -.03, .05 
 Social 
Identification 
 .19 .05 .27 4.17*** .10, .28 
F(8, 389)=7.50*** Prototypicality .12 .08 .04 .12 1.92+ -.00, .16 
F(9, 388)=7.98*** Interaction .14 .07 .02 .17 3.22** .03, .12 
7. Negative Affect Constant  1.43 .33    
 Sample 2  .62 .11 .34 5.74*** .41, .84 
F(2, 395)=24.15*** Sample 4 .10 .06 .09 .04 .67 -.12, .25 
 Age  .00 .02 .01 .22 -.03, .04 
 Gender  -.20 .08 -.12 -2.56* -.36, -.05 
 ESL  .07 .10 .03 .73 -.13, .27 
F(6, 391)=10.65*** Stressor .13 -.06 .02 .14 2.97** .02, .10 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.04 .05 -.05 -.84 -.13, .05 
F(8, 389)=8.41*** Prototypicality .13 .08 .04 .13 1.94+ -.00, .16 
F(9, 388)=7.93*** Interaction .14 .04 .02 .10 1.91+ -.00, .09  
8. Overall Distress 
(DASS-21) 
Constant  1.73 .25    
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 Sample 2  .10 .08 .07 1.23 -.06, .28 
F(2, 395)=3.82* Sample 4 .01 .21 .07 .17 3.01** .07, .35 
 Age  -.02 .01 -.07 -1.52 -.04, .01 
 Gender  -.01 .06 .01 .18 -.11, .13 
 ESL  -.16 .08 -.10 -2.06* -.30, .01 
F(6, 391)=7.08*** Stressor .08 .08 .01 .26 5.51*** .05, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.12 .03 -.23 -3.55*** -.18, -.05 
F(8, 389)=7.99*** Prototypicality .12 .05 .03 .12 1.78 -.01, .12 
F(9, 388)=7.36*** Interaction .13 .02 .02 .08 1.48 -.01, .06 
9. Depression    
(DASS-D) 
Constant  1.74 .29    
 Sample 2  .10 .10 .06 1.02 -.09, .29 
F(2, 395)=2.64 Sample 4 .01 .21 .08 .14 2.51* .05, .37 
 Age  -.02 .01 -.06 -1.25 -.05, .01 
 Gender  -.03 .07 -.02 -.41 -.17, .11 
 ESL  -.18 .09 -.09 -1.97* -.35, .00 
F(6, 391)=5.17*** Stressor .06 .08 .02 .22 4.67*** -.05, .11 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.19 .04 -.31 -4.85*** -.27, -.12 
F(8, 389)=8.54*** Prototypicality .13 .07 .04 .12 1.81 -.01, .14 
F(9, 388)=7.71*** Interaction .13 .02 .02 .06 1.05 -.02, .06 
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10. Anxiety (DASS-A) Constant  1.73 .24    
 Sample 2  .14 .08 .11 1.83 -.01, .30 
F(2, 395)=2.49 Sample 4  .01 .18 .07 .15 2.64** .05, .31 
 Age  -.03 .01 -.11 -2.31* -.05, .00 
 Gender  .04 .06 .03 .69 -.07, .15 
 ESL  -.06 .07 -.04 -.81 -.20, .09 
F(6, 391)=5.20*** Stressor .06 .07 .01 .24 4.90*** .04, .10 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.08 .03 -.15 -2.20* -.14, -.01 
F(8, 389)=5.08*** Prototypicality .08 .06 .03 .14 2.05* .00, .12 
F(9, 388)=5.08*** Interaction .09 .03 .02 .12 2.16* .00, .07 
11. Stress (DASS-S) Constant  1.72 .29    
 Sample 2  .05 .10 .03 2.31 -.14, .24 
F(2, 395)=4.45* Sample 4 .02 .24 .08 .17 2.89** .08, .40 
 Age  -.01 .01 -.03 -.69 -.04, .02 
 Gender  .02 .07 .01 .29 -.12, .16 
 ESL  -.23 .09 -.12 -2.56* -.40, -.05 
F(6, 391)=7.34** Stressor .09 .09 .02 .25 5.19*** .05, .12 
 Social 
Identification 
 -.09 .04 -.15 -2.28* -.17, -.01 
F(8, 389)=6.63*** Prototypicality .10 .04 .04 .07 .99 -.04, .11 
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F(9, 388)=5.98*** Interaction .10 .02 .02 .05 .90 -.02, .06 
+ p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
For “ESL”, English as a second language was coded as 1 and English as a first language 
was coded as 0. 
For gender, male was coded 0 and female was coded 1. 
 
As can be seen, the relationship between social identification and various 
indicators of psychological well-being was moderated by the degree to which 
participants saw themselves as a prototypical group member. Overall, participants 
reported higher levels of psychological well-being (specifically higher levels of self-
esteem, positive affect, satisfaction with life, social connectedness and lower levels of 
depression and anxiety as social identification and perceived self-in-group prototypical 
also increased). In the case of self-esteem, the slope of the lines for both higher 
prototypicality (t(271)=3.41, p<.001) and lower prototypicality (t(271)=2.28, p<.05) 
were significant. For satisfaction with life, the slope of the lines for both higher 
prototypicality (t(567)=7.19, p<.001) and lower prototypicality (t(567)=6.88, p<.001) 
were significant. For social connectedness the slope of the lines for both higher 
prototypicality (t(567)=9.81, p<.001) and lower prototypicality (t(567)=10.46, p<.001) 
were significant. Nevertheless for these three outcome variables (self-esteem, 
satisfaction with life and social connectedness), higher prototypicality enhanced the 
negative effects of lower social identification on psychological well-being (as evidenced 
by the significant interaction). 
 For positive affect, the slope of the lines for both higher prototypicality 
(t(396)=4.63, p<.001) and lower prototypicality (t(396)=2.68, p<.01) were significant. 
In the case of this outcome variable, higher prototypicality enhanced the positive effects 
of higher social identification on psychological well-being.  
For anxiety, the slope of the line for lower prototypicality was significant 
(t(396)=-3.35, p<.001) but not that for higher prototypicality (t(396)=-.94, p=.35). For 
depression, the slope of the lines for both higher prototypicality (t(465)=-3.80, p<.001) 
and lower prototypicality (t(465)=-6.87, p<.001) were significant. Surprisingly, for 
these two negative well-being measures lower prototypicality enhanced the protective 
effect of high identification on psychological well-being. 
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Figure 21a. Study 6 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on self-esteem 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
Figure 21b. Study 6 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on satisfaction with life 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
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Figure 21c. Study 6 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on social connectedness 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
 
Figure 21d. Study 6 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on positive affect 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
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Figure 21e. Study 6 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on anxiety 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
 
 
Figure 21f. Study 6 statistically significant interaction between salient social identity 
and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on depression 
Note: * denotes significant slope 
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Discussion Study 6 
The results of this final study (which combined the data from four separate 
studies) confirms the findings obtained in the individual studies that social identification 
is an important predictor of several measures of positive and negative psychological 
well-being (H2). Prototypicality was also shown to independently predict anxiety, 
supporting (H3). These results extend previous work by providing evidence for support 
of Hypothesis 4, that prototypicality moderates the positive effects of social 
identification on several measures of psychological well-being. However, the pattern of 
these moderation effects were not entirely consistent with the pattern of effects in the 
single studies for a number of outcome variables. For the first time in this thesis, 
findings of empirical work revealed the negative effects of low social identification on 
psychological well-being were enhanced when participants perceived themselves to be 
relatively higher in prototypicality. Reasons for this are examined further in the 
discussion.  
I set out in the current chapter to more fully elucidate the predictive role of 
relative levels of social identification and perceived self-in-group prototypicality on 
various measures of psychological well-being. As was the case in previous studies 
reported in this thesis, I anticipated that social identification would serve as a significant 
predictor of this well-being, and that perceived self-in-group prototypicality would 
moderate this effect in a number of possible ways. In the end, the results of this study 
confirmed the previous findings of a positive relationship between social identification 
and psychological well-being for a number of outcome variables. Higher prototypicality 
also enhanced the positive effects of higher social identification on positive affect, 
depression and anxiety. Indeed, once again, the findings indicated that without 
including perceived self-in-group prototypicality, the full impact of social identification 
processes would not have been revealed. Most importantly, this study, by virtue of its 
large sample size, enabled greater confidence in the results and, hence, clearer 
understanding of the possible nature of the moderating role of perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality. However, it is important to note that combing the data from the four 
empirical studies also increased the chance that the same participant may have been 
counted more than once in Study 6. Certainly efforts were made to limit this (i.e. studies 
were conducted over a 2 year period, only first year students were included in later 
studies and slightly different identities aimed to target different participants). 
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING 
 
 
198 
Additionally, combining studies, within which ‘different’ identities were made salient, 
may have made comparability an issue. However because the nature of the identities, in 
each study, were similar (i.e. all of the salient identities where based on being a member 
of largely positive university social groups and average levels of identification across all 
studies were high) this suggests it was legitimate to combine the data from each single 
study in Study 6. This also served to increase validity through comparing the effect of 
the construct of identification itself, as opposed to any one group identity alone. The 
findings suggest that not only is it beneficial to identify with one’s social group, it is 
also beneficial (at least for those who do strongly identify) to see oneself as a 
prototypical member of that group. However, in addition, it could be beneficial for 
those who identify less strongly (marginal group members) to see oneself as a less 
prototypical member of that group. 
Consistent with the findings of Studies 2-5 reported in this thesis, Study 6 found 
relatively higher social identification was positively associated with psychological well-
being, even after accounting for the sample from which the data was obtained and the 
covariates of age, gender, English as a second language, and recent experience of a 
major life stressor. This is important to note, because even after accounting for these 
effects in Study 6, I find the main effect for social identification remains significant. 
The ubiquitous effects of social identification still held true when the data from all the 
studies were combined. Of course, it was important to account for differences across the 
studies, in terms of the effects of the manipulation in studies 4 and 5 or differences in 
the identities and comparative out-groups, to ensure any differences between samples 
were accounted for.  
Comparing the pattern of moderation effects in Study 6 to those obtained in the 
previous studies revealed prototypicality moderated the effects of social identification 
on psychological well-being in similar ways, but for some outcome variables in a way 
previously not found (i.e., consistent with Figure 5 depicted in Chapter 4). More 
specifically, relatively higher prototypicality was shown to have enhanced the negative 
effect of low social identification on psychological well-being for a number of outcome 
measures. This is a pattern of interaction effect uniquely found in Study 6. It appears 
that, only once the data from all the empirical studies was combined, and analysed as 
one large dataset, the significance of this effect was revealed. This is an important 
finding for a number of reasons. First, it demonstrates that prototypicality is relevant for 
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those highly identified, and for those who are relatively less identified. While consistent 
with recent evidence and theorising that prototypicality is likely to only have an effect 
for those social group members who are high in social identification (Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2001; Steffens et al., 2015), these results additionally suggest that it is also 
important to consider the effects of prototypicality judgements at varying degrees of 
identification. In Study 6, for those relatively lower in social identification, it may be 
that the group was still important to how they saw themselves, but when they also 
perceived their position in the group as more central (i.e., high prototypicality) this 
enhanced the negative effects of lower social identification on psychological well-being. 
These significant moderation effects are consistent with the prediction depicted in 
Figure 5 (see Chapter 4), where the moderating effects of prototypicality are predicted 
to occur for those relatively lower in social identification.  
How then might one understand the nature of this effect? It could be that if 
individuals feel less affinity with a social identity (lower social identification), then 
being highly prototypical of the same identity could be undesirable. The threat of being 
representative of a social identity which one is not emotionally invested in, could 
represent a threat of being categorised in a way in which the individual is not happy 
about. In such cases, being highly prototypical possibly represents being more ‘in’ a 
group which one does not necessarily desire to be a member of. The findings of Study 6 
therefore demonstrate for the first time that self-judgements of prototypicality do indeed 
influence psychological well-being for individuals with relatively lower social 
identification, as well as those with relatively higher identification. 
 The results of Study 6 also demonstrated social identification can predict both 
positive and negative well-being measures, and prototypicality moderates the positive 
effects of social identification on both positive and negative well-being measures. This 
is inconsistent with Steffens et al.’s (2015) assertion that prototypicality may be related 
to positive well-being measures alone and instead suggests that social identity processes 
are also very important to mental health, consistent with the analysis of Cruwys et al. 
(2014).  
Conclusion 
The results of this study confirmed previous findings of a positive relationship 
between social identification and psychological well-being. In addition, it confirmed the 
findings of the previous studies which comprise the empirical work of this thesis, that 
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING 
 
 
200 
prototypicality significantly moderated the effects of social identification on 
psychological well-being. The most significant finding of Study 6 was that 
prototypicality significantly moderated the positive effect of higher social identification 
on positive affect, depression and anxiety. This supports previous evidence that 
prototypicality is particulary important for high identifiers (Schmitt & Branscombe, 
2001). In the case of positive affect, we find higher prototypicality enabled us to see the 
positive impact of higher identification on psychological well-being. In addition, lower 
prototypicality enabled us to see the positive impact of high social identification on 
psychological ill-health (i.e. depression and anxiety). For the first time, we also found 
that higher prototypicality also enhanced the negative effects of lower identification to 
psychological well-being. A particular strength of these findings derives from the large 
sample size provided by combing data from four independent samples. At the same 
time, the correlational nature of the study design serves to qualify any causal 
conclusions. This suggests that replication of these results is required to fully establish 
the nature of the relationship between social identification, prototypicality and 
psychological well-being, particularly in relation to self-judgments of prototypicality. 
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CHAPTER 10 
General Discussion 
Chapter Overview 
In the final chapter, I review the aims and objectives of the current thesis, reiterate 
the hypotheses developed and tested, and summarise the findings of the empirical work. 
I then consider some of the theoretical and practical implications of this work, 
particularly in relation to the biopsychosocial model of psychological-wellbeing. In 
doing so, I examine how we might apply the knowledge obtained from the current thesis 
to benefit human-kind’s psychological well-being. Finally, limitations of the current 
research, as well as directions for future research are discussed. 
 
Review of Thesis Aims and Objectives 
This thesis set out to use a social identity analysis to bring together the disparate 
social perspectives in the biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being. It was 
observed that social factors are very important to psychological well-being and previous 
attempts to account for these effects have failed to provide a single cohesive conceptual 
approach. It was argued that a social identity approach is able to address many of the 
shortcomings of existing work by articulating a mechanism through which societal, 
group and individualistic levels of analysis interact to explain the role of social factors 
in psychological well-being. In other words, it was argued that the existing theoretical 
framework of the social identity approach (SIA) is able to account for how social 
factors at all levels of analysis are psychologically represented and there-fore come to 
influence psychological well-being.  
In order to test the applicability of this framework in the psychological well-being 
domain, three broad theoretical hypotheses were directly derived from the social 
identity approach. These were: 1) the social affinity people feel towards social groups 
they are a member of (social identification) will enhance psychological well-being, 2) 
perceiving oneself to be representative of a social group, or embodying the 
characteristics of group members, or being in a central position within a social group 
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING 
 
 
202 
(prototypicality), will enhance psychological well-being and, 3) the relationship 
between the social affinity people feel towards social groups (social identification) and 
psychological well-being will be moderated by perceptions of representativeness or 
position within a social group (prototypicality). 
Certainly previous work demonstrated that social identification is largely 
positively related to psychological well-being. However, some work also demonstrated 
this is not always the case. In this current thesis I therefore proposed another social 
identity concept, prototypicality, may be used to examine the differences observed in 
the effect of social identification on psychological well-being. Although the concept of 
relative in-group prototypicality is well-grounded in extant theory (e.g., McGarty, 1999; 
Turner et al., 1987) and research (e.g., Koivisto et al., 2013; Platow et al., 2006), the 
operationalisation of the construct has largely focused on others’ perceptions of an 
individual’s prototypicality and typicality (as defined by the intra-group comparison 
alone). Therefore, I first set out to develop a measure that would examine perceptions of 
one’s own self-in-group prototypicality and determine if this scale would measure 
prototypicality separately from social identification.  
 While social identification and prototypicality had been shown to interact to 
afford differential effects on followers’ endorsement of leaders (Steffens et al, 2015), 
and impact group inclusionary behaviours for marginal group members (Ellemers & 
Jetten, 2013), little was known about the relationship between these factors and 
psychological well-being. Similar to evidence that suggested overall higher 
identification is beneficial to psychological well-being (Jetten et al., 2012), I proposed 
that higher prototypicality may also be beneficial to psychological well-being. 
Prototypicality had been suggested to signal to an individual their ‘position within the 
in-group’, as a result of increased perceptions that one substantially embodies the 
characteristics of a group member (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013), or ‘fits in’ the group. 
Some work also predicted that higher and lower prototypicality would have different 
effects on psychological well-being depending on an individual’s degree of 
identification with the group (Steffens et al., 2015). I proposed that prototypicality 
would moderate the positive effect of social identification on psychological well-being 
for high identifiers and for low identifiers in different ways. Most broadly, relatively 
higher identification and higher prototypicality combined were expected to enhance 
psychological well-being, whereas lower identification and lower prototypicality 
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combined were expected to predict reduced psychological well-being. Indeed, this is 
exactly what I found across four unique data sets and a fifth that combined the data 
from each of these studies. I now examine the pattern of the effects found. 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
 The social identity analysis concepts of social identification and prototypicality 
explain how social factors come to be psychologically represented, and how this could 
come to influence psychological well-being. Designed to assess self-judgments of 
prototypicality, which has not been explored extensively in the past, the Perceived self-
in-group Prototypicality scale (PSIPS) was developed and described in depth in Chapter 
4. Across four studies and 569 participants, a confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated 
this 5-item scale measured a separate construct from social identification and had 
excellent internal consistency. Overall, the empirical work presented in Chapter 4 
represents a substantial contribution to the literature by demonstrating self-judgements 
of prototypicality can be measured using this scale, and this concept can be measured 
separately from social identification.  
 The pattern of results, across the empirical studies, were overall consistent with 
the self-categorisation analysis presented and confirmed the empirical hypotheses of 
this thesis. These were, 1) social identification and prototypicality can be measured 
separately, 2) social identification will be positively related to psychological well-being, 
3) perceived self-in-group prototypicality will be positively related to psychological 
well-being and, 4) perceived self-in-group prototypicality would moderate the positive 
effect of social identification on psychological well-being in a number of possible ways. 
  The empirical findings from Study 1 demonstrated that perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality can indeed be measured separately from social identification, confirming 
Hypothesis 1. The correlational approach of Studies 2 and 3 and the experimental 
design of Studies 4 and 5 complemented each other and provided evidence to support 
both hypotheses 2 and 3. Specifically, that social identification and psychological well-
being would be positively related (Hypothesis 2) and perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality would moderate the effects of social identification on psychological 
well-being in a number of ways (Hypothesis 4). The combination of the data from all 
four empirical studies in one final analysis in Study 6 provided further support for the 
same two hypotheses. Overall, the findings confirmed previous empirical work that 
demonstrated a strong positive relationship between social identification and an 
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individual’s psychological well-being (Jetten et al., 2012). In addition, they revealed 
that an individual’s perceptions of their own degree of prototypicality significantly 
moderated the positive effects of social identification on psychological well-being, 
confirming Hypothesis 4. While in most cases this moderation effect enhanced the 
already positive effect of social identification on psychological well-being, in others it 
appeared to enable the effect to be seen. The pattern of significant effects across each of 
the studies presented in this thesis are summarized in Table 18 and 19. As can be seen 
in Table 18, the results of studies 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 a significant main effect of social 
identification for almost all of the positive and negative measures of psychological well-
being. In Studies 5 and 6, a significant main effect for prototypicality was revealed on a 
number of well-being measures. However, the limited consistency of the main effect for 
prototypicality across studies and especially when the larger data size enhanced 
statistical power (in Study 6), suggested these effects must be interpreted with caution. 
In contrast, a significant moderation effect of prototypicality on social identification 
was shown across all studies, albeit for different outcome variables and with a different 
pattern of significant effects found across studies. The inconsistency between studies, in 
terms of the pattern of moderation effects found, led to the decision to combine the data 
from Studies 2- 5 in one final analysis (i.e. Study 6) to determine the most robust 
effects. 
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Table 18.  
Summary of significant effects across all five studies 
 Main effect for Social 
Identification 
Main effect for 
Prototypicality 
Moderation effect for 
Prototypicality on 
Social identification 
Study 2 Self Esteem 
Social Support 
Satisfaction with Life 
Social Connectedness 
Depression (CES-D) 
none Social Support 
Social Connectedness 
 
Study 3 Social Support 
Social Connectedness 
Satisfaction with Life 
Positive Affect 
Distress (DASS-21) 
Depression (DASS-D) 
none Satisfaction with Life 
Social Connectedness 
Negative Affect 
Positive Affect 
Study 4 
(Manipulated 
Prototypicality) 
Social Support 
Social Connectedness 
Satisfaction with Life 
Positive Affect 
none Positive Affect 
Depression (DASS-D) 
Study 4  
(Measured 
Prototypicality) 
Satisfaction with Life 
Social Support 
Positive Affect Positive Affect 
Depression (CES-D) 
Anxiety (DASS-A)++ 
Study 5 
(Manipulated 
Prototypicality) 
Satisfaction with Life 
Social Support 
Social Connectedness 
Distress (DASS-21) 
Depression (DASS-D) 
Depression (CES-D) 
Anxiety (DASS-A) 
Stress (DASS-S) 
Positive Affect 
None None 
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Study 5 
(Measured 
Prototypicality) 
Satisfaction with Life 
Social Support 
Social Connectedness 
Distress (DASS-21) 
Depression (DASS-D) 
Depression (CES-D) 
Anxiety (DASS-A) 
Stress (DASS-S) 
Positive Affect 
Social Support 
Distress (DASS-21) 
Depression (DASS-D) 
Depression (CES-D) 
Anxiety (DASS-A) 
Negative Affect 
Study 6 Self Esteem 
Satisfaction with Life 
Social Support 
Social Connectedness 
Distress (DASS-21) 
Depression (DASS-D) 
Depression (CES-D) 
Anxiety (DASS-A) 
Stress (DASS-S) 
Positive Affect 
Anxiety (DASS-A) 
 
Self-Esteem 
Satisfaction with Life 
Social Connectedness 
Positive Affect 
Depression (CES-D) 
Anxiety (DASS-A) 
 
 In Table 19, I present a summary of the significant moderation effects found 
across all the studies. I compare each moderation effect with the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 5 where the possible nature of the moderation effect was pictorially represented 
in four possible combinations (Figures 4-7). These figures are re-presented here for ease 
of reference. Figures 4 and 5 represent the possible differential effect of higher/lower 
prototypicality occurring for those higher in identification. In contrast, Figures 6 and 7 
represent the possible relationship between these variables for those lower in 
identification. As we can see, the majority of significant moderation effects took the 
form of Figures 4 and 5, in which higher prototypicality either 1) significantly enhanced 
the positive effect of social identification on psychological well-being, but only for 
higher identified group members or, 2) enabled the positive effect of social 
identification on psychological well-being, but only for higher identified group 
members. 
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Figure 4. High-perceived self-in-group prototypicality enhances the positive effect of 
high social identification on psychological well-being. 
 
In a number of cases (all of which were found in Study 6), we find perceived relative in-
group-prototypicality predicted psychological well-being for those lower in social 
identification (consistent with Figure 6). In this case, lower prototypicality reduced the 
negative impacts of lower identification on psychological well-being on three outcome 
variables across the five studies. As can be seen in Table 19 no significant moderation 
effect consistent with Figure 7 were found in any of the studies. 
 
 
Figure 5. High perceived self-in-group prototypicality enables the positive effect of 
high social identification on psychological well-being. 
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Table 19. Nature of Significant Moderation effects across all five studies 
 Figure 4 
enhanced 
Figure 5 
enabled 
Figure 6 Figure 7 
1. Self- Esteem - -  - 
2. Satisfaction with Life -   - 
3. Social Support  - - - 
4. Social Connectedness  -  - 
5. Depression (CES-D)  - - - 
6. Overall Distress 
(DASS-21) 
- - - - 
7. Depression (DASS-D) -  - - 
8. Anxiety (DASS-A) -  - - 
9. Stress (DASS-S) - - - - 
10. Positive Affect   - - 
11. Negative Affect - - - - 
 
Overall, higher prototypicality consistently demonstrated greater effect on the 
psychological well-being of higher identified individuals, in line with predictions 
derived from recent theorizing by Ellemers and Jetten (2013) and Steffens et al. (2015). 
That being said, self-in-group prototypicality also moderated the negative impact of low 
social identification on psychological well-being in a number of instances consistent 
with Figure 6 shown below.  
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Figure 6. Significant interaction effect between social identification and prototypicality 
on psychological well-being, only when social identification is low 
 
 Closer examination of these effects showed that for those lower in identification, 
lower prototypicality was influencing their psychological well-being in a different way 
to higher identified individuals. Specifically, lower prototypicality reduced the negative 
effects of low identification on psychological well-being. This indicates that for lower 
identifiers, lower prototypicality may, in fact, be a more desired state. Lower 
prototypicality possibly allows those who are lower in social identification to maintain a 
positive self-concept, subsequently enhancing positive psychological well-being. While 
this was largely consistent with the self-categorisation analysis outlined in this thesis, 
which suggests higher prototypicality is of greater importance to high identifiers, 
however even when social identification was lower in Studies 1-6, individuals clearly 
were still highly identified overall. The results of the current work confirm previous 
work that suggests prototypicality is more important to higher identifiers (Schmitt & 
Branscombe, 2001) and additionally demonstrates that even among high identifiers, 
prototypicality may have differing effects depending on the degree of social 
identification. A final remark in relation to the finding that higher prototypicality 
enhanced the negative effect of lower social identification on psychological well-being 
is that this effect was only found in Study 6. In this study the combination of the data 
from all the studies provided a considerably larger sample size and hence more 
statistical power to find this effect. Thus, while this effect appears strong, the limited 
replication across all the studies, and the contra indication of this effect from the lack of 
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a similar pattern found in Studies 2-5, suggests further work is required to confirm this 
result. Despite this, we do find a number of possible theoretical explanations that could 
predict this effect. For example, the categorisation threat (see Branscombe et al., 1999), 
need for belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 1999), and optimal distinctiveness 
(Brewer, 1991) perspectives provide a rationale for why the psychological well-being of 
particularly lower identified individuals may be further compromised by higher 
prototypicality. If we consider each in turn, we find that for those lower in 
identification, higher prototypicality could negatively impact psychological well-being 
through 1) signalling to the individual that they are being categorised in opposition to 
how they see themselves (which is identity threatening), 2) reducing feelings of 
belongingness or 3) being contrary to their goal for personal distinctive. However, the 
findings of the current thesis simply does not examine these mechanisms, so we do not 
know which is primarily involved. Instead the current work simply demonstrates that, 
without considering the impact of perceived self-in-group prototypicality, these effects 
would simply would not have been revealed.  
 The empirical work of the current thesis clearly demonstrates that 
prototypicality is an important variable to consider in terms of understanding when 
social identification will be beneficial to psychological well-being and when it may be 
less so. This addresses a gap in the current literature, in explaining when social 
identification may be beneficial or not to psychological well-being. More broadly, it 
demonstrates the usefulness of employing the framework of the social identity approach 
to understanding social factors in the biopsychosocial model of psychological well-
being. The findings of the current work support previous evidence that it is largely 
beneficial to identify with one’s social group. The findings add to this by demonstrating 
that in some instances (i.e., for those higher in social identification), it is also beneficial 
to see oneself as a prototypical member of that group, but in other instances (i.e., for 
those lower in social identification), it may be detrimental or not be beneficial at all.   
 
Implications of Current Findings  
Theoretical Issues 
 The empirical studies of this research program have, therefore, achieved three 
key outcomes that reflect on the social-psychological theory in which this thesis is 
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grounded. To summarise, these are 1) the demonstration that the SIA is a 
comprehensive, cohesive theoretical framework that can be used to explain the effects 
of social factors in the biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being, 2) the 
demonstration that social identification and prototypicality are related social identity 
constructs but can be measured separately and, 3) the demonstration that prototypicality 
moderates the largely positive effects of social identification on psychological well-
being.  
The clearest theoretical implication of this thesis derives from the finding that 
seeing oneself in terms of a social identity is positively related to psychological 
well-being. Indeed, social identification was a significant predictor of every 
outcome variable measured in this thesis. This is wholly consistent with the social 
identity analysis presented in this thesis, that people derive a sense of self from 
group memberships (Turner & Oakes, 1986) - a social identity - and this is largely 
beneficial to psychological well-being. This confirms evidence from a growing 
number of studies that demonstrate a strong positive relationship between social 
identification and health and well-being (Jetten et al., 2012; Steffens et al., 2016) 
and more specifically psychological well-being (Cruwys, 2014). This thesis 
therefore provides further support for the social identity analysis of psychological 
well-being.  
In addition, the finding of a significant negative relationship between social 
identification and depression in a number of the studies in this thesis further 
highlights the value of social identification for psychological well-being. This is 
important, particularly in light of this effect being demonstrated for two different 
depression measures (i.e. the effect was not measure-dependent) and because these 
are the most severe mental-health measures included in the current work. Combined 
with the additional evidence of social identification’s negative relationship with 
measures of anxiety, stress and overall distress (DASS-21), this finding provides 
strong evidence for the importance of social identification in mental health and 
accords with the conclusion of Cruwys et al. (2014, p. 223) that the “negative 
association between social identification and depression appears not only to be 
moderately strong but also to be both reliable and robust.”   
 The empirical work of this thesis also demonstrates that the strength and nature 
of the social identity – psychological well-being relationship differs even amongst those 
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highly identified. Across the board, participants in all the studies reported in this thesis 
endorsed relatively high levels of social identification. Hence, those who endorsed 
lower social identification all still identified strongly as a group member of the salient 
social category. Interestingly, despite this, the strength of the effect of social 
identification was still stronger for those highest in identification compared to those 
relatively lower in identification. This is important to note because it highlights that 
there are differences in the effects of even slight variations in levels of identification, 
not just differences between extremes of identification (high/low). This perspective has 
been championed by authors within the marginal group membership literature (Ellemers 
& Jetten, 2013; Cruwys, Berry, Cassells, Duncan, et al., 2013) and is supported by the 
findings of the current thesis. It is also important to note two more points. First, it is 
unclear what the effects of prototypicality might have been for those who did not 
identity at all, or identified very little with the university student identity. Second, we do 
not know what the pattern of results may have been if the valence of the social identity 
examined had been negative (for example, a stigmatised group). Indeed, the valence of 
social identities measured in each of the empirical studies of this thesis could largely be 
considered positive. In fact, if the social identity examined had been negatively 
valenced, we may have found completely different effects. Very recent work has shown 
that social identification with negatively valenced groups can, in fact, be associated with 
poorer psychological well-being (Kremisnski, Barry & Platow, 2018). This points to the 
fact that social identification is not an isolated concept and its effects could be 
influenced by a range of factors other than degree of prototypicality, including, category 
valence or content of social category, to name but a few. Indeed, when these aspects of 
a social identity are not measured, then we simply do not know what the meaning of the 
social identity may be to group members and hence may not accurately predict the 
effects of social identification on psychological well-being.  
 Other theoretical implications of this work relate directly to the social identity 
concept of prototypicality and its conceptualisation and operationalisation. Within the 
SIA, while social identification has received a considerable amount of work in terms of 
measurement (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Leach et al., 2008; Postmes et al., 2013), 
prototypicality has received comparatively little. Until recently the development of 
measures of prototypicality have largely been ad hoc and have focused on participants’ 
perceptions of others prototypicality rather than their own (e.g., Steffens, et al., 2014; 
Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001). The current thesis provides a significant 
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contribution to this area of the literature through the development of a scale designed to 
specifically measure self-judgments of prototypicality, the PSIPS, and demonstrating its 
ability to measure this concept separately from social identification. These results 
support the assumption that prototypicality “is different from other related constructs 
such as group identification” and “while these constructs often covary, at times they can 
also be distinct” (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013, p 5).  
 These findings also support a multicomponent approach to measuring social 
identification, as posited by Leach et al. (2008), specifically in terms of the separate 
measurement of the concept of prototypicality. However, it is important to note that 
because the social identification scale chosen for use in this thesis did not include any 
items related to prototypicality (e.g. self-stereotyping), other work may find this is not 
always the case. Indeed, if the PSIPS items were compared to another measure of social 
identification, one which included an item that measured prototypicality, the same 
results may not have been found. Certainly, further development of this measurement 
tool (e.g., PSIPS) will assist clarification around these issues. Further to this, this thesis 
highlights an important consideration around how prototypicality could be successfully 
manipulated in experimental study designs. Unfortunately, in Studies 4 and 5 of this 
thesis, the manipulation of self-perceptions of prototypicality appeared to have limited 
success in altering the actual perceptions of one’s degree of self-in-group prototypicality 
(as indicated by an absence of the manipulation significantly predicting scores on the 
PSIPS). As stated previously, it is possible this speaks to the difficulties in altering self-
perceptions, which are clearly very difficult to do sometimes, so it may not be a 
surprising result. It should also be considered however that other factors such as the 
desire to maintain a good impression of oneself (Leary & Kowalski, 1990), the ability to 
use strategies such as social creativity and mobility to manage social group membership 
(Turner, 1982) and adherence to group norms (Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1997) may 
have also been playing a role in participants’ responses to the manipulation. Certainly, 
we cannot rule out the possibility other processes may have also contributed to how 
individuals responded to the PSIPS.  Future work that empirical tests the PSIPS and 
employs study designs that incorporate the above mentioned factors may resolve the 
issues around the measurement of prototypicality identified here. 
Finally, we must consider the theoretical implications of the finding that 
prototypicality moderated the effects of social identification on psychological well-
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being. This was the most novel finding of the current thesis and directly speaks to the 
gap in the literature this thesis attempted to address – the question of when social 
identification might be beneficial to an individual’s psychological well-being and when 
might it not be. The findings of the current thesis demonstrated that higher 
prototypicality afforded greater benefits to the psychological well-being of high 
identifiers than to those less identified.  They also reveal that lower prototypicality 
buffered individuals against the negative effects that lower social identification can 
mean for psychological well-being. Combined, these findings suggest that self-
judgements of prototypicality contribute to social identification’s influence on 
psychological well-being, but prototypicality’s contribution differs depending on the 
degree to which an individual identifies as a group member. These are important 
findings as they suggest that perceptions of one’s representativeness as a group member, 
or one’s position in the group relative to others, is an additionally important determinant 
of social identification’s effects on the affective and cognitive processes which underlie 
psychological well-being. This has important implications for predicting which social 
factors (stressors or support) may be beneficial or detrimental to psychological well-
being. It also increases our understanding of the underlying psychological processes by 
which social factors come to be important in the biopsychosocial model of 
psychological well-being. For instance, social identification and prototypicality predict 
when a social stressor or source of social support is likely to be beneficial or detrimental 
to psychological well-being. Also, when the cause of stress or support derives from an 
in-group member and that group is important to the self-concept of the individual, it is 
clearly more likely to influence one’s psychological well-being. In addition, perceptions 
of one’s position in the social category as being more peripheral or central (i.e. high or 
low prototypicality) may have differing effects depending on the content or valence of 
the social identity itself. The findings of this thesis represent an important step forward 
in the application of the social identity approach.  
Practical Implications 
 The current research program has direct relevance for clinical psychological and 
socio-political interventions. One example derives from the demonstration of the 
importance of group membership to psychological well-being. This indicates a strategy 
for both enhancing the effectiveness of clinical psychological interventions (by 
considering the social identities important to individuals), and also a novel strategy for 
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identifying those at risk of developing psychological ill-health and better targeting 
prevention efforts. The Groups4Health intervention, developed by Haslam, and 
colleagues (2016) was derived from principles demonstrated in the Social Cure 
literature. This intervention aims to foster individuals social group memberships (with 
groups individuals identify as a member of) to improve psychological well-being. The 
empirical work conducted in this thesis demonstrates that interventions such as this may 
be enhanced by also attempting to increase participants’ self-perceptions of 
prototypicality. This could possibly be achieved by highlighting the features, norms or 
attitudes of group members that a participant also holds, and/or discounting those that 
they do not match. If we consider both how prototypicality is conceptualised within the 
SIA, and the findings of the current thesis, we know that if indeed self-perceived 
prototypicality can be influenced in this way, it could enhance psychological well-
being. Of course, the current study also supports evidence that through increasing 
participants’ social identification with multiple social groups, interventions such as the 
Groups4Health program, are likely to afford real benefits to an individuals 
psychological well-being. 
 The empirical work conducted in this thesis further identified the negative 
implications that lower identification and prototypicality as a social group member can 
cause. This further suggests that highlighting the centrality or security of one’s position 
in a social group, or at least downplaying the peripheral or insecure position one holds 
in a social group, may be valuable for clinical psychological intervention. Simply 
having other in-group members tell you that you are a valued member, ‘just like them’, 
or group members wearing displays of unity (ie. uniforms) could serve to increase 
perceptions of similarity and hence prototypicality. However, these suggestions of ways 
in which prototypicality may be influenced were not tested in the current thesis and 
clearly further work is required to identify the best possible means of influencing self-
prototypicality judgements to improve psychological well-being. In addition, this thesis 
shows the relevance of social identity processes to psychological well-being and 
suggests that they are relevant for a range of social factors known to be important in 
psychological well-being interventions. For instance, social factors such as the 
clinician-patient relationship, social stressors and support, and even society wide factors 
such as social isolation, stigma, and discrimination, can be explained in terms of social 
identity processes.  
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 Finally, a vital contribution of this thesis is the understanding that psychological 
representations of social groups that afford individuals a positive sense of self are 
important to psychological well-being. As mentioned previously, the vast majority of 
research on psychological well-being has focused on the biological and psychological 
factors, and the work on social factors has been ad-hoc or lacking in theoretical 
cohesiveness. A disturbing consequence of this is the lack of integration and application 
of the knowledge about the powerful effects of social factors on psychological well-
being. The social-psychological approach taken in this thesis suggests several social 
identity concepts (i.e. social identification and prototypicality) that may be applied to 
interventions that aim to influence psychological well-being. Most notably this work 
demonstrates the value of integrating social identity principles in psychotherapy that 
aims to treat psychopathology. In particular, social identity principles would neatly 
align with therapies that integrate therapeutic alliance, identity, meaning making and 
social relationship perspectives into their therapeutic approach. An example of a direct 
translation of the findings of the current thesis would be the integration of social 
identification and self-judgments of prototypicality in the assessment or treatment of 
psychological well-being. For instance, underlying problematic social categories with 
which a patient identifies (i.e. I am a male) and their self-prototypicality related 
judgements in relationship to that identity (i.e. I am a ‘weak’ male because I cry) may 
lead to poorer psychological well-being for that individual. This knowledge can be used 
to inform specific interventions that could either highlight different aspects of ones 
social identity (i.e. men are brave) or prototypical behaviours exhibited in the past (i.e. 
when one hasn’t cried) and this may protect the individuals’ psychological well-being.  
Highlighting similarities rather than differences that exist between the patient and the 
clinician could also serve to strengthen feelings of shared identity and hence the 
therapeutic alliance with direct benefits to psychological well-being. Certainly the 
current work does not directly test the effectiveness of interventions such as those 
suggested here, however this work could inform the development of clinical 
interventions, or further develop interventions which have incorporated the evidence 
from within the SIA to treat psychopathology (Haslam, Cruwys, Haslam, Dingle, 
Chang, 2016).  
 The practical implications of the findings of the current thesis are also relevant 
to broader societal interventions and their effect on psychological well-being. For 
example, when the prevailing political discourse focuses on the differences between 
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social groups, this increases tensions between those groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), or 
represents a threat to a specific group. This can have serious implications for the 
psychological well-being of minority group members (Branscombe et al., 1999). 
Therefore, the social identity analysis presented in this thesis not only assists the 
identification of those most vulnerable in these situations, but also the development of 
interventions that may assist them.  
 
Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions 
 It is important to note that the strong theoretical grounding of this program 
represents a considerable strength. This has enabled the current thesis to contribute 
substantially to the understanding of social factors in the biopsychological model of 
psychological well-being. As mentioned previously, this is particularly important given 
the largely disparate and disjointed theoretical approaches previously employed within 
this literature. The explicit use and articulation of assumptions form a cohesive 
theoretical framework, which has been established and well-validated, and this means 
we can have confidence in extrapolating the findings of the current work.  
 However, there are also some limitations of the empirical work reported here. 
These relate to three areas, 1) the measure developed to assess perceived self-in-group 
prototypicality (the PSIPS), 2) the experimental manipulation of prototypicality, and 3) 
the limited consistency of the pattern of moderation effects between each of the studies 
conducted. These issues are important to consider here, to examine in future research, 
and form the basis for a number of recommendations. I will now consider each in turn, 
before outlining possible future research directions.  
 First, given the PSIPS scale was not formally empirically tested prior to being 
employed in the empirical studies, this somewhat limits confidence in its applicability 
for subsequent studies. The PSIPS items were also only compared in relation to one 
social identity scale (Doosje et al., 1995). This social identity scale did not include items 
that explicitly measure typicality, or what Leach et al. (2008) consider ‘self-
stereotyping’ components of social identification. This is a limitation of the PSIPS in 
terms of stating it is completely measure a construct separate from social identification. 
While this does not invalidate the findings of the current work, it is possible that if 
another social identity scale had been used, one may not have found the same result. 
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Although further validation of the PSIPS and its comparison with other social identity 
scales is certainly required, the development and use of the PSIPS has nevertheless been 
a useful contribution.  
 Second, a few factors contributed to a difficulty in confidently inferring 
causation from the current findings. The correlational design of the earlier studies and 
the limited success of the manipulation of prototypicality in the experimental studies are 
both limitations of the current research. It appears that manipulating prototypicality was 
particular difficult to achieve. Possibly because it attempted to convince participants of 
something that may have conflicted with their conscious beliefs. The form or manner of 
the bogus feedback (ie. manipulation material presented), the task upon which the 
feedback was osentiously derived (ie. the IAT and PAT) and the legitimacy and group 
membership of the perceived provider of the feedback are all likely to have influenced 
the ‘believability’ of the manipulation. In addition, self-presentation effects – the 
attempt to control images of oneself held by others (Schlenker, 1980) and social 
categorisation threat – the threat of being categorised negatively (Ellemers et al., 2012) 
could have confounded attempts to manipulate prototypicality. These factors are 
therefore important to consider in any future work that attempts to manipulate 
prototypicality.  
 Finally, a lack of consistency in the pattern of significant moderation effects of 
prototypicality on the social identification relationship across the various outcome 
variables employed and across the five studies conducted, represents another limitation. 
It is important for future research to further test the hypotheses about the relationship 
between social identification and prototypicality, and psychological well-being. This 
will be important for clarity and confidence in the current findings. Future research 
could expand upon the present findings in a number of important ways. In particular, 
future research could focus on the differences in effects of social identification and 
prototypicality on: 1) identities that are particularly important to individuals (e.g., 
gender, ethnic group); 2) negatively valenced identities; 3) groups where members 
possess more mixed levels of social identification and prototypicality, including non-
prototypical individuals; and 4) different out-groups in the comparative context within 
which self-categorisation is derived. The current thesis almost solely focused on 
positive valenced social identities and relatively high in social identification. Future 
work that examines more mixed levels of social identification and even individuals who 
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are non-prototypical (ie. black sheep or marginalised group members) would assit to 
develop a deeper understanding of the effects of these variables. Future work could also 
examine how perceived self-in-group prototypicality may differ due to a range of other 
factors. For example, the social curse literature suggests that not all social group 
memberships are positively related to well-being. Therefore, examining the effects of 
negative valenced groups on prototypicality may possibly assist us to determine the SIA 
processes involved. Of course the role of prototypicality could also be examined in 
situations where schisms in groups form (Sani & Reicher, 1988) for, where group 
norms and values are changing in a fundamental manner we may also expect perceived 
self-in-group prototypicality to be involved. In addition, longitudinal research may also 
allow fuller exploration of causality (to some extent) and prototypicality judgments as 
they change over time. Future work which examines the social identity analysis of 
psychological well-being should aim to more fully elucidate the role that prototypicality 
plays in any one of the above processes. In particular, future studies which consider 
whether prototypicality is an antecedent of social identification, or whether social 
support is an antecedent to prototypicality and identification, via path analysis, would 
be beneficial to understand the causal relationships between these variables and 
psychological well-being. Unfortunately the current work could not examine all these 
factors, however, I recognise there is a need for future work to do so. However, the 
current thesis does provide an important first step towards this and has provided an 
important contribution to the social identity analysis of psychological well-being.  
 
Conclusion 
The current thesis provides evidence that applying a social identity analysis to the 
examination of social factors in psychological well-being is indeed valuable. Results 
from five studies provided support for all empirical hypotheses. It was demonstrated 
that not only is social identification positively associated with psychological well-being 
across a variety of outcome measures, but these effects were either enhanced or enabled 
to be seen when people also saw themselves as relatively highly in-group prototypical. 
Surprisingly, the findings also demonstrated that higher prototypicality also enhanced 
the negative implications of low identification on psychological well-being on a number 
of outcome measures. The effects of relative perceived self-in-group prototypicality do 
not seem to emerge independently of social identification but, instead, were predicated 
                                                                  PROTOTYPICALITY & PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL-BEING 
 
 
220 
upon and facilitate the effects of social identification. Not only is identifying strongly 
with a salient psychological (and positively valenced) group beneficial to our 
psychological well-being, but seeing ourselves as relatively prototypical is even more 
protective. The social identity analysis of psychological well-being employed in the 
current thesis both supports and extends current knowledge about the importance of 
social factors in the biopsychosocial model of psychological well-being. This work also 
has profound implications for how these social factors are conceived in clinical and 
societal level interventions which aim to enhance people’s psychological well-being.
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